

















Violent or Nonviolent Means to Political Ends: 
What Accounts for Variation in Tactics Among 




















Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 


























































Adriana Lins de Albuquerque 







Violent or Nonviolent Means to Political Ends: 
What Accounts for Variation in Tactics Among 
Dissident Organizations Targeting Domestic Governments? 
 
Adriana Lins de Albuquerque 
 
What determines whether organizations with maximalist demands - those calling for regime change 
and increased political self-determination - employ violent or nonviolent tactics to make their 
governments acquiesce in political demands? More specifically, why do some organizations employ 
strikes and demonstrations whereas others employ guerrilla warfare/conventional warfare, and 
others still terrorist tactics, against their governments? 
 I infer from bargaining theory that rational organizations should prefer to use nonviolent means of 
contestation to resolve conflicts of interests with target regimes because it is generally less costly than 
employing violent tactics. When nonviolent protest cannot be employed due to fear of lethal government 
repression, inability to mobilize enough participants to pose a military challenge, or inability to solve the 
information problem using nonviolent tactics, organizations are either deterred from using any tactic at all or 
they employ violent tactics.  
 Whether they do the former or the latter, and which type of violent tactic they employ depends on 
organizations’ ability to mobilize supporters to participate in contention, which in turn depends on popular 
satisfaction with the status quo.  
 I argue that organizations’ choice of tactics depends on two key factors: 1) Anticipated repression of 
nonviolent protest; and 2) Popular satisfaction with the status quo. I refer to this theory as mobilization 
theory. 
  I evaluate the empirical support for this theory as well as the predominant theory in the existing 
literature, opportunity structure theory, by using statistics to analyze organizational choice of tactics in nine 
high state capacity countries in the Middle East and North Africa from 1980-2004 and 37 low state capacity 
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“The difference is not like the difference between prayer and dynamite.  
Political violence, like political nonviolence, usually has as its purpose  
making someone do something or not do something or stop doing something.” 
  





Chapter  1 
Variat ion in Violent  and Nonvio lent  Tact i cs  and Why i t  Matters  
 
1. Introduct ion and Research Quest ion 
During April 2014 the New York Times featured news reports on dissidents using demonstrations in 
Taiwan (Ramzy 2014), Venezuela (Burnett and Newman 2014), and Ukraine (Higgins and Kramer, 
2014); guerrilla/conventional warfare1 tactics in Syria (Barnard 2014), Central African Republic 
(Sengupta 2014) and South Sudan (Fortin 2014); and terrorist2 tactics in Afghanistan (Ahmed and 
Kakar 2014), Nigeria (Nossiter 2014), and Pakistan (Walsh 2014), to target their governments.  
As made clear by these events, dissident organizations seeking to coerce governments have 
various tactics beyond conventional politics to choose from.  
 Despite the stark differences between violent and nonviolent tactics, all are means to similar 
ends, namely making governments give in to political demands. If nonviolent, 
                                                
1 I do not consider guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare the same although I treat them as such in this 
dissertation.  Doing so is unfortunate, but impossible to avoid, since I cannot differentiate between them 
empirically in the quantitative data I use to analyze the research question. I discuss this issue in more detail in 
chapter 6.  
 
2 Terrorism is defined as indiscriminate violence used to randomly target governments’ civilian constituencies; 
attacks take place in public spaces; entail use of explosive devices; and are meant coerce governments rather 
than civilians. This definition is very reminiscent to Stanton’s (2009) “coercion strategy.” I define all tactics of 





guerrilla/conventional, and terrorist tactics are all tools that domestic dissident organizations (from 
hereon organizations) use strategically to make governments acquiesce in political demands, what 
determines which tactic they use? 
 Obtaining an answer to this question is a matter of urgency. Understanding what factors 
determine organizations’ choice between these tactics is crucial to informing international policy 
efforts aimed at: 1) Preventing organizations from radicalizing; 2) Preventing the outbreak of 
domestic armed conflict; and 3) Formulating effective counter-terrorism policy.  
  Despite various explanations suggested in the literature, we have surprisingly little systematic 
insight into what accounts for variation in organizations’ choice of violent versus nonviolent tactics.  
 In an effort to contribute to greater understanding of this empirical puzzle for the purposes of 
informing policy and addressing the lacuna in the literature, this dissertation asks the following 
research question: What determines whether organizations with maximalist demands - those calling 
for regime change and increased political self-determination - employ violent or nonviolent tactics to 
make governments acquiesce in political demands? More specifically, why do some organizations use 
nonviolent tactics, whereas others employ guerrilla/conventional warfare, or terrorist tactics, to do 
so?  
 
2. Why the Answer Is  Not Obvious 
The argument that “nonviolent resistance is a practical mode of strife only when the government 
allows it to take place…[and is]... absolutely useless in repressive regimes determined to remain in 
power” (Merari 2007, 23) implies that organizations using nonviolent tactics in repressive regimes 
are not only foolhardy, but should also be few and far between. Yet, as will be shown below, 
organizations in repressive regimes frequently employ nonviolent tactics to obtain their objectives, 





 A brief look at the currently only publicly available dataset tracking variation in tactics among 
organizations representing ethnic group interests in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
from 1980-2004, the Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) dataset, suggests the 
answer to what determines organizations’ tactical choices is not straightforward.  
 There are four organizations representing Azerbaijani and Kurdish interests in Iran, all whose 
primary political objective is secession.  Only Komala and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (DPKI) - the 
two Kurdish organizations - used violence as their primary tactic to make their government 
acquiesce in political demands. Why?  
 That variation in tactics fell squarely along ethnic lines may suggest that the explanation be 
cultural: Is there something about being Kurdish that makes these organizations quicker to use 
violence than their Azerbaijani counterparts?  
 Variation in tactics among Kurdish organizations in Turkey seems to refute the notion that a 
shared culture determines the choice between violent and nonviolent tactics. Of four organizations 
with secessionist goals representing Kurdish minority interests in Turkey, only one - the Partiya 
Karkari Kurdistan (PKK) - employs violence as its primary tactic. The remaining organizations have 
instead chosen to work within the political system, or alternatively, use nonviolent tactics. 
 That three out of four Kurdish organizations in Turkey employ nonviolent tactics is perhaps 
not surprising given that the country is a democracy, a regime type that typically not only encourages 
nonviolent protest, but also offers institutional avenues through which minority groups can express 
their political demands. But if democracy encourages nonviolent tactics, why do so many 
organizations in Israel, the bastion of democracy in the Middle East, frequently employ violent 





Let us assume for now that Israel is an outlier – an assumption that will be relaxed later on –
and that democracy influence organizations to use nonviolent tactics. Is there also a causal 
relationship between autocracy and organizations’ propensity to employ violent tactics?  
 Such an argument is challenged by MAROB data. None of the eight organizations 
representing ethnic group interest in Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Bahrain – some of the most autocratic 
MENA countries – used violent tactics during 1980-2004, relying instead on nonviolent tactics.   
 Perhaps the reason why none of these organizations use violent tactics is because highly 
autocratic regimes also tend to be the most repressive? State repression can be used to both deter 
collective action and crack down on organizations seeking to challenge the political status quo.  
If organizations are deterred from using violence in repressive regimes, why are they not also 
deterred from using nonviolent tactics such as demonstrations, given that this tactic is often illegal 
and leaves organizations highly exposed in case of a violent state crackdown?  
 Clearly, variation in organizations’ choice of tactics surveyed above is much more complex 
than outlined here. Nevertheless, these different accounts serve as a useful reminder that the answer 
to the research question is far from obvious.  
 
3. Why Care About the Answer? Relevance to Pol i cy  and Academic Literature  
Policy Relevance 
Understanding what determines organizations’ choice of tactics is crucial for the purposes of 
informing policy aimed at preventing organizations from radicalizing, preventing the outbreak of 
domestic armed conflict, and countering terrorism. 
To prevent radicalization of organizations, one needs to comprehend when and why they 
opt for violent over nonviolent tactics. This requires analyzing why, among organizations with 





Preventing the outbreak of domestic armed conflict requires a better understanding of why 
certain conflicts of interests between organizations and governments are resolved peacefully, while 
others escalate to violence. Obtaining such knowledge necessitates figuring out why some 
organizations seek to obtain their political objectives by using nonviolent tactics, whereas others see 
the need to employ either guerrilla/conventional warfare or terrorist tactics.  
Finally, developing effective counter-terrorism strategies aimed at preventing organizations 
from adopting this tactic requires understanding why organizations opt for this tactic as opposed to 
alternatives. To do so, we need to analytically compare organizations that use terrorism to those 
using other tactics.  
 
Relevance to the Literature in Political Science  
Despite this research question addressing some of the most urgent issues in security studies, there 
are few published large-N studies explaining what accounts for variation in organizations’ choice of 
tactics3 (exceptions include Asal et al. 2013; Gallagher Cunningham 2013). This is not for lack of 
scholarly interest: There is a wealth of separate literatures devoted to the study of terrorism, guerrilla 
warfare and nonviolent protest. Yet, the general trend within academia has been to study violent and 
nonviolent organizations separately.  
 The majority of scholarship in security studies and civil war only addresses why some 
organizations use violent tactics as opposed to no tactic at all (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Fearon and 
Laitin 2003; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Walter and Kydd 2006); why they use different violent 
tactics (Bloom 2007; Horowitz 2010; Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Kalyvas 1999, 2006; Kalyvas 
and Balcell 2010; Pape 2005; Stanton 2009, Valentino et al. 2004); and have less to say about when 
                                                
3 The dependent variable in Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) foundational study is the success rate of violent 





organizations employ nonviolent tactics versus guerrilla/conventional warfare or terrorist tactics.   
 Although important exceptions exists (Della Porta 1995; Della Porta and Tarrow 1986; 
DeNardo 1985; Lawrence 2010; Pearlman 2011; Sambanis and Zinn 2005; Tilly and Tarrow 2006),4 
the majority of the literature on nonviolent protest has few insights into what determines whether 
organizations opt for violence over nonviolence and vice versa (Ackerman and Duvall 2001; 
Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Chenoweth and Stephan 2010; Erickson Nepstad 2011; Schock 1973; 
Zunes et al. 1999).   
 Despite the literatures mentioned above all addressing organizations’ choice of tactics, there 
has been limited cross-disciplinary scholarly collaboration. Consequently, little effort has been 
devoted to consolidating and/or contrasting insights from each literature.  
 The richness of the scholarly work within each research program suggests a promising starting 
point from which to engage in some exploratory theory building. By doing exactly that, as well as 
testing subsequent hypotheses, this dissertation hopes to contribute to a more comprehensive 
understanding of what accounts for variation in organizations’ choice between nonviolent protest, 
guerrilla/conventional warfare and terrorist tactics.   
 I also seek to build on the literature applying bargaining theory to intra-state conflict by 
incorporating the role of nonviolent tactics into the existing theoretical framework in ways that have 
not previously been done. I suggest bargaining theory provides a theoretical framework better able 
to incorporate how organizational and governmental strategies are interactive and anticipatory, and 
how this influences choice of tactics, than structural arguments represented in the literature.  
 The majority of bargaining theory scholarship on civil war focuses on understanding how 
bargaining obstacles influence the ability to reach a negotiated settlement capable of ending 
                                                
4 Only Sambanis and Zinn (2005) employ large-N analysis to address the research question. This manuscript 





domestic conflicts that have already turned violent. Considerably less work has analyzed, as opposed 
to just theorized, under what conditions conflicts turn violent versus are resolved in peacetime.5 
 A crucial exception is Walter’s (2006, 2009) work. Numerous insights from these studies are 
relevant to understanding what explains variation in organizations’ choice of tactics. By using this 
theoretical framework as a lens to addressing the research question, this dissertation aspires to 
provide insights structural arguments alone cannot, while also contributing to an understudied 
aspect of bargaining theory. 
 Doing so does not mean that I believe structural factors are irrelevant to explaining variation 
in organizations’ choice of tactics. I merely suggest that approaching the research question through 
the lens of bargaining theory enables us to better understand the effect of structure and agency in 
organizations’ tactical choices in a more holistic fashion.    
   
4. Argument in Brie f  
Bargaining theory suggests a partial answer to the research question, namely why organizations use 
violent tactics. Following the logic of bargaining theory, organizations opt for violent tactics when 
bargaining obstacles make it impossible to reach a negotiated settlement in peacetime. Knowing this 
allows me to theorize about when, and why, organizations are more or less likely to employ violent 
tactics, thus providing insights into what determines organizations’ choice of tactics. 
 I posit that organizations have a bias toward using nonviolent tactics and against violent 
tactics because using nonviolent tactics is generally less costly than using force (Fearon 1995), and 
because it allows organizations to overcome impediments to initiating bargaining in peacetime as 
well as ameliorates the information problem inherent in bargaining.  
                                                





By using nonviolent tactics, especially demonstrations, organizations can make implicit 
compellent threats to use violent tactics in peacetime without the same risk of being the target of a 
government crackdown. In addition, implicit compellent threats using nonviolent tactics allows 
governments a more face saving way to initiate bargaining, and potentially acquiesce in political 
demands, than do explicit compellent threats.  
Finally, by signaling latent military capability and resolve, and making the implicit threat to 
use violence credible partly through the compellent technique of brinkmanship, nonviolent tactics, 
and in particular demonstrations, can be used to ameliorate the information problem, thereby 
increasing the chances of successful conflict resolution in peacetime. 
 Fear of lethal government repression of nonviolent protest, failure to mobilize enough 
participants, or inability to solve the information problem using nonviolent protest, are reasons why 
organizations nevertheless opt for violent over nonviolent tactics.  
When nonviolent protest cannot safely be employed due to lethal government repression, 
organizations are either deterred from using any tactics or they employ violent tactics. Whether they 
do the former or the latter, and which type of violent tactic they employ, depends on organizations’ 
ability to mobilize supporters, which in turn depends on popular satisfaction with the status quo.  
In short, I argue that organizations’ choice of tactics depends on two key factors, namely the 
level of 1) Anticipated repression of nonviolent protest; and 2) Popular satisfaction with the status 
quo. I refer to this theoretical framework as mobilization theory.  
This dissertation evaluates the empirical support for this theory and the predominant 
explanation in the existing literature, opportunity structure theory. 6 
 
                                                
6 The core thesis of opportunity structure theory is that organizations employ different tactics depending on 
when conditions for doing so are opportune. I discuss the logic of opportunity structure theory in more detail 





5. Findings  
I find that the level of popular satisfaction with the status quo, the level of anticipated repression of 
nonviolent protest, and regime type, largely determine whether organizations employ nonviolent, 
guerrilla/conventional warfare, or terrorist tactics.  
Results suggest that organizations active in political environments characterized by low 
popular satisfaction with the status quo and high anticipated repression of nonviolent protest are 
more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics. Those operating in environments 
characterized by low repression of nonviolent protest, regardless of the accompanying level of 
popular satisfaction with the status quo, are more prone to using nonviolent tactics.  
Organizations are also more likely to use nonviolent tactics and terrorism in democracies, 
and more likely to abstain from using any of these tactics in high state capacity autocracies.  
These findings are, however, limited in scope to high state capacity MENA countries. The 
two theories are largely unable to account for what determines organizations’ tactical choices in low 
state capacity African countries.  
Three more general findings emerge from the statistical analyses: 1) Surprisingly, whereas 
organizations in high state capacity MENA democracies are more prone to employing nonviolent 
and terrorist tactics, organizations in low state capacity African democracies are not. This suggests 
organizations’ propensity to use nonviolent and terrorist tactics differ depending on whether they 
are active in high state capacity MENA or low state capacity African democracies; 2) Contrary to 
what is implicitly assumed in the civil war literature, organizations in anocracies are not more prone 
to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics; and 3) Perhaps counter-intuitively, organizations 
with small constituencies are not more prone to employing terrorist tactics. This suggests that 
terrorism may not actually be the default tactic of the weak, at least in terms of latent military 





6. What This Disser tat ion Does and Does Not Do 
The research question can be approached at different levels of analysis. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, I treat organizations as rational unitary actors (Crenshaw 1990).7 
 Because the unit of analysis is already established organizations, I do not address how 
constituencies with political grievances overcome the collective action problem inherent in 
organizing (Olson 1965).8 I do consider, however, the extent to which organizations can mobilize 
members of their constituencies to take a more active role in using different tactics, and how 
anticipation of their ability to do so influences choice of tactics.  
 For the purposes of this project, I assume that the factors that determine organizations’ 
initial choice of tactic also determine potential changes in tactics over time. 
 Finally, I do not analyze what accounts for variation in tactics among popular masses that 
are not formally organized, or under what circumstances the various tactics of interest succeed in 
obtaining political objectives.  
 
7. Disser tat ion Outl ine 
The dissertation consists of nine chapters. 
 Chapter 2 examines the dependent variable - organizations’ choice of tactic - by 
documenting broad patterns in organizations’ tactical choices across countries covered in the two 
datasets I use for my statistical analysis. The first dataset tracks variation in tactics among 
                                                
7 This means that I do not consider psychological explanations exploring the role of individual leaders or 
members of the organization in deciding when to employ different tactics. These aspects are clearly relevant 
to our greater understanding of why certain organizations use violent versus nonviolent tactics.  However, it 
is beyond the scope of my research to assess the validity of possible theoretical explanations at different levels 
of analysis along with the ones I consider here. 
 






organizations representing ethnic group interests in nine countries in MENA from 1980-2004, and 
the second dataset covers variation in tactics among organizations across 37 African countries from 
1990-2010. The reason for this regional focus is that I only have quantitative data on organizations’ 
use of tactics across time for these regions and periods.  
 The chapter continues by reviewing various alternative explanations and presenting testable 
hypotheses that can be derived from the predominant existing theoretical framework, namely 
opportunity structure theory. I conclude by defining important concepts, making explicit theoretical 
assumptions, and discussing and justifying my research design.    
 Chapters 3 and 4 feature two theory-generating case studies from the same regions as the 
datasets I employ for statistical analysis. Chapter 3 seeks to explain variation in tactical choice among 
Islamist organizations in Algeria from 1962-1997. Chapter 4 analyzes the same variation among 
organizations in the South African anti-apartheid movement from 1912-1992. 
 These case studies allow me to derive three insights: 1) Organizations tend to generally have 
a bias toward nonviolent tactics and against violent tactics, even when nonviolent protest is likely to 
be met by government violence; 2) Organizations in repressive regimes employ nonviolent tactics 
when they believe they can mobilize a significant number of people; and 3) Organizations employ 
guerrilla/conventional warfare when they believe themselves able to mobilize a significant number 
of people, and when nonviolent tactics are likely to be met with lethal government force. 
These insights, in combination with insights from bargaining theory, form the foundation of 
what I refer to as mobilization theory, the logic and testable hypotheses of which I present in 
Chapter 5.  
Chapter 6 discusses the empirical strategy employed for the statistical analyses, describes the 
datasets, explains how dependent and independent variables are conceptualized and coded, and 





The MENA dataset includes 53 organizations with maximalist political demands 
representing ethnic groups across nine countries - Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, 
Morocco, Syria, and Turkey - from 1980-2004.  
The new contestation in Africa dataset is, at time of writing, to my knowledge the most 
extensive of its kind. It tracks variation in tactics among 167 organizations with maximalist political 
demands across 37 African countries from 1990-2010.  
 Chapter 7 features the first of two statistical chapters devoted to testing mobilization and 
opportunity structure theory. The statistical analysis proceeds in two stages. The primary MENA 
analysis (MENA 1) uses more precise proxies for mobilization theory’s key independent variables. 
The secondary MENA analysis (MENA 2) uses more generalizable proxies for these explanatory 
variables.  
Chapter 8 seeks to ascertain whether the statistical findings of the MENA 2 analysis translate 
to a broader set of organizations and to another region, namely Africa. I begin by discussing the 
Africa results, and conclude by examining how the Africa and MENA 2 findings compare to each 
other.   
 The final chapter discusses the findings, their implications to policy and theory, as well as 
potential limitations to the study. I conclude by proposing various future research projects suggested 

















Chapter  2   
 
The Lay o f  the Land: Summary Stat is t i c s ,  Literature Review, and Research Design 
 
1.  Introduct ion and Chapter  Outl ine 
This chapter provides the backdrop against which I analyze the research question, and is divided 
into three sections. I begin by examining the dependent variable - organizations’ choice of tactics - 
by documenting broad trends in tactical choice among organizations with maximalist political 
objectives, as described in the datasets I use for statistical analysis. 
 The first dataset looks at variation in tactics among organizations with maximalist political 
grievances representing ethnic groups in nine MENA countries from 1980-2004. The second dataset 
tracks variation in tactics among organizations with maximalist political grievances in 37 African 
countries from 1990-2010.  
 Second, I review and discuss four possible explanations represented in the literature and their 
limitations; 1) Repression; 2) Culture; 3) Relative Deprivation; and 4) Opportunity Structure. I 
conclude that opportunity structure theory is the most persuasive explanation and proceed to 
present its testable hypotheses. I conclude by describing and justifying the research design adopted 







2. Empir i cs  
Trends across Time 
The following discussion of summary statistics illustrates variation in the dependent variable across 
region and time for the purposes of justifying that there is indeed an empirical puzzle that warrants 
the research effort undertaken here. It also serves to highlight differences in propensity to employ 
tactics among organizations across regions and with disparate maximalist political objectives.  
 Since the overall number of organizations changes over time, one has to be careful not to 
read too much into these summary statistics. Given lack of alternatives, however, they are 
nevertheless the best statistics capable of demonstrating trends over time. 
Graph 1 shows the number of organizations representing ethnic groups using nonviolent, 
guerrilla/conventional warfare, and terrorist tactics, respectively, in nine MENA countries from 
1980-2004.  
 Despite a slump from 1980-1986, there has generally been a steady increase in organizations 
representing ethnic groups using nonviolent tactics. The decline in organizations using nonviolent 
tactics during the early 1980s is surprising; I would expect organizations to be more prone to using 
this tactic given its successful employment in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. 
 Following the end of the Cold War the number of organizations representing ethnic groups 
employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics declined significantly. This is somewhat surprising, 
given that the overall number of civil wars increased immediately following the Cold War.  
 Organizations’ use of terrorist tactics appears to be more or less constant from 1980-2004, 
with no more than three organizations employing the tactic at any given time. Overall, only a very 








Graph 1. Trends across Time: Variation in Tactics, MENA  
  
 Graph 2 depicts the number of organizations using nonviolent, guerrilla/conventional and 
terrorist tactics across 37 African countries from 1990-2010. 
 The graph shows that the majority of African organizations from 1990-2009 employed 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics. No significant decline in propensity to employ this tactic 
followed the end of the Cold War, as was the case among organizations in the MENA dataset.  
 The number of organizations employing terrorist tactics has been fairly constant across time, 
with the number of organizations using this tactic never exceeding three in any given year in the 
dataset. The trend as the dataset is ending shows a decline in the number of organizations using 
terrorism, with no organizations doing so in 2009-2010. 
 The number of organizations using nonviolent tactics never exceeded five from 1994-2004. 
These are incredibly low numbers given that they represent organizations in 37 African countries. 
Although the number of organizations using nonviolent tactics increased from 2004 onwards, it 
remains a not very frequently employed tactic regionally among organizations with maximalist 
































































































  Source: MENA dataset 





Graph 2. Trends across Time: Variation in Tactics, Africa  
 
 
Tactics across Time 
With regards to organizations’ choice of tactics across time, more than half of all African 
organizations use only violent tactics, 42% use only nonviolent tactics, and a mere 5% use both 
nonviolent and violent tactics, as shown in graph 3. Judging from graph 4, this is quite different 
from MENA organizations, where 23% of organizations use only violent tactics, 29% use only 
nonviolent tactics, 24% use both violent and nonviolent tactics, and 24% use none of these tactics. 
 These numbers may be somewhat misleading, however, since organizations that do not use 
any tactics during their presence in the dataset are included in the MENA, but not the Africa dataset. 
Nevertheless, it seems clear that African organizations are much more prone to employing 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics than MENA ones.  
 These numbers also come with a big caveat. As the datasets reflect mere snapshots in time, 
they do not provide information about organizations’ activity since inception, making me unable to 





















































































Source: Africa dataset 





Graph 3. Organizational Tactics across Time, Africa 
 
Graph 4. Organizational Tactics across Time, MENA 
 
 
 Another interesting regional difference across the datasets is the percentage of organizations 
seeking to achieve regime change versus political self-determination.9 Graph 5 tells us that whereas 
89% of African organizations are calling for regime change and 11% for political self-determination, 
the MENA counterpart is 29% and 71%, as seen in graph 6.  
 The high number of organizations calling for self-determination in MENA is probably a 
function of the dataset containing only organizations representing ethnic groups, as these may be 
more prone to demanding political self-determination for reasons related to nationalism.  
                                                
9 Although it is possible to view calls for political self-determination as calls for regime change, I consider 
them different on the basis that demands for political self-determination usually entail calls for political 
autonomy that does not mean replacing the current government.  
53%	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5%	  
Source: Africa dataset 
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Graph 5. Issue Area, Africa 
 
Graph 6. Issue Area, MENA 
 
 
Graph 7 shows that African organizations calling for regime change are about as likely to 
employ violent as nonviolent tactics. The pattern is similar in MENA, as seen in graph 8, although 




























Graph 7. Tactics if Demands Entail Regime Change, Africa 
 
Graph 8. Tactics if Demands Entail Regime Change, MENA 
 
 
African organizations calling for self-determination are especially prone to employing violent 
tactics (78%), as shown in graph 9.  In contrast, MENA organizations use violent tactics only 19% 










Source: Africa dataset 
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Graph 9. Tactics if Demands Entail Political Self-Determination, Africa 
 
Graph 10. Tactics if Demands Entail Political Self-Determination, MENA 
 
 
3. Possible  Explanat ions Suggested in The Literature  
 Four overarching categories of explanations can be identified within the literatures on contentious 
politics/social movements, civil war, guerrilla warfare and terrorism: 1) Repression; 2) Culture;  
3) Relative Deprivation; and 4) Opportunity Structure. The following section reviews and discusses 
the limitations of each. I conclude that opportunity structure, despite its flaws, is the most persuasive 




















Potential Explanation I: Repression 
Numerous explanations in the literature refer to repression as a key explanatory variable capable of 
explaining variation in organizations’ choice of tactics. How repression matters depends on which of 
two strands of the literature is referred to. Both focus on the effect of repression on organizations 
employing nonviolent tactics. 
 The first strand argues that repression of nonviolent tactics makes organizations reassess the 
efficacy of this tactic, causing them to substitute for violent tactics (Gurr 2000; Lichbach 1987; 
Moore 1998, 2000; Pierskalla 2009; Sambanis and Zinn 2005.) 
 
H1 (Efficacy and Substitution): Repression of nonviolent protest causes organizations to reassess the  
      efficacy of this tactic and escalate to violent tactics.  
 
 The second strand focuses on how repression of nonviolent protest or leadership 
decapitation fragments organizations, which in turn creates structural incentives for them to employ 
violent tactics (Della Porta and Tarrow 1986; Lawrence 2010; Pearlman 2012).  
These smaller factions are believed to be more predisposed to violent tactics because they;  
1) No longer have to moderate their views to accommodate the majority of participants, resulting in 
organizations becoming more radical and more disposed to violence; 2) Due to their size are unable 
to employ nonviolent tactics effectively; and 3) Are more likely to engage in outbidding.  
 
H2 (Splintering): Repression and leader decapitation causes organizations to splinter, and splinters to use  
                              violent tactics.   
 
H3 (Outbidding): Organizations are more likely to use violent than nonviolent tactics when there are  









Limitations of Explanations Emphasizing Repression 
There are four main drawbacks to these explanations. 
First, neither explanation states the reason why organizations use nonviolent tactics/   
Second, neither explanation explains why repression of nonviolent protest sometimes causes 
organizations to escalate to violent tactics, while it at other times deters organizations from engaging 
in contestation completely.10  As summarized by Davenport  
“There have never been any analyses of the conditions under which governments effectively 
eliminate or reduce dissent; there have only been empirical investigations that reveal that 
occasionally repression increases and/or decreases the activity of state challengers (i.e., that 
state coercive efforts are respectively ineffective and/or effective). Whether repression is 
more or less likely to reduce proto-insurgency or any other form of dissident activity, and if 
so under what conditions, are open empirical questions.” (2007, 210): 
 
Third, arguments emphasizing how repression of nonviolent protest causes organizations to 
update their beliefs about the efficacy of this tactic, and escalate to violent tactics, fail to explain why 
organizations cannot anticipate the level of repression nonviolent tactics will meet in advance, and 
adjust accordingly, prior to becoming targets of government violence.  
 Third, arguments suggesting that organizational splintering cause organizations to become 
more prone to radical agendas and violent tactics seem to forget that all organizations start off small, 
yet only a minority of them adopts violent tactics.  
 Despite these critiques, I will nevertheless center my South African theory generating case 





                                                
10 Della Porta and Tarrow (1986) come close by arguing that repression both deters participants that are 





Potential Explanation II: Culture 
Explanations proposing that culture (Geertz 1977) and history (Tilly and Tarrow 2006) are key to 
explaining organizations’ choice of tactics come in two flavors: monadic or dyadic. Monadic 
explanations argue that tactical choice is a result of ethnic group ancestry or nationality, whereas 
dyadic explanations posit that tactics can be predicted based on the extent to which cultural 
identities of organizations and governments differ.  
 
Culture: Monadic Explanations 
Monadic cultural explanations suggest that organizations’ tactics are “inherited” (Tilly and Tarrow 
2006, 4), and “recurrent, historically embedded characters of contentious politics ...[sic]...” that 
“draw[sic] on a long history of previous struggles” (Ibid., 17). They propose that organizations’ 
choice of tactics is constrained by cultural norms embedded in either ethnic or national identities 
(Ibid.). This is reminiscent of the concept strategic culture (Johnston 1995, 1998; Snyder 1991).  
 Strategic culture refers to the notion that there are “beliefs, attitudes, and habits pertaining to 
the use of force that are distinctive, enduring and shared within a group”(Snyder 2010, 1). Early 
work on strategic culture considered it a national characteristic applicable to both governments and 
citizens of particular nation-states (Gray 1999; Johnston 1998). 
 Scholars arguing in this vein propose that strategic culture causes organizational choice of 
tactics primarily by conscribing the range of tactical options available (Johnston 1995). The primary 
function of strategic culture is to assist in decreasing analytical complexity by suggesting culturally 
appropriate “standard operating procedures” (Snyder 2010, 4).  Tilly and Tarrow refer to this 
culturally conscribed range of tactical choices as repertoires of contention (2006, 11).  
Arguments about strategic culture generally assume that overarching beliefs about the 





Limitations of Monadic Cultural Explanations 
Monadic cultural explanations fail to address why, given the dangers involved for generally much 
weaker organizations in challenging governments, organizations pick tactics more or less by default, 
without considering whether they can employ them successfully or not. This suggests that 
organizations lack the ability to be pragmatic. 
The concept of repertoires of contention partly addresses this critique since it explains that 
organizations have various tactical options available to them. But it does not specify the tactics 
included within the repertoire, or how such repertoires vary across cultures. Nor does the concept 
tell us how organizations decide which tactic within their repertoire to use.  
If repertoires of contention can include tactics such as demonstrations, strikes, 
guerrilla/conventional warfare, and terrorism, but does not tell us what determines when and why 
one can expect each tactic to be employed, it is unclear it can be helpful in answering the research 
question.  
 Although monadic cultural arguments do not provide specific predictions about 
organizations’ use of tactics, they could potentially explain statistical findings suggesting that 
organizations in different regions have disparate propensities to employ diverse tactics.  I return to 
exploring this possibility when discussing the comparative results from the MENA 2 versus Africa 
analysis. 
 
Culture: Dyadic Explanations 
Dyadic cultural explanations suggest that choice of tactics is better explained by differences in 
cultural identities between organizations and governments. Actors sharing similar cultural traits are 





2006), whereas cultural dyadic differences makes it more likely that parties employ violent tactics to 
settle conflicts of interests (Huntington 1996).  
The core logic behind cultural dyadic arguments resonates with that of social identity theory 
(Brewer 2001; Brewer et al. 2007; Tajfel 1982). Social identity theory argues people divide into 
groups of individuals of similar descent.11 Intergroup behavior is determined by the extent to which 
these groups are culturally different. Consequently, “some relationships (those with groups socially 
recognized as similar) will be more cooperative than others (those with groups recognized as 
different) even if the same issue is at stake (such as territory, power, or status)” (Abdelal et al. 2006, 
699).  
Norms dictating what constitutes acceptable behavior are more likely to restrain choice of 
tactics when organizations target governments of similar cultural background than vice versa (Ibid.). 
This logic is echoed in Pape’s (2005) argument that suicide terrorism is more frequently employed by 
organizations targeting governments of different religious affinity. 
That cultural differences cause normative relativism also resonates with what we know about 
the evolution of laws of war. Historically, codified norms of restraint on the battlefield shared the 
common trait that they only applied to adversaries considered culturally similar, but not adversaries 
perceived as “others” (Ober 1994).  
Since cultural differences are suggested to determine the intensity of conflict between 
organizations and governments, organizational tactics chosen will correspond to what is considered 
normatively appropriate given the identity of the adversary: Nonviolent tactics will be used for 
limited conflicts with culturally similar governments; guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics will be 
the tactic of choice for more serious conflicts with more culturally different governments; and 
                                                
11 A desire to strengthen the bond within the “in-group” causes it to view itself as socially superior to groups 





terrorist tactics - the least normatively acceptable tactic– will only be employed against very culturally 
divergent governments.  
 
Limitations of Dyadic Cultural Explanations 
Even if we were to assume that cultural differences between organizations and governments make 
them more likely to have conflictual relationships, that does not explain the outbreak of violent 
conflict or the tactics they employ. Since cultural ancestry is a constant, interaction between actors 
with very different cultural affiliations should be as well. Yet, empirically, relationships between 
culturally different groups are almost always characterized by periods of both peaceful coexistence 
and violent conflict. Hence, cultural differences cannot explain the timing of different tactics being 
employed. This suggests that organizations have more agency over whether or when they use 
different tactics than dyadic cultural arguments seem to acknowledge.  
 Dyadic cultural explanations also do not adequately address alternative explanations for the 
formation and cohesion of identity. Nationalism scholarship suggests that the salience of ethnic and 
national identity varies depending on whether and when individuals and organizations believe they 
will benefit from invoking such affiliations (Hardin 2001; Posner 2004; Snyder 2000; Swindler 1986). 
Hence, culture serves as a “tool kit of arguments, metaphors, and operational techniques that 
strategic actors can draw upon creatively and selectively to accomplish their task” (Snyder 2010, 4).  
 In addition, a correlation between the degree of dyadic cultural differences and the intensity 
of conflict may not mean that the relationship is causal. What this correlation actually represents 
may be a governmental tendency to discriminate against particular ethnic or cultural groups as 
opposed to others as part of a divide-and-rule strategy.  
 This strategy was often employed by colonial powers as a means to prevent anti-colonial 





colonial powers gave preferential treatment to one ethnic group, most often a minority, while 
discriminating against others. By doing so, colonial powers created loyal allies in the ethnic group 
that received preferential treatment, while breeding animosity between the preferred group and 
those discriminated against.  
 Since this system stayed largely in place following de-colonization, it is possible that the 
relationship between cultural differences and organizations’ use of tactics is more accurately related 
to the extent to which ethnic groups represented by organizations are economically and politically 
discriminated against.  If so, it may be the level of discrimination that explains organizations’ tactical 
choices, rather than dyadic cultural differences.  
 
Potential Explanation III: Relative Depravation 
Relative deprivation arguments suggest that organizations’ propensity to using violent tactics is 
determined by the level of relative deprivation suffered by its constituents. Organizations whose 
constituents feel targeted by governmental discriminatory practices are more likely to use violent 
tactics (Gurr 1970; Horowitz 2001; Petersen 2002).  
 
Limitations of Relative Deprivation Explanations 
The main problem with relative deprivation arguments is that they fail to explain why, given the 
multitude of groups that are victims of severe governmental discrimination, only a select few use 
violent tactics (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). This is probably because government discrimination and 
repression go hand in hand, making collective action among discriminated groups difficult.  
 Indeed, even relative deprivation explanations suggesting that emotions such as jealousy or 
hatred are driving factors in explaining ethnic violence note that the timing of organizations 





opportune or not (Horowitz 2001; Petersen 2002).  
 
Potential Explanation IV: Opportunity Structure 
Explanations emphasizing opportunity structure persuasively argue that although political grievances 
may be a necessary condition for organizations using violence against governments, it is not a 
sufficient one. Pragmatic organizations will only challenge governments using violent tactics when 
conditions to do so are opportune (Fearon and Laitin 2003).12 More generally, the theory suggests 
organizations employ different tactics when conditions for doing so are favorable. 
 
Factors Influencing Opportunity Structure 
Regime type and state capacity are the independent variables most commonly referred to as explaining 
organizations’ choice of tactics, according to opportunity structure theory.  
 Some scholars suggest that organizations’ choice of tactics is partly determined by the 
openness of the political system. Democracies are generally believed to encourage organizations to 
either work within existing political institutions or use nonviolent tactics to bring about political 
change (Tilly and Tarrow 2006, 161). Conversely, when the political system is closed, organizations 
are driven towards using violent tactics (Ibid.).  
 Whether organizations employ violent tactics against governments in closed regimes depends 
on state strength. High state capacity autocracies often divert substantial funds and institutional 
capacity towards maintaining a repressive state apparatus, allowing them to prevent and deter 
                                                
12 Most opportunity structure arguments focus more on making predictions about the general character of 
political contestation in a country or what types of states are especially at risk of civil war (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Sambanis 2004) than predicting whether 
individual organizations will employ violent versus nonviolent tactics. Yet, much of the logic behind these 






collective action. High state capacity autocracies are therefore not only highly capable of deterring 
collective action, but also adept at cracking down on organizations that despite odds succeed in 
organizing and challenging the government (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Tilly and Tarrow 2006).  
 Organizations are unlikely to use violent tactics in both high state capacity democracies and 
autocracies, but for different reasons.  In high state capacity democracies, using violent tactics is less 
cost-effective than working within the political system or using nonviolent protest (Amenta 2010; 
Andrews 2000). In high state capacity autocracies, government repression makes collective action 
hard, and the odds of organizations successfully employing violent tactics low. 
 H1: Organizations are more likely to abstain from using any tactic in high state capacity autocracies 
Low state capacity democracies and autocracies are less able to provide public goods and otherwise 
rule effectively, something that is likely to translate into higher levels of popular dissent. An increase 
in popular grievances combined with a decrease in governments’ ability to repress makes 
organizational mobilization easier.  
 Organizations in low state capacity democracies are unlikely to use violent tactics for the same 
reasons as high state capacity democracies. Indeed, the prediction that organizations in democracies 
seldom rely on violent tactics resonates with there being a “democratic domestic peace” (Davenport 
2009, 10).   
 H2: Organizations are more likely to use nonviolent tactics in both high and low state capacity democracies 
  
 Having said that, organizations in democracies should also be more prone to employing 
terrorist tactics. This is because terrorism is more likely to succeed in democracies, on account of 
democratic governments being more sensitive to both civilian fatalities and popular calls for giving 
in to organizations to avoid further terrorist attacks (Pape 2005; Reiter and Stam 2002).13  
                                                






 H3: Organizations are more likely to employ terrorism in both high and low state capacity democracies 
 
 Low state capacity autocracies provide optimal conditions for organizations to challenge the 
government by force. Weak autocracies are less able to repress and deter collective action, thereby 
making mobilization and organization possible, while also having a decreased ability to withstand 
violent insurgent assaults (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Tilly and Tarrow 2006).14  
 Anocracies and rentier states are special types of regimes believed to have inherently weak 
bureaucracies, something that translates into low levels of state capacity (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; 
Fearon and Laitin 2003).15 Organizations in these types of regimes can also be expected to opt for 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.   
H4: Organizations are more likely to use guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics in low state capacity  
        autocracies, and in both low and high state capacity anocracies 
 
 H5: Organizations are more likely to use guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics in rentier states  
 Financial resources (McCarthy and Zald 1977) are likely to influence ability to pay for weapons 
needed to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Hence, 
organizations receiving foreign state financial support should be more likely to employ this tactic.16 
H6: Organizations receiving foreign state financial support are more likely to employ guerrilla/conventional     
        warfare tactics  
 
 
                                                
14 Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that regime type is irrelevant to whether organizations employ insurgency, 
and that what really matters is state strength and whether conditions are conducive to using guerrilla tactics.   
 
15 Organizations are also believed to be more likely to employ violent tactics against politically unstable target 
governments (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Tilly and Tarrow 2006). Newly formed states and states undergoing 
regime change (Fearon and Laitin 2003), and/or whose political elite are realigning (Tilly and Tarrow 2006) 
are examples of states that are politically unstable. 
 
16 Mountainous terrain is frequently referred to in the literature as a condition conducive to guerrilla warfare. 
The measure is not included in the analysis because the variable as constructed by Fearon and Laitin (2003) is 
problematic. The original article does not define what level of elevation should be considered enough to be 
referred to as mountainous. In an email conversation with James Fearon on April 3, 2013, he told me he was 
unsure there had ever been a definite cut-off. Without knowing what the definition of mountainous terrain is, 





The percentage of rural population is a factor that should influence organizations’ ability to 
mobilize participants for both violent and nonviolent tactics. Whereas guerrilla /conventional 
warfare tactics should benefit from higher levels of rural population (by making recruitment of 
farmers easier (Zedong 1961)), the opposite should be true of nonviolent tactics and terrorism.  
Demonstrations contesting governments usually take place in cities, suggesting recruitment 
occurs there as well.  Inflow of urban populations was relevant for mobilization purposes both for 
the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa during the latter part of the apartheid regime (Price 
1991) and for mobilization leading up to the 1979 Iranian Revolution of (Kurzman 2004).  
Targeting civilians using terrorist tactics should be easier in cities, since the population density 
there is higher than in rural areas.  
 
 H7: Organizations are more likely to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics at higher levels  
       of rural population, and more likely to employ nonviolent tactics or terrorism at lower levels of  
       rural population 
 
Table 1 summarizes the core hypotheses of opportunity structure theory.  
 
Table 1. Core Hypotheses 
Opportunity Structure 
































Limitations of Opportunity Structure Theory  
Although I believe opportunity structure theory to be the most persuasive explanation in the 
literature, it is not without some theoretical weaknesses.  
 The very factors that suggest to organizations that conditions are conducive to using violent 
tactics should also translate into increased organizational bargaining leverage (Walter 2009). In these 
situations, the chances of successful bargaining prior to organizations employing violent tactics 
should be especially high. In other words, opportune conditions for using coercive tactics should 
result in organizations being more able to resolve conflicts of interests diplomatically, without the 
need to use violent tactics.   
Having said that, bargaining theory also explains why, despite seemingly favorable bargaining 
conditions, organizations nevertheless may see the need to employing violent tactics (Fearon 1995).  
 
4. Research Design 
I combine both quantitative and qualitative research methods (Lieberman 2005) and implement my 
research in three steps.  
 I begin by conducting two theory-generating case studies. The first features variation in tactics 
among Islamist organizations in Algeria from independence to 1997. The second features variation 
in tactics among anti-apartheid organizations in South Africa from 1912 -1992. To structure these 
case studies, I center them around testing existing theoretical explanations, namely opportunity 
structure (Algeria) and repression (South Africa). 
 These case studies are methodologically appropriate for the purposes of generating theory for 
two reasons. First, both feature variation in tactics among several organizations within the same 
country and with the same political agenda. By holding constant both political demands and country 





Bennett 2005). Second, because the case studies correspond to the regions for which I have large-N 
quantitative data I can be more confident that the findings are generalizable to these regions.  
 I draw on key insights from the case studies, as well as bargaining theory, to inform what I 
refer to as mobilization theory.  
 I proceed to test the hypotheses of mobilization and opportunity structure theory using 
statistical methods. Large-N analysis is a powerful research tool allowing me to deal with 
informational complexity. Although this research method alone cannot prove causation (King et al. 
2001), it is effective at dismissing explanations that are not supported statistically as well as 
identifying potential explanations that, because they are statistically supported, may be causally valid 
as well. As such, it is a suitable tool for initial theory testing. 
 Two separate datasets are used for testing. The MENA dataset is a time-series cross-sectional 
dataset that tracks tactical choice among 53 organizations with maximalist political grievances 
representing ethnic group interests in nine high state capacity MENA countries from 1980-2004. 
The Africa dataset is a new time-series cross-sectional dataset featuring 167 organizations with 
maximalist political grievances across 37 low state capacity African countries from 1990-2010. 
Differences in the dataset allow me to draw on the comparative advantage of each.  
Since I have more information about organizational characteristics for the MENA dataset, I 
can test hypotheses related to such variables to a greater extent than I can with the Africa dataset.  
Because opportunity structure theory argues that organizational choice in tactics partly 
depends on the level of state capacity, I can only test hypotheses about high state capacity with the 
MENA dataset and those about low state capacity with the Africa dataset.  
I conduct two versions of the statistical analysis using the MENA dataset. The primary 
MENA analysis (MENA 1) features more precise proxies for the key independent variables of 





more generalizable, proxies. To be able to compare the findings of the MENA 2 and Africa analyses, 
I make the MENA 2 dataset as similar as possible to the Africa dataset. This entails excluding 
organizations that do not employ any tactic during their presence in the dataset.  
I then employ essentially the same regression model I used to analyze MENA 2 to explore 
the Africa data, using the same proxies for mobilization theory’s key explanatory variables. I 
conclude by comparing the findings of MENA 2 and Africa, in an effort to assess whether findings 
from the former is generalizable to another region and broader set of organizations.  
   
   

























Chapter  3  
Theory Generat ing Case Study I :  
Violence ,  Nonvio lence  and Is lamic Pol i t i ca l  Dissent  in Alger ia 1962-1997 
 
1.  Introduct ion and Main Analyt i ca l  Findings  
The 1992 Algerian civil war resulted in more than 100,000 people dead. This figure and the insight 
that civil wars are intrinsically hard to resolve once started (Walter 2009), begs the more general 
question: Why do some organizations use violence to achieve their political objectives, whereas 
others employ nonviolent tactics for the same purposes?  
 This exploratory case study of the evolution of organized political dissent in post- 
independence Algeria seeks to answer this question by analyzing what precipitated choice in tactics 
amongst eight Islamic organizations, namely Al Qiyam, Mouvement Islamique Armée (MIA), Takfir wa-
Hijra, Mouvement pour d’Etat Islamique (MEI), Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA), Front Islamique du Salut 
(FIS)/Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS), Al Nahda, and Hamas. 
 I draw three general conclusions from this study that I later use to inform theory building.  
First, organizations tend to generally have a bias towards nonviolent tactics and against violent 
tactics, even when nonviolent tactics are likely to be met by government violence. Second, 
organizations in repressive regimes employ nonviolent tactics when they believe they can mobilize a 





believe they can mobilize a significant number of people, and when nonviolent tactics are likely to 
be met with lethal government force. 
 
2. Guiding Theoret i ca l  Framework: Opportunity Structure Theory  
Although the main purpose of this case study is for theory generation, I structure the chapter around 
predictions made by opportunity structure theory.  
Opportunity structure theory can be tested using a one-country study with variation in 
tactics among organizations partly because Algeria experienced regime change during the period 
studied. It was a low state capacity17 autocracy18 from 1962-1990, upon which it became a low state 
capacity anocracy, only to return to becoming a low state capacity autocracy again in 1991.  
The theory predicts that organizations in low state capacity autocracies and anocracies are 
more likely to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics. As will be seen below, these predictions 
are largely unable to explain organizations’ choice of tactics in Algeria from 1962-1997. 
 
3. Chapter  Outl ine 
The chapter consists of five parts. I begin with four sections describing contestation and 
government-organization interaction chronologically, and corresponding to the following time 
periods: 1)1962-1978; 2)1979-1987; 3)1988-1991; and 4)1992-1997. I discuss contention among 
organizations active during each period, focusing in particular on explaining the rationale for tactical 
choices. Upon assessing whether opportunity structure theory can explain variation in tactics among 
                                                
17 A low state capacity state is one that has a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita that is less than $4,086. 
I return to discussing why I use this cut-off in more detail in chapter 5.  
 
18 I obtain information about regime type over time for Algeria from the PolityIV project 
[http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/alg2.htm], using the cut-offs for autocracy and anocracy that are 





these organizations, I conclude by discussing what general insights capable of informing theory 
building can be drawn from the analysis.  
 
4.Contestat ion 1962-1978: Al-Qyiam, Dawa wa Tabl igh,  Ansar Allah and Takfir  wa Hijra   
Co-optation and Repression 
The first Algerian post-independence constitution of 1963 established a single-party regime with a 
strong presidency. The national assembly was composed exclusively of members of the Front de 
Libération Nationale (FLN), and was a consultatory and largely powerless body. Composed of various 
factions from the civil war’s winning coalition, FNL was far from a coherent party. President 
Ahmed Ben Bella was able to exploit the post-independence honeymoon period of popular support 
for the first two years, during which he ruled without largely any contestation from civil society 
(Willis 1998, 101, 72). 
 The exception was Al Qyiam.19 Founded in 1964, it was the first Islamic organization to 
emerge in post-independence Algeria (Ibid., 41). Opposing the government’s socialist agenda and 
seeking to pressure it into taking Islamic values more into account (Ibid., 161), the organization soon 
became an important nexus for popular protest (Ibid., 41). 
Although Al Qiyam’s publications featured calls for the establishment of an Islamic state 
using rhetoric echoing the radical Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leader, Salim Qutb, - known for 
believing that an Islamic state could only be created using revolutionary measures (Ibid., 42) - the 
organization never challenged the government directly (Ibid., 43). Despite Al-Qiyam not using 
violent tactics,  “the association [could] be seen as a precursor of the later radical Islamist 
movements in that they believed that all political parties, leaders and regimes that are not based on 
Islam are dangerous and illegal” (Roberts 1988, 563). 
                                                





Since independence, Ben Bella had made his utmost mission to neutralize and remove his 
enemies from within FLN. Seeking to remove the army chief of staff, he eventually went to far, and 
inadvertently created the impetus for a coup, which took place on 19 June, 1965 (Willis 2012, 56-57).  
 Al Qiyam enjoyed benign neglect until 1965, largely as a result of political infighting within 
the government (Ibid.).  But the new president, Houari Boumedienne, felt that Al Qiyam threatened 
the government implicitly by questioning its religious legitimacy, and for its capacity to mobilize 
popular protests (Roberts 1988, 563; Willis 1998, 41, 43). The latter was especially significant since 
the Algerian government, like other rentier states,20 sought to take advantage of the current influx of 
petro-dollars to acquiesce the masses (Entelis in Martinez 2000, xi). Consequently, the government 
tried to undermine the organization by employing a “twin-pronged strategy of repression and 
incorporation” (Willis 1998, 47).  
 First, the government adopted the organizations’ Islamic rhetoric, in addition to some more 
peripherally Islamist features, to appeal to Al Qiyam’s constituency.  It then proceeded to ban its 
activities in 1966 and eventually the entire organization in 1970 (Shahin 1997, 116-117). By offering 
them positions within the government, Boumedienne co-opted Al-Qiyam members into staying 
quiescent about the banning.  
 Remaining parts of the organization split into two new organizations: Dawa wa Tabligh and 
Ansar Allah. Both came to have little political influence due to Ansar Allah being outlawed and 
Dawa wa Tabligh being largely apolitical (Willis 1998, 56). Although Takfir wa Hijra emerged in 
1974-1976 (Ibid.), it was largely dormant, resulting in their being little to no significant organized 
dissent in Algeria until the early 1980s (Ibid., 161).  
                                                
20 For more on the rentier state thesis see Beblawi and Luciani (1987) and Beblawi (1990). For a critique, see 





Despite Dawa wa Tabligh publicly seeking the “abolition of the socialist regime in all Muslim 
countries” (Ibid., 161) and the treaties of Takfir wa Hijra calling for the overthrow of the 
government (Ibid., 65), neither organization adopted violent tactics. Hence, no Islamist organization 
used violent tactics during this period (Willis 1998, 65.)   
 
Explaining Organizations’ Choice of Tactics: Opportunity Structure Theory and General Insights 
Contrary to predictions by opportunity structure theory that organizations in low state capacity 
autocracies and rentier states are more likely to use guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, Islamist 
organizations during this period used exclusively nonviolent tactics, or abstained from using any 
tactics at all. They did this despite at least one of them, Takfir wa Hijra, calling for the violent 
overthrow of the government.  
The government appears to have relied more upon co-optation than violent repression to 
handle organizational challenges to the status quo during this period.  Algerian contestation during 
1962-78 hence suggests that organizations have a bias towards using nonviolent tactics and against 
violent tactics as long as repression of nonviolent tactics is not too severe.  
 
5.  Contestat ion 1979-1987: MIA 
The end of the decade saw an increase in Islamic activism throughout the Muslim world. Although 
religion had increasingly taken over the role of Arab nationalism following the loss of the Six Days 
War with Israel in 1967 (Roberts 1988, 562), it was the latter part of the decade that spurred the 
resurgence of the Islamic movement. Many Muslims volunteered to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, 
and the Iranian Revolution of 1979 demonstrated the possibility of creating an Islamic state (Ibid., 





 Although these events were relevant in Algeria as well, the sudden death of President 
Boumedienne and his being replaced by Chadli Benjedid were more important to explaining the 
upsurge of Islamic activism (Ibid., 94). The combination of these regional developments and the 
ascendance of an initially weak president provided the political space needed for the Islamist 
movement to reemerge (Ibid., 578). 
 Islamist organizations began developing among the student population. These were allowed 
to function, and indeed encouraged to do so, by the president. The reason was not only because 
Benjedid had yet to assert himself politically (Ibid., 578), it also had a strategic rationale: Islamist 
organizations were seen as balancing the radical leftist and Berber student groups, which at the time 
were considered more dangerous (Willis 2012, 97).  
 Although Islamism spread within civil society, most of these groups were followings 
gathered around a leader, rather than formal organizations with a name. The exception to this rule 
was an organization formed in 1979 by Moustapha Boyali. The organization initially called itself the 
Group for the Defense of the Illicit, and would later become the Mouvement Islamique Armée (MIA).  Its 
political goal was the creation of an Islamic state (Willis 1998, 71). 
  The organization initially sought to coerce the government through nonviolent means. In 
1981, MIA unsuccessfully called on the Islamic movement to join it in a protest march calling for 
the creation of an Islamist state. Having failed to mobilize the broader Islamist community for the 
purpose of using nonviolent tactics, MIA escalated to guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics instead 
(Ibid., 72).  
 Despite MIA having similar goals as the greater Islamic movement, there was little to no 
support for its violent, or apparently nonviolent, methods (Burgat and Dowell 1993, 267). Upon 
hearing that MIA was going to use violent tactics, “several senior figures” within the movement used 





one scholar, this suggests “Boyali’s belief in the necessity and efficacy of armed struggle to install an 
Islamic state was not shared by most of the wider Islamic movement” (Willis 1988, 88). 
 Unrest among Islamist student groups prompted the government to crack down on MIA, 
despite the organization having yet to conduct any major armed operation. A substantial number of 
MIA members were arrested on charges that the organization was planning to target official 
structures and high-ranking personnel (Willis 1998, 73). Boyali escaped capture and hid abroad.  
He returned in 1984, when 92 jailed MIA members were released, to reconstitute the 
organization. MIA fought domestic security forces in the Algerian mountains from 1985 until 1987, 
when Boyali was killed. Nevertheless, the organization was to take on an increased importance when 
resurrected in 1992. 
  
Explaining Organizations’ Choice of Tactics: Opportunity Structure Theory and General Insights 
Why did MIA resort to violence? Some scholars argue the turn to violence was due to the “lack of 
any democratic channels to express frustrations and disenchantments with economic and social 
policies and cultural trends” (Ait-Hamadouce and Zoubir 2007, 106). This argument resonates with 
opportunity structure theory, which also correctly predicts that MIA use guerrilla/conventional 
warfare tactics.  
Although opportunity structure theory is technically correct in predicting MIA’s choice of 
tactics, the timing of the organization’s decision to use force suggests an alternative rationale: It was 
made following the failure to mobilize Islamic groups for the purposes of nonviolent contestation. 
This suggests MIA gave up on using nonviolent tactics because it could not recruit enough 
participants to use this tactic effectively. Lacking the numbers needed to successfully employ 





requiring fewer active participants. Had MIA been more successful at organizing nonviolent events, 
perhaps it would not have resorted to violence. 
Having said that, it is important to note that the majority of Islamic organizations were 
clearly not in favor of using violent tactics, preferring instead to stay inactive.  
This discussion suggests two insights. First, organizations tend to have a bias towards 
nonviolent tactics and against violent tactics, even when nonviolent tactics is likely to be met by 
violence. Second, organizations in repressive regimes only employ nonviolent tactics if they can 
mobilize enough people.  
 
6. Contestat ion 1988-1991: FIS, Al-Nahda, and Hamas  
The Algerian rentier state social contract started to crumble due to declining oil prices in the mid-
1980s, resulting in countrywide demonstrations and riots in October 1988 (Shahin 1997, 127).21  The 
government reacted harshly to the protests, declaring a state of emergency and calling in the army. 
Protests were violently suppressed and at least 500 civilians killed (Ibid., 128).  
Although the protest was not formally organized, the government blamed the Islamic 
movement and proceeded to crack down on it. The spontaneous mobilization and the military 
crackdown of October 1988 became the backdrop against which the next phase of Islamic organized 
dissent in Algeria developed.  
Realizing he had alienated the populace by allowing the army to use excessive force against 
protesters, Benjedid sought to redeem himself by liberalizing the political system. Political reforms 
set forth in the Constitution of 1989 hence allowed for the “formation of associations of political 
character” and multi-party elections (Willis 2012, 113). This was a radical break from the single-party 
                                                
21 For an analysis of how the rentier state strategy of controlling contestation failed in preventing the Iranian 





rule that had characterized post-independence Algerian politics. Over fifty political parties applied 
for recognition, among them Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) (Ibid.).  
 FIS, under the leadership of Abassi Madani and Ali Belhadj, was formed in February 1989 
for the purpose of becoming a political party. Focused primarily on criticizing the existing regime to 
appeal to as many voters as possible, FIS’ overarching goal was nevertheless creating an Islamic 
state.   
Since Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt all prohibited Islamist parties from obtaining legal 
recognition and the right to compete in multiparty elections (Willis 1998, 389), it was uncertain 
whether FIS would be allowed to become a political party (Willis 2012, 117). It was hence somewhat 
surprising when the government approved FIS’ application on 16 September 1989 (Ibid.,117).  
Benjedid’s reform and accepting FIS as a political party was not only a reaction to the riots, 
it also had a strategic rationale: Giving FIS the right to compete in elections was part of a divide-
and-rule strategy, with regards to both FLN and the larger Islamist movement. 
By allowing multi-party elections, Benjedid sought to undermine FLN, thereby strengthening 
the presidency. Doing so allowed him to distance himself from popular critique of the ruling party, 
something he believed would be crucial to winning a third term (Willis 2012, 129, 135).  
Benjedid realized FIS would become a popular party, and envisioned this playing into his 
scheme of breaking up FLN’s political power. A strong electoral outcome for FIS would make it less 
likely that FLN won a majority of votes. Ideally, the two parties would tie, giving the president the 
chance to play kingmaker in the new National Assembly (Ibid., 121). In addition, by allowing FIS to 
work within the political system, Benjedid sought to isolate the radical fringes of the Islamic 
movement, while also keeping mainstream organizations under close surveillance (Ibid.,120).  
 High popular support for FIS soon became apparent through its ability to mobilize the 





demonstrations with over 100,000 participants as early as 1989. In April 1990, it mobilized 600-
800,000 supporters for a rally in Algiers (Ibid., 122). 
 The new constitution called for local and regional elections to be held in June 1990, followed 
by national elections in December 1991. FIS won overwhelmingly in the local and regional election, 
beating FLN with a wide margin (Ibid.,133).  
 Upon realizing that FIS was becoming more successful than was strategically in the 
president’s interest, Benjedid legalized two additional Islamist parties - Al Nahda22 and Hamas23 - in 
an effort to splinter FIS’ support (Ibid., 165). These new parties represented the more mainstream 
Islamist movement, which up until then had been uncertain about the correctness of engaging in 
politics for the purposes of establishing an Islamic state.24 
Governmental attempts at gerrymandering by imposing new election laws sought to further 
minimize FIS’ turnout in the national election (Ibid., 135). On May 25, 1991, FIS called for a general 
strike and marched in protest over the new electoral laws. Security forces shot into the crowd during 
the demonstration, killing seven FIS members (Shahin 1997, 142). The demonstration turned violent 
and the army intervened.  
The government used the situation as an excuse to start cracking down on FIS, arresting its 
leaders in June 1991 on charges of “rebellion, the setting up of unauthorized armed forces, the 
obstruction of the economy and incitement of citizens to take up arms against the state” (Willis 
1998, 171).  
                                                
22 Al-Irchad wal Isla/Islamic Society Movement.  
 
23 Mouvement de la Nahda Islamique/ MNI/Renaissance. 
 
24 There had been doubts within the larger Islamist movement - as represented by the apolitical umbrella 
organization Rabitat Dawa - about whether pursuing the political path was the correct way to establish an 





 Government repression and gerrymandering appeared to have the desired effect: Polls 
suggested that FIS would be unable to win more than 30% of the national votes (Ibid., 218). 
Nevertheless, participation in a November 1991 FIS rally exceeded 300,000 participants (Ibid., 221), 
an indication that support for the party still remained high. Indeed, FIS won 47% of all votes in the 
first ballot of the national election in December 1991, close to twice as many as FLN.  
 
Explaining Organizations’ Choice of Tactics: Opportunity Structure Theory and General Insights 
Contestation during this period was exclusively nonviolent. Opportunity structure still erroneously 
predicts that organizations during this period should be more likely to employ guerrilla/conventional 
warfare tactics, since Algeria was a low state capacity anocracy.  
 This suggests organizations tend to generally have a bias towards nonviolent tactics and 
against violent tactics, even when nonviolent protest is likely to be met by government violence. 
 
7.Contestat ion 1992-1997: FIS, Al Nahda, Hamas,  Takfir  wa Hijra,  MIA, MEI, GIA 
The electoral outcome in the first ballot of the national elections in December 1991 suggested FIS 
would win an absolute majority of votes in the second ballot (Ibid., 225, 232). This scenario was of 
great concern not only to Benjedid, but the army as well. It feared that a FIS government would 
generate domestic unrest and seek to take away power from the military (Ibid., 245).  
When Benjedid expressed willingness to rule with a FIS government, the army saw the need 
to step in. Under pressure from the military, Benjedid resigned and power was transferred to a High 
Council for Security in January 1992 (Ibid., 247). The military cancelled the second round of voting 
and annulled the results from the first round of the national election.  
 FIS had suspected a military intervention and reacted cautiously to the coup d’état, being 





252, 253). The current FIS leader, Abdelhakader Hachani, cautioned members against engaging the 
police and made a public statement saying that FIS “would pursue the application of its programme 
in a peaceful manner and rejects the use of violence” (quoted in Willis 1998, 253) 
 Despite FIS’ attempt at keeping a low profile, the military junta started arresting its members 
starting in January 1992 (Ibid., 256). It was not until the military tried to remove imams from FIS 
controlled mosques that violent clashes broke out. In light of escalating violence, the military called 
for a state of emergency on February 9, 1992 (Ibid., 256).  
 The new president, Mohammad Boudiaf, announced that FIS was banned starting March 4, 
1992, on account of the organization “wanti[ing] to use democracy to destroy it”(quoted in Willis 
1998, 256). While FIS would not be allowed to compete in any subsequent elections (Ibid., 261), the 
other two Islamist parties, Al Nadhah and Hamas retained their legal prerogative to do so.  
 The FIS reacted to the news with the following statement:  
“The dissolution of the FIS is a return to rule by the sword and domination by a self-interested elite 
which opens up the state to unpredictable consequences and dangerous developments, as long as the 
country remains in the control of a gang who has no respect for sharia or the constitution.”  
(Quoted in Willis 1998, 267) 
 
 The party’s banning resulted in little popular protest, largely as a result of the military making 
it abundantly clear that any nonviolent protest would be met by lethal force.  FIS cancelled plans for 
a rally on February 14, 1992, for fear of a massacre (Ibid., 257). 
 The decision to cancel the rally may have been a costly strategic mistake by FIS. With over 
three million votes (Ibid., 258), FIS knew it enjoyed substantial popular support. Some of this could 
arguably have been mobilized for the purposes of nonviolent protest. According to a senior officer 
in the Algerian military, “[i]f [FIS] had brought 500,000 of their supporters onto the streets [sic], the 





Armed organizations started to emerge following the banning of FIS and the suspension of 
elections. Perhaps surprisingly, none were directly created or immediately sanctioned by FIS.  
Takfir wa Hijra , which had remained largely inactive since the 1970s (Ibid., 268) united with a 
revived version of Bouyali’s original MIA, featuring some of his recently released lieutenants (Willis 
2012, 173; Hafez 2000, 574).  
Both organizations used rhetoric suggesting that obtaining their political goal - the 
establishment of an Islamic state - could only come through armed struggle.  Nevertheless, they had 
lain dormant during FIS’ electoral campaign (Willis 1998, 268). Indeed, Takfir Wa Hijra had even 
participated in FIS organized demonstrations and marches (Hafez 2000, 574).   
 According to one scholar, it is “not clear that the MIA has ever seriously envisaged a 
revolutionary seizure of power. It has never attempted to mobilize popular support on a large scale, 
or to provoke a collapse of the state by targeting senior power holders” (Roberts 1994, 24). Instead, 
its political goal was focused solely on exerting coercive pressure on the military regime to recognize 
FIS and its electoral victories (Martinez 2000, 198; Roberts 1994, 25).   
 Another militant group, the Mouvement pour l’Etat Islamique (MEI), had kept a very low 
profile since its creation in the late 1980s. An organization with the belief in the necessity of a 
people’s war to establish an Islamic state, its main strategic goal from 1991-1993 centered on 
mobilizing people for nonviolent protest (Martinez 2000, 206).   
A MEI pamphlet dated January 1991 states:  
“Injustice is arising and persisting mainly because of the docility and silence of the majority. The 
government in power has no authority outside that which society willingly gives it through its 
silence, submission, and cooperation. Without our consent and silence, the regime cannot control 
more than twenty million people with four hundred thousand soldiers and police...So it is a question 
of struggling against the unjust and corrupt government by withdrawing confidence from it in order 
to change it. If the people shows its determination and remains united, the regime in power will fall, 







When calls to mobilize the masses for nonviolent protest failed, the organization concluded 
that the Algerian people were too afraid to defy the regime, and decided to target them in order to 
“shake civilians out of their indifference and force them to change sides.” (Ibid.). 
 The initial phase of armed combat was somewhat unorganized, due to FIS not having 
formally sanctioned the resort to arms (Willis 1998, 268). This changed in January 1993, when the 
jailed original leader of FIS, Ali Belhadj, smuggled out a letter from his cell stating that “[i]f I was 
outside the walls of this prison I would be a fighter in the ranks of army brother Abdelkader 
Chebouti [the leader of the MIA]” (Qtd in Willis 1998, 277). Belhadj’s statement was timed to 
detract media attention away from a more radical and recent organization that had been 
monopolizing the media spotlight to the detriment of MIA: Groupe Islamique du Armée (GIA)25.  
 Established in January 1993, GIA took a more fundamentalist approach to the military 
struggle. Not only did it see armed combat as the only means toward creating an Islamic state, it was 
also fiercely anti-democratic. GIA’s communiques “hardly referred to the cancellation of elections 
[sic] to justify its violence” (Hafez 2000, 591). Its political goal appeared revolutionary to the core: 
The overthrow of the government and the creation of an Islamic state. The organization’s hard line 
approach was clear from its motto “No dialogue, no reconciliation, no truce” (Kepel 2006, 266).   
 GIA saw civilians that supported the military regime as apostate, making them legitimate 
targets. Targeting civilians, first through individual assassinations starting in March 1993, and later, 
in 1996 onwards, through mass killings, resulted in GIA dominating the Algerian media. The early 
phase of GIA’s soft targeting in September 1993 included killings of government officials, 
journalists, and foreign tourists (Willis 1998, 283). The later phase starting in 1997 entailed 
assassinating regular Algerian civilians believed to either support the regime or not be GIA-friendly 
enough (Kalyvas 1999, 113).  
                                                





 While GIA accrued notoriety, FIS faded further into the background. Despite endorsing 
armed struggle, and MIA in particular, and there being many minor organizations fighting on its 
behalf, FIS did not control any of them. To regain the momentum and provide a more pragmatic 
alternative to GIA (Kepel 2006, 265), FIS, MIA and MEI, in addition to smaller associated groups, 
created the Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS) in 1993 (Willis 2012, 174).  
 The formation of AIS was important because it was the military wing of FIS (Martinez 2000, 
198), and because it unified several of the organizations that had been fighting on behalf of FIS all 
along. AIS rejected GIA’s absolutist stance of not negotiating with the regime and its targeting of 
civilians. Nevertheless, prior to the creation of AIS, FIS felt compelled to condone killings of 
intellectuals and journalists by organizations supporting their political cause for fear of appearing 
weak and less militarily ruthless than GIA (Willis 1998, 288) The majority of AIS’ deadly force was 
nevertheless projected against Algerian security services (Hafez 2000, 580).  
 
Explaining Organizations’ Choice of Tactics: Opportunity Structure Theory and General Insights  
What caused so many organizations to use violent tactics following 1992? The literature suggests 
two possible explanations: 1) Ideology; and 2) The political system being closed.   
 
Ideology 
The majority of organizations using violent tactics were arguably of the belief that using 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics was the only means by which to create an Islamic state.  
Although this outlook no doubt plays some role in their decisions of what tactics to employ, I 
suggest the significance of ideology on organizations’ choice of tactic was actually limited.  
First, Takfir wa Hijra, MIA and MEI’s political goal may not have been revolutionary.  





“Islamic State” is really only an icon representing more basic desires - the overthrow of the regime 
and the end of official repression and economic and social deprivation” (1998, 387). This view is 
echoed by Roberts, who states: “ While the rhetoric of the rebellion has suggested that its aim is to 
overthrow the present state and establish an Islamic Republic in its state, there are grounds for 
thinking that the aim of the mainstream of the rebellion has been to force the regime to revoke its 
ban on FIS and resurrect the possibility of a negotiated transfer of power within a measure of 
constitutional continuity” (1995, 240).   
The overall goal for the majority of the armed groups not being revolutionary is significant, 
because it suggests that violent tactics is a means to a political end, namely obtaining a bargaining 
leverage, rather than an end in itself. It implies organizations think strategically when deciding 
whether to use violent tactics, and are not driven purely by an ideology espousing violence.    
Second, since ideology is a constant it cannot account for variation in tactics. We know that 
Takfir wa Hijra, MEI, and MIA all lay dormant during the period FIS was successfully exploring the 
electoral path. Had they believed that guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics was the only means of 
obtaining an Islamic state they would have used violence prior to 1992. In other words, ideology 
cannot account for these organizations’ choice of tactics.  
What about GIA? Since its inception in 1993, GIA was publicly always absolutist in its belief 
in the necessity of armed jihad. It was against working within the political system and adamant about 
not negotiating with an apostate government. Since violent tactics is a constant in the case of GIA, is 
it not possible that ideology explains the organization’s resort to arms? Ideology may arguably have 
influenced GIA in two ways: 1) By making it use guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics; and 2) By 
making it target civilians. I begin by discussing the latter option.  
One scholar argues that GIA’s more fundamentalist ideology explains why the organization 





But since ideology is a constant it cannot explain the timing of the organization’s targeting 
civilians (Kalyvas 1999, 251). “The GIA did not alter its ideology between 1994 and 1997, yet it 
committed massacres in 1997 but not 1994” (Kalyvas 1999, 251). Kalyvas argues that the timing of 
massacres is better predicted by developments on the battlefield. He claims that “[m]assacres are 
likely to be committed by insurgents in the context of a particular strategic conjecture characterized 
by a) fragmented and unstable rule over civilian population, b) mass civilian defections toward 
incumbents, and c) escalation of violence” (2000, 245). This suggests that ideology cannot explain 
why GIA targeted civilians versus used guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.  
But since GIA consistently used guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, and never had a 
period where it lay dormant or used nonviolent tactics, is it not possible that ideology can explain 
the organization’s choice of this tactic? 
I suggest that although it is feasible that the overall outlook of GIS was different from the 
majority of armed organizations, this does not mean that ideology explains why the organization 
used guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics. Instead, I suggest that one can infer more about the 
organization’s decision to go violent by looking at the timing of the formation of the organization. I 
expand on this alternative explanation in more detail below, after addressing whether organizations’ 
embraced guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics due to the closed political system.  
 
Closed Political System 
Some scholars suggest the reason why organizations employed violent tactics after 1992 is due to the 
political system being closed. Willis argues “the manifest failure of the FIS legalist strategy, following 
the January coup, strengthened the conviction of those radical Islamic elements that had remained 
outside the party, that only force of arms could achieve an Islamic state” (1998, 268). Hence, he 





most of these [organizations] to break their tactical alliance with the party and join those seeking 
armed confrontation with the government” (Ibid., 278). Roberts agrees, stating that “violence of the 
mainstream of the armed rebellion has been primarily a reaction to the state’s decision to deprive it 
of a constitutionalist avenue rather than the expression of a doctrinaire preference for violent over 
nonviolent activity” (1995, 239-240). This reading is largely in accordance with the logic and 
predictions of opportunity structure theory, which suggests that organizations oscillate to violent 
tactics when the political system is closed.  
 I take issue with this explanation. First, I suggest that the timing of organizations’ use of 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics is highly relevant to understanding their motivation for 
choosing this tactic. Despite existing prior to the Constitution of 1989 (which allowed for the 
formation of political parties and multiparty elections), violent tactics was not Takfir wa Hijra, MIA 
and MEI’s primary choice.  Takfir wa Hijra and MEI had been largely inactive during the early 
1980s, and MIA and MEI had both, unsuccessfully, sought to use nonviolent tactics before 
escalating to guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics. Hence, these organizations did not use this tactic 
because constitutionalist avenues of contestation were blocked.  
 
General Insights  
I argue that organizations employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics only did so upon 
realizing not only that using nonviolent tactics would be met by lethal repression, but also that they 
had enough popular support to employ this violent tactic.   
The results from the first ballot of the national election in 1991 served to convey 
information to these organizations about the size of their potential recruitment pool. When the 
election was cancelled and nonviolent protest lethally repressed, organizations realized that the 





scholar, Takfir wa-l Hijra and MIA “saw in the dissolution of [FIS] and the imprisonment, exile or 
murder of its officials an exceptional opportunity to represent the Islamist electorate. They found in 
the communes recently supporting the FIS a fund of sympathy, which made it possible to launch 
guerrilla operations against the security forces in 1992 and 1993” (Martinez 2000, 21).  
 Of all the organizations following 1992 discussed, only MEI believed massive adherence to 
civil disobedience could bring about a nonviolent revolution capable of overthrowing the 
government. Ironically, failure to mobilize people to use nonviolent tactics led MEI to start targeting 
civilians, in an effort to force them to take active sides in the conflict. MEI’s decision to escalate to 
violent tactics following failing to mobilize people for nonviolent contestation is very similar to that 
of Boyali and the original MIA. 
What about GIA? Many of the leading members of the organization had previously been 
active in FIS and MIA, yet the organization was only created January 1993. The timing of GIA’s 
creation suggests that the rationale for GIA using guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics was the 
same as for other militant organizations: It saw the opportunity to draw on massive popular 
discontent and support for an Islamist state made apparent by the electoral results.   
Finally, what accounts for FIS’ escalation from nonviolent to guerrilla/conventional warfare 
tactics through the creation of AIS? One possible argument is that the endorsement of MIA and the 
later formation of AIS were done in reaction to GIA taking over FIS’ struggle. FIS was beginning to 
lose the momentum and ability to affect developments in both the military and political realm.  This 
explanation suggests an outbidding logic at play.   
 Although there is no doubt that FIS worried about the ascendance of GIA, I argue that 
outbidding provides only a very partial rationale for the organization’s decision to escalate to violent 
tactics. More important, I suggest, was that FIS not only knew that it had a significant following, as 





behalf, but also that it could no longer safely employ nonviolent tactics due to the threat of lethal 
government repression. The combination of nonviolent tactics being too dangerous to employ and 
the knowledge that it nevertheless had enough of a following to potentially succeed in using 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, is what I suggest finally drew it to take to arms.  
 The delay in FIS escalating to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics is most likely 
due to it waiting to see if the military would reverse its decision to annul the election results. If this 
were to happen, FIS wanted to make sure that it was in a not going to be prevented from forming a 
government because it had gone violent. As time passed such a scenario became less and less likely, 
eventually causing FIS to conclude in 1993 they had nothing to lose from endorsing MIA and 
literally joining the fight.   
 If a formerly nonviolent political party such as FIS went violent, why did the other two 
Islamic parties, Hamas and Al Nahda, not do so as well? Despite ideological differences between 
FIS versus Hamas and Al Nahda (Roberts 1995, 239), I posit that ideology is unlikely to have 
influenced these organizations’ decision to remain inactive.  
Instead, I suggest the reason for these two organizations not going violent is due to two 
factors. First, Al Nahda and Hamas jointly received only 15% of the votes in the election. Hence, 
the majority of voters gave their support to FIS rather than the general Islamic movement, as 
epitomized by these two other Islamist organizations. Second, as opposed to FIS, Hamas and Al 
Nahda maintained their status as legal political parties eligible to participate in future multiparty 
elections. The prospect of doing so, without having to compete against FIS, their biggest challenger, 








8. Conclusion:  Opportunity Structure Theory Appli cat ion and General  Insights   
My analysis suggests that opportunity structure has limited ability to explain what accounts for 
variation in tactics among Islamic organizations during this period in Algeria.  
There was little to no violent contestation - with the exception of the early MIA - during the 
period in which the political system was completely closed, i.e. prior to the constitution of 1989, that 
allowed for political parties and multiparty election.  This suggests that a closed political system does 
not necessarily make organizations more likely to use violent tactics. Instead, organizations active in 
political environments such as these appear more likely to use nonviolent tactics. I found that the 
original MIA (and partially MEI) only employed violent tactics after failing to mobilize enough 
people for nonviolent protest.  
Furthermore, I argue that FIS, MIA, MEI and GIA all opted to employ 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics because the election made clear the extent of their 
constituency, allowing them to deduce that they could mobilize enough popular support to employ 
this tactics, and because nonviolent tactics was seen as a non-starter due to the likelihood of a lethal 
government crackdown.  
What about insights into what determine organizations’ use of terrorism? Although MEI and 
GIA targeted civilians, they did not do it in a way that is in accordance with my definition of 
terrorism. I define terrorism as indiscriminate violence used to randomly target governments’ civilian 
constituencies; attacks take place in public spaces; entail use of explosive devices; and are meant 
coerce governments rather than civilians. MEI and GIA’s targeting of civilians were largely meant to 
coercing them into cooperating, which is an inherent part of guerrilla tactics (Galula 1964; 
Huntington 1968) that I consider separate from terrorist tactics  
 To what extent does this analysis suggest new theoretical insights? I derive three general 





First, organizations tend to generally have a bias towards nonviolent tactics over violent 
tactics, even when nonviolent protest is likely to be met by government violence.  
Second, organizations in repressive regimes only employ nonviolent tactics when they 
believe they can mobilize a significant number of people.  
Third, organizations employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics when they believe they 
are able to mobilize a significant number of people, and when nonviolent tactics are likely to be met 


































Chapter 4  
 
Theory Generat ing Case Study II :  
 
Choice  o f  Tact i cs  among South Afri can Anti-Apartheid Organizat ions  
 
1.  Introduct ion 
 
What accounts for variation in organizations’ choice of tactics? Under what circumstances are 
organizations more inclined to employ nonviolent tactics than guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics 
and vice versa?  
This exploratory case study seeks to answer this research question for the purposes of 
informing theory generation, by analyzing what factors influenced variation in tactics among 
organizations within the national anti-apartheid movement in South Africa from 1912-1992. 
Studies of South African contestation usually limit their analysis to explaining the African 
National Congress’ (ANC) decision to escalate to from nonviolent to guerrilla/conventional warfare 
tactics (Seidman 2000). Fewer studies have analyzed variation in tactics among domestic anti-
apartheid organizations beyond ANC (exceptions include Sommer 1996), more specifically Black 








2. Main Analyt i ca l  Findings 
I find that repression hypotheses are generally unable to explain ANC, BC, and UDF’s choice of 
tactic.  
 I argue that ANC escalated to guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics due to a combination of 
lethal repression of nonviolent protest and popular pressure to use violent tactics. The latter allowed 
the organization to conclude that it would be able to mobilize enough people to take up arms.  
 Despite ANC deeming nonviolent tactic ineffective in countering the apartheid regime, BC 
and UDF both opted for nonviolence as their initial tactic. They did so knowing that they could 
largely avoid repression by maintaining a non-confrontational stance.  
 Neither BC nor UDF escalated to guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics upon later 
becoming targets of severe government repression. The reason for not doing so, I argue, was 
because they assumed the cohort of black South Africans willing to use force had joined, or were in 
the process of joining, the already militant ANC.  
 I derive two general insights relevant to theory generation from this analysis.  
First, organizations tend to generally have a bias towards nonviolent tactics and against 
violent tactics, even when nonviolent tactics are likely to be met by government violence. 
Second, organizations employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics when they believe they 
are able to mobilize a significant number of people, and when nonviolent tactics are likely to be met 
with lethal repression. 
 
3. Chapter  Outl ine 
The case study is organized in five sections.  
I begin by presenting testable hypotheses derived from the literature on repression. Second, 





the year South African Communist Party (SACP), Pan African Congress (PAC) and ANC all escalated 
from nonviolent to violent tactics. My main focus here is explaining what accounted for ANC’s 
decision to escalate. I then discuss BC’s trajectory of contestation, focusing in particular on its 
choice of initial tactics and the reason why it did not escalate to guerrilla/conventional warfare 
tactics despite being the target of significant state repression. Fourth, I discuss the same factors as 
they apply to UDF. I conclude by summarizing whether the case study finds support for repression 
arguments, and more generally, what additional testable hypotheses are suggested by the analysis.  
 
4. Guiding Theoret i ca l  Framework: Repress ion  
This case study features variation in tactics among organizations with the same political demand, 
representing the same constituency, and active within the same country. Explanations focusing on 
culture and relative depravation cannot explain such variation.  Opportunity structure theory would 
assume that given that South Africa was a low state capacity anocracy26 during the period studied, 
organizations are more prone to engaging in guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics. Nevertheless, the 
theoretical explanation I center this case study around is repression.  
The repression literature suggests the following hypotheses: 
 
H1 (Efficacy and Substitution): Repression of nonviolent protest causes organizations to escalate to  
      violent tactics because they deem nonviolent protest ineffective.  
 
H2 (Splintering): Repression and leader decapitation causes organizations to splinter, and splinters to use                     
      violent tactics.   
 
H3 (Outbidding): Organizations are more likely to use violent than nonviolent tactics when there are  
       many organizations competing for the same constituency.  
                                                
26 I obtain information about state capacity from the World Bank’s World Development Indictator. Low state 
capacity is coded the same way as in the Algeria case study. I obtain data on regime type from the Polity IV 
dataset. [http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/SouthAfrica2010.pdf] I discuss the coding of regime type and 





5. Contestat ion 1948-1961: ANC, SACP and PAC 
ANC was founded in 1912. Despite the modest stated nature of its political goal at this time, namely 
the creation of a “national union for the purposes of creating national unity and defending [black] 
rights and privileges” (Younis 2000, 42), the prime impetus of the organization was to protest the 
discriminatory policies of the white minority regime. Black people being deprived of their right to 
vote to affect politics directly, ANC’s main means of contestation from its inception until the early 
1950s included writing petitions and lobbying.  
 
Escalation in Nonviolent Tactics in Response to Expansion of Apartheid Regime 
Although apartheid had informally been the modus operandi for the supremacist South African 
government for decades, it was not until 1948, when the National Party came to power, that the 
framework for apartheid was implemented more forcefully. The main ideological core of apartheid 
ideology is that whites and blacks should be both politically and geographically separate. In an effort 
to achieve such separation, the government envisioned the creation of ten separate bantustans in 
which black South Africans would be forced to live (Schock 2005, 56). Access to the urban and 
white controlled areas of the country were allowed for the purposes of employment only, and 
exclusively by those displaying mandatory passes (Price 1991, 19-20).  
 The development of these pass laws led ANC to revise its formerly non-confrontational 
political goal. The Program of Action, adopted in 1949, called for “freedom from White domination 
and political independence consistent with the African people’s right of self-determination”, the 
“right of direct representation in all the governing bodies of the country” and the “abolition of all 
differential institutions or bodies specially created for Africans” (Younis 2000, 83). 
  The installment of the National Party government clearly demonstrated that ANC’s current 





by which to contest the expansion of the apartheid regime. The Programme of Action of 1949 
therefore outlined the introduction of more radical tactics to be employed, including ”immediate and 
active boycott, strike, civil disobedience, non-cooperation and such other means” (Ibid.). ANC had 
formally made its shift to a strategy of nonviolent mass mobilization.  
 The impetus for this initial escalation was the increased influence of members of the newly 
formed (1943) ANC Youth League (Zunes 1999, 204) and the more radical SACP. Founded in 1921, 
SACP had increasingly shifted towards representing black workers. Consequently, the membership 
of it and ANC overlapped significantly, resulting in an informal alliance. This informal alliance 
deepened further with the banning of the SACP in 1950 (Barrell 1990, 6). 
 The first serious manifestation of ANC’s more confrontational approach to nonviolent 
tactics was the Defiance Campaign of 1952, led by Youth League leader Nelson Mandela. The 
nationwide campaign called on South Africans to disobey rules demanding that public places be 
segregated (Schock 2005, 58). When rioting broke out, the government intervened forcefully, quickly 
succeeding in bringing the campaign to a halt by detaining thousands of participants. In the 
aftermath of the Defiance Campaign the government passed numerous laws aimed at making 
collective action more difficult (Ibid.). Nevertheless, the campaign had served to get the message out 
and ANC’s membership swelled to 100,000 (Mandela 2008, 120).  
 
The Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 and the Banning of ANC and PAC 
Objecting to the inclusion of whites within the ANC membership, a faction in 1959 splintered off to 
create its own organization, PAC (Ellis and Sechaba 1992, 29). PAC employed the same type of 
nonviolent tactics as ANC and soon somewhat of a rivalry developed. In an effort to preempt an 





28, 1960. Participants in this rally in Sharpeville were met by a brutal government crackdown leaving 
69 dead and 178 wounded. The event became known as the Sharpeville Massacre.  
   In memory of the people killed, ANC called a general strike. The strike lasted three weeks 
and caused a severe government crackdown. A state of emergency was declared during which the 
police detained more than 10,000 people. ANC and PAC were both banned in 1961.  
 
Abandoning Nonviolent Tactics for Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare Tactics 
The decision by SACP, ANC, and PAC to escalate to violent tactics was taken in the aftermath of 
the state of emergency following the Sharpeville massacre. ANC and SACP jointly formed their 
military wing, Umkonto we Sizwe (MK), and PAC theirs, Poqo (Ellis and Sechaba 1992, 33). Initially 
conceived of as an autonomous movement from ANC, MK was formally adopted as the 
organizations’ military wing in October 1962 (Adams 2001, 54). 
Despite much discord within ANC about whether escalation was legitimate given how long 
ANC had used nonviolent tactics, a compromise solution was reached that allowed organizational 
cohesion to remain intact.  In congruence with the political objective of attaining nonracial 
democracy and avoiding a race war, it was decided that MK would abstain from using lethal violence 
against white South Africans and initially merely engage in sabotage (Mandela 1994, 246).  
The MK, led by Nelson Mandela, launched its initial sabotage operations in December 1961. 
The primary purpose of adopting sabotage was as a warning to the government that the conflict 
could easily escalate out of control (Ibid., 4). Sabotage was not only morally more acceptable than 
all-out guerrilla warfare, it also had the added benefit of being easier to recruit for (Ibid., 7) and 
requiring fewer active participant (Ibid., 246).  
 ANC did not believe the conflict would remain limited. According to Mandela, “if sabotage 





warfare and terrorism” (1994, 247). It was clear that the government’s violent response to sabotage 
would justify ANC’s escalation to full on guerrilla warfare (Ibid., 247). Hence, sabotage was merely 
the stepping-stone between nonviolent and violent conflict and laid the groundwork for the creation 
of a revolutionary army (Barrel 1990, 7).  
 ANC felt that “[i]f war was inevitable, we wanted the fight to be conducted on terms most 
favorable to our people. The fight which held out prospects best for us and the least risk of life to 
both sides was guerrilla warfare. We decided, therefore, in our preparation for the future, to make 
provision for the possibility of guerrilla warfare ” (Ibid.) 
 Given that conditions in South Africa are particularly poorly suited to guerrilla warfare, it is 
somewhat perplexing that ANC decided to employ this tactic. South Africa has little mountainous 
terrain or forests for rebels to use for cover and concealment, the peasant class was small and highly 
controlled by white farm owners, and there were no friendly neighboring countries in which to set 
up external bases (Adams 2001, 57; Davis 1987, 4; Marx 1992, 157; McKinley 1997, 28; Price: 1991, 
39; Zunes 1999, 207). The organization chose to ignore these facts, focusing instead on the recent 
successes of insurgency in Algeria and Cuba (Barrell 1990, 7; McKinley 1997, 28), and later on the 
de-colonization of Mozambique and Angola, as reasons to be optimistic about the potential for 
armed conflict (Zunes 1999, 205).  
 As suspected, the initial sabotage campaign failed to bring the regime to the bargaining table 
or withdraw white support from the National Party. Consequently, ANC and SACP escalated to 
guerrilla warfare. Given the lack of friendly neighboring countries from which to launch attacks, the 
majority of MK action centered round creating such conditions by helping ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe 
(then Rhodesia) to power (Ellis and Sechaba 1991, 43). This resulted in ANC in exile becoming even 






ANC’s Rationale for Escalating to Violent Tactics: Repression, Efficacy, and Popular Pressure 
Why did ANC escalate to violent tactics? The literature suggests three possible motives: 1) 
Nonviolent tactics had been unsuccessful in obtaining political objectives; 2) Lethal repression had 
made nonviolent tactics a prohibitively dangerous tactic to employ; and 3) To respond to popular 
calls to use start using violent tactics. 
 First, after more than 40 years of using nonviolent tactics, there was an increasing sense 
within ANC and blacks in society at large that the tactic had accomplished little. According to 
Mandela “nonviolence was not a moral principle, but a strategy; there is no moral goodness in using 
an ineffective weapon” (Mandela 1994, 137). Mandela believed that “nonviolence has failed, for it 
had done nothing to stem the violence of the state nor change the heart of our oppressors” (Ibid., 
23). Because “[n]onviolence was a tactic that should be abandoned when it no longer worked”(Ibid., 
137), ANC “had no alternative to armed and violent resistance” (Ibid., 236), according to Mandela.   
Second, nonviolent tactics were becoming a prohibitively dangerous tactic to employ, even 
prior to the organization being made illegal. “Over and over again [ANC] had used nonviolent 
weapons in our arsenal - speeches, deputations, threats, marches, strikes, stay-aways, voluntary 
imprisonment - all to no avail, for whatever [it] did was met by an iron hand,” stated Mandela (Ibid., 
236-237). 
 Police repression against nonviolent protest was becoming increasingly ferocious (Davis 
1987, 14), and the government had started to call on the army to do protest policing (Meli 1988, 
148). Oliver Tambo, a central ANC figure, directly attributes government escalation to the 
organization’s decision to take to arms:  “Once the army was involved we could not take it any 
further than that. The police were no longer sufficient. It was a new situation. We decided then to 





According to Mandela, repression had made nonviolent tactics “suicidal” (Mandela 1994, 
141), meaning “it was wrong and immoral to subject [the] people to armed attacks by the state 
without not offering them some kind of alternative” (Ibid., 137).  
A final factor influencing ANC’s decision to use force was popular pressure. The black 
populace was growing increasingly tired of nonviolence and there were signs suggesting they were 
about to take up arms independently. Urban and rural revolts suggested that ANC needed to get on 
the bandwagon or risk becoming obsolete (Adams 2001, 54; Davis 1987, 14; Ellis 1991, 32; 
McKinley 1997, 28-29).  
While debating Moses Kotane, the SACP Secretary, about the decision of whether to 
abandon nonviolent tactics for violent ones, Mandela pointed out that “[p]eople were already 
forming military units on their own, and the only organization that had the muscle to lead them was 
the ANC” (Mandela 1994, 237). In Mandela’s view, “[v]iolence would begin whether we initiated it 
or not”(Ibid., 237). Hence, concluded Mandela, if ANC “did not take the lead now, [sic] we would 
be latecomers and followers to a movement we did not control” (Ibid.).  
 
Explaining ANC’s Choice of Tactics: Repression Hypotheses & General Insights 
Repression Hypotheses 
How does ANC’s rationale for escalating to violent tactics resonate with repression hypotheses? 
ANC’s discussion of how repression of nonviolent tactics undermines the efficacy of the 
strategy, in turn suggesting an escalation to violent modes of contestation, seems like evidence in 
favor of the efficacy and substitution hypothesis.  
 The prediction that repression and leader decapitation cause organizations to splinter, and 





but the decision to escalate to violent tactics was also made prior to the incarceration of Nelson 
Mandela.  
 The outbidding hypothesis is only partially supported. There was clearly concern within 
ANC that unless it escalated to violent tactics it would be “left behind.” Yet, the immediate worry 
was less about other organizations using violence to recruit participants from a joint pool of recruits, 
than about failing to represent unorganized popular pressure to employ violent tactics following the 
Sharpeville massacre.  
 
General Insights  
Of the three reasons for why ANC escalated to violent tactics - ineffectiveness of nonviolent tactics, 
repression of nonviolent tactics, and popular pressure to employ violent tactics - I suggest the two 
latter ones were most important.  
Although ANC had used nonviolent tactics with largely no results for the last 40 years, it was 
only when the government called in the army to repress nonviolent protesters that the organization 
concluded that it was time to escalate to guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.  
Since people had already started to call for a more militant approach to apartheid, the 
organization knew it would be able to mobilize a substantial number of participants for the purposes 
of armed conflict. 
Combined, these insights suggest that organizations employ guerrilla/conventional warfare 
tactics when they can mobilize enough participants and when nonviolent tactics is likely to be met 








6. Contestat ion 1969-1977: BC 
The Sharpeville massacre and the banning of the main South African opposition parties resulted in 
an increasingly repressive political environment with largely no organized popular contestation. The 
repression of dissent gave the illusion of a “domestic peace” (Price 1991, 24), a security situation 
that lasted for the majority of the 1960s. 
 It was not until 1969 that organized anti-apartheid activity was once again initiated. Founded 
in 1969, BC originated among black university students, and was closely associated with the South 
African Students Organization (SASO) under the leadership of Steve Biko.  Highly influenced by the 
writing of Franz Fanon (1965), the mission of this umbrella organization was to improve black self-
esteem and assertiveness, the means to achieving regime change. 
 Although Fanon provided the ideological foundation for numerous violent independence 
movements, this was not an aspect adopted by BC. Anthony Marx notes that “[f]or BC, the use of 
force to undermine the regime’s will or capacity to rule was simply unnecessary, because ““the limits 
of tyrants are prescribed by the endurance of those whom they oppress”” (1992, 47). For the same 
reason, it was considered unnecessary to try to persuade whites to give up power. Although BC did 
not elaborate on exactly how black assertiveness would bring about political change, it was clear that 
its overall approach was fundamentally nonviolent (Hirshmann 1990, 10; Marx 1992, 47).  
Given the repressive climate, keeping an initially low profile was pragmatic: The vagueness 
of BC’s political objectives and its passive approach to organizing nonviolent protest made the 
apartheid government view it as non-threatening. Consequently, it allowed BC and its two core 
affiliates – SASO and the Black People’s Convention  - to grow somewhat unrestrained in the early 
1970s (Marx 1992, 47; Price 1991, 50). Hence, BC was able to avert government repression during 
its nascent phase, thereby allowing the organization to recruit members and affiliates among a 





(Marx 1992, 47). Indeed, given the radical alternative inherent in ANC, the government was 
somewhat encouraging of the development of a much more moderate black organization (Marx 
1992,49).  
 Nevertheless, since it was the only active anti-apartheid organization in the country, the 
government soon started viewing BC as threatening. Consequently, as the influence of the 
organization grew within the black community, so did government repression: 1971-1973 saw 
individual BC leaders being either banned or jailed. SASO was made illegal in 1975. Yet, the harshest 
forms of repression were to take place following the events in Soweto on June 16, 1976.  
 The Soweto uprising began as a spontaneous demonstration protesting that secondary 
school would be taught exclusively in Afrikaans. Police violence against protesters resulted in two 
fatalities, which in turn set off a spree of protests and riots that spread throughout the country. The 
first week of the uprising resulted in at least 130 people killed (Ibid., 68). 
Despite the revolt lasting 5 months, neither did an organization emerge nor were political 
demands explicitly made (Price 1991, 58). The uproar appears to have been largely a manifestation 
of popular anger over a deteriorating economy and a general decline in living standard (Ibid., 56).  
 Although the people revolting had clearly been influenced by BC rhetoric, the organization 
had no role in organizing the violent uprising (Ibid., 70). It nevertheless became the target of state 
repression, just as ANC and PAC had been targeted after the Sharpeville massacre. BC’s de facto 
leader, Steve Biko, was arrested and died while incarcerated, probably at the hands of his guards. 
Five weeks later, on October 17, 1977, the government banned BC and 17 of its most important 
affiliates (Ibid., 84) in order to prevent the organization from uniting with the exiled ANC/SACP 
and PAC. BC dissolved following the banning, and the organization emerging in its wake, AZAPO, 





 Government violence during the uprising made many black South Africans conclude that 
taking up arms was the only viable option. This resulted in numerous former BC members fleeing 
the country to join ANC. As a result, ANC’s membership rose to 9,000 in 1980, nine times as high 
as in 1975 (Ibid.,93). 
   
Explaining BC’s Choice of Tactics: Repression Hypotheses and General Insights 
Despite ANC’s conclusion that nonviolent tactics were ineffective and due to anticipated repression 
even being referred to as “suicidal”, BC nevertheless chose to employ nonviolent tactics 
BC’s experience is remarkably similar to that of ANC and PAC following the Sharpeville 
massacre. ANC, PAC, and BC all initially espoused nonviolent tactics, all were repressed and 
eventually banned in the aftermath of violent spontaneous rioting that they had no role in 
organizing. All organizations were witness to an increasingly militant populace, which clearly 
indicated that the black populace was ready and willing to use violence to confront the regime. 
Finally, historical developments during both uprisings suggested that violent tactics could be 
productive in bringing about political change, with Angola and Mozambique gaining independence 
in 1974 and developments in Zimbabwe suggesting that the transition to majority rule was soon in 
the making. Yet, whereas ANC and PAC escalated to violent tactics, BC did not. Why? 
I begin with discussing to what extent repression hypotheses correctly predict BC’s choice of 
tactics, and then consider more general insights.  
 
Repression Hypotheses 
Repression hypotheses have little to say about BC’s initial choice of nonviolent tactics. But once BC 





leader at the hand of the regime, repression hypotheses would have predicted that it adopt violent 
tactics. Yet, it did not. 
Upon being banned, BC instead dismantled, and the splinter group emerging in its wake, 
AZAPO, used exclusively nonviolent tactics. This goes against both the efficacy and substitution, 
and the splintering hypotheses.  
Finally, despite ANC drawing on BC support in the aftermath of the Soweto riots due to an 
increase in youth wanting to employ violent tactics, thus fleeing the country to join ANC, BC did 
not feel compelled to escalate as predicted by the outbidding hypothesis. 
None of the repression hypotheses predicting violent tactics are hence supported.  
 
General Insights  
BC organized and sought to further its political cause largely by functioning as a cultural and 
educational organization, only occasionally employing nonviolent tactics, and when doing so, 
making sure it did not confront the regime. This suggests organizations tend to generally have a bias 
towards nonviolent tactics and against violent tactics, even when nonviolent tactics is likely to be 
met by government violence.  
 Why did the organization not escalate to violent tactics in face of heavy repression following 
the Soweto riots? According to Biko, BC was “not going to get into armed struggle” (quoted in 
Davis 1987, 25), something he believed that the organization could “leave [sic] to the PAC and the 
ANC” (Ibid.) Despite this statement making it sound as if BC was ideologically committed to 
nonviolence, I suggest that BC may not have remained wedded to nonviolent tactics in face of 
severe repression had ANC not already begun using guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.  
The onslaught of refugees escaping South Africa to join the ANC following the Soweto riots 





cohort of BC’s constituency not left the country for ANC, it is possible that popular pressure for a 
more militant approach could have made the organization escalate to violent tactics.  
The more militant black cohort leaving to join ANC meant that BC might not have enough 
participants to mobilize for guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, were it to escalate. Hence, despite 
nonviolent tactics becoming prohibitively dangerous to employ, in contrast to ANC, BC did not 
escalate to violent tactics because it did not have enough participants to employ violent tactics.   
This argument reinforces the earlier insight derived about ANC escalation, namely that 
organizations employ violent tactics when they know they can mobilize enough participants and 
nonviolent tactics is likely to be met by lethal government repression.  
 
 
7. Contestat ion 1983-1991: UDF 
The years following the Soweto riots and banning of BC saw the South African economy improving. 
Recovering from the recession, the apartheid regime decided to try to buy black quiescence by co-
optation rather than use of force. One way in which the government hoped to do so was through 
partial liberalization in the form of constitutional reform.  
But the 1982 proposal offering select groups of blacks and Indians voting rights in three 
“ethnically separated houses of parliament” was met by disdain by the black community, who 
recognized it as a cheap attempt of “divide and rule,” given that the proposal would effectively leave 
more than half of all South Africans without the right to vote (Marx 1992, 106, 111).  
 UDF formed in reaction to this proposal in 1983. It was an umbrella organization with the 
purpose of coordinating collective action among its initially 300 local affiliates. Although the nature 
of affiliates varied markedly (Seekings 2000, 15), they all shared the common denominator of being 
anti-apartheid (Marx 1992, 130). Affiliates were autonomous and independent of UDF, who largely 





 Despite the goals of UDF being essentially those laid out in ANC’s Freedom Charter, the 
organization initially maintained its non-alignment (Ibid., 130), and abstained from inflammatory 
rhetoric against the government. UDF and its affiliates initially only made claims against individual 
businesses and local regional government by using nonviolent tactics (Ibid., 111). Because 
nonviolent protest was initially not aimed directly at the apartheid regime, UDF largely averted 
government attention and repression during its formative years (Schock 2005, 59).  
Given that ANC had stepped up its attacks in the aftermath of Soweto, the government was 
hopeful that the formation of an alternative, less militant organization, would redirect popular 
contestation towards UDF instead (Marx 1992, 144-145). The government was trying to be strategic 
in its use of violent repression in the hopes that this would make UDF maintain its non-
confrontational approach to the regime.   
 UDF’s first national campaign directly targeting the government was precipitated by the 
proposal for a revised constitution. The Anti-Election Campaign, launched in August 1984, called 
for boycotting the reform referendum (Schock 2005, 60). The campaign made clear to the apartheid 
regime that UDF might be more of a status quo challenger than initially thought.  
Upon hearing the news that the white electorate had approved the new constitution, non-
UDF related local protests in the Vaal triangle turned violent. Acting on the mistaken belief that 
UDF was behind the violence in Vaal, the government responded with repressing the organization 
(Marx 1992, 148, 155, 159). In reality, UDF sought to make its affiliates abstain from using violence 
(Ibid., 159).  
 Targeted repression against UDF precipitated popular anger, and subsequently more 
violence and protests in the bantustans. Reacting to the deteriorating security situation, the 





emergency on June 12, 1986. Unrestrained in its repressive capacity, the government detained more 
than 26,000 people without a trial, 80% of which were UDF affiliate members (Ibid., 159-160).  
 Thanks to its cell-like structure, UDF was initially able to withstand government repression, 
and by 1985 the organization had more than 2 million affiliated members (Ibid., 167). Yet, eventually 
repression made it impossible for the organization to serve the role of a moderating coordinator 
among its affiliates. When the government banned UDF and numerous affiliates in February 1988, 
the momentum and optimism characterizing the early years of protest had already faded (Ibid., 176).  
UDF’s moderation was considered partly to blame for the revolts’ inability to obtain 
concrete political objectives by taking advantage of the momentum and challenge the regime (Ibid., 
178-179). The organization continued its work clandestinely under the name the Mass Democratic 
Movement until February 1990, when some of its rights were restored. It formally dissolved in August 
1991, after the de-legalization of PAC, ANC, and SACP among others (Seekings 2000, 698). 
 
Explaining UDF’s Choice of Tactics: Repression Hypotheses and General Insights 
Repression Hypotheses 
UDF employed nonviolent tactics and did not escalate to violent tactics despite increased 
government repression during the state of emergency. This goes contrary to repression hypotheses, 
which would have predicted UDF use violent tactics following the government crackdown, 
potentially splintering, and splinters employing violent tactics. Hence, repression arguments are 









General Insights  
UDF went to great lengths to appear non-confrontational, initially only directing claims against state 
officials and local businesses. It was only upon having organized substantially that it took on the 
central government directly using nonviolent tactics.  
 Just as was the case with BC, this suggests that organizations tend to generally have a bias 
towards nonviolent tactics and against violent tactics, even when this form of contestation is likely 
to be met by government violence.  
Upon becoming the target of severe repression following the Vaal uprisings and later 
banned, UDF continued its nonviolent work under another name instead of escalating to violent 
tactics. Given the intense repression and the organization’s close alliance with ANC, why did UDF 
not escalate to violence? The decision seems even more perplexing given that UDF affiliates saw 
“themselves as being under ANC discipline and carrying out its strategies” (Suttner 2004, 699).  
The answer may, counter-intuitively, lie partly in UDF’s close relationship to ANC. 
According to one scholar, UDF saw “itself as a curtain raiser before the main team arrived on the 
field” (Ibid.). Given UDF’s deferential stance towards ANC, as exemplified by the organization’s 
decision to disband following the legalization of ANC (Ibid.), it is perhaps not surprising that UDF, 
just as BC before it, saw violent tactics as something to be left to this earlier organization.  
I suggest that UDF did not escalate to violent tactics, because the cohort within its 
constituency that were willing to use force already had the option of joining ANC. Hence, the 
reason why UDF did not escalate to violence was the same as BC: Although nonviolent tactics were 
no longer a feasible option given the intensity of state repression, the organization did not think it 









8. Conclusion and Theoret i ca l  Ins ights  Suggested by Analys is  
I find that repression hypotheses are generally unable to explain what accounts for anti-apartheid 
organizations’ tactical choices during the period studied.  
I suggest that ANC escalated to guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics because nonviolent 
tactics were likely to be met with lethal government repression, and because of popular pressure to 
escalate to violent tactics. The extent of calls for escalation meant that ANC knew it would be able 
to mobilize enough participants to use guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.  
Hence, a more encompassing general hypothesis suggested by the analysis is that 
organizations employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics when they know they can mobilize 
enough participants, and nonviolent tactics is too dangerous to employ due to lethal government 
repression.  
Neither BC nor the later UDF opted for violent over nonviolent tactics. Instead, both 
organizations initiated their activity with exceedingly non-confrontational stances towards the 
government and did not escalate to violent tactics when faced with violent state repression.  
That both organizations used nonviolent tactics as their initial tactic suggests the following 
general hypothesis: Organizations tend to generally have a bias towards nonviolent tactics and 
against violent tactics, even when nonviolent protest is likely to be met by government repression. 
I suggest that the reason why neither of them escalated to violent tactics was because they 
did not believe themselves capable of mobilizing enough participants to use violent tactics, since the 
militant cohort of their constituency had joined, or were in the process of joining, ANC.  
This conclusion reinforces the earlier insight that organizations employ 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics when they believe they are able to mobilize a significant 












Chapter  5  
 
A Mobi l izat ion Theory o f  Contestat ion 
 
1. Introduct ion:                                                                                           
Ins ights  f rom Case Studies  and Bargaining Theory Informing Mobi l izat ion Theory 
Insights from the case studies and bargaining theory provide important clues to what determines 
organizations’ choice of tactics. In this chapter, I draw on these combined insights to construct a 
supplemental theory to opportunity structure theory, which I refer to as mobilization theory.  
 
Insights from Case Studies 
The exploratory case studies seeking to explain organizations’ tactical choices in Algeria and South 
Africa suggest three general insights relevant to theory generation: 1) Organizations tend to generally 
have a bias toward nonviolent tactics and against violent tactics, even when nonviolent protest is 
likely to be met by government repression; 2) Organizations in repressive environments only employ 
nonviolent tactics when they believe they can mobilize a significant number of people; and 3) 
Organizations employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics when they believe they are able to 







Insight from Bargaining Theory  
I derive two key insights from bargaining theory that, I argue, are crucial to understanding what 
accounts for variation in organizations’ choice of tactics: 1) All rational organizations should prefer 
to solve their conflict of interests without using violent tactics, since doing so is costly;  
2) Organizations willing to use violent tactics only do so when bargaining obstacles make it 
impossible to solve conflict of interests through negotiations in peacetime (Fearon 1995).  
 
2. Chapter  Outl ine 
The chapter is divided into four sections. I begin by stating important assumptions and defining key 
variables. Second, I review and discuss how bargaining theory applies to intra-state conflicts of 
interests. Third, I lay out the tenets of mobilization theory, paying particular attention to how 
nonviolent protest, under certain conditions, can serve as a signaling device allowing organizations 
to overcome not only what I refer to as the peacetime bargaining dilemma, but also ameliorate the 
information problem inherent in bargaining. I close by presenting testable hypotheses.  
 
3. Key Assumptions and Def ini t ions 
 
Key Assumptions 
For the purposes of this analysis, I make five theoretical assumptions that should be made explicit.  
 First, I assume that organizations and governments are rational unitary actors that seek to 
maximize utility and make their decisions by weighing the costs and benefits of using various tactics.  
 Second, I assume that organizations know whether they are willing to employ violent tactics. 
 Third, I assume that organizations seek to use whatever tactic is most likely to work given 
their resource endowment and the structural context. This, however, does not mean that the tactics 





 Fourth, I assume that factors determining organizations’ initial choice of tactic also 
determine potential changes in tactics over time. 
 Fifth, I assume that violent tactics that do not constitute terrorism are always 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics. 
 
Definitions 
A dissident organization is a political organization whose objectives entail “seeking to alter power 
deficits and to effect social transformations” and who makes political demands on the government 
“by mobilizing civilians for sustained political action”(Amenta 2010, 288).27  
 Maximalist political demands are those requiring governments to “make concessions that 
fundamentally alter the political order or the nature of the state”(Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 69). 
These include calls for increased political self-determination and regime change. The former includes 
calls for federalism or secession and the latter calls for democratization, creation of an Islamic or 
socialist state, changes in the constitution, or the removal of the current government.  
Strategy is a  “plan of action or policy designed to achieve a major or overall aim.”28  
Tactics are the means through which strategies are put in action and/or implemented.29  
A nonviolent tactic does not entail the use of force. Nonviolent tactics include strikes, 
demonstrations, petitions, and sit-ins.  
A demonstration fulfills the following four criteria, namely being:  “(1) a voluntary [public] 
gathering of persons with the purpose of engaging in a collective display of sentiment for or against 
                                                
27 This definition draws heavily on Amenta et al.’s definition of a social movement (2010, 288). 
 
28 New Oxford American Dictionary. 
 
29 Technically, there is an intermediate step between strategy and tactics, namely operations. For the purposes 





public policies;  (2) bounded by space and time (that is, it occurred in a specific location during a 
limited time period); (3) the number of participants was not restricted by the organizers of the event 
(that is, it was not a conference, convention, or other restricted organized meeting); and (4) did not 
have as its primary purpose the infliction of violence by its participants (that is, it was not a mass 
violent event)” (Beissinger 2002, 462).  
A strike is an organized work stoppage for the purposes of achieving political demands.  
A violent tactic relies on the use of lethal force. Violent tactics include guerrilla/conventional 
warfare or terrorist tactics.  
Guerrilla warfare is a technique of armed combat that employs “small, mobile groups to inflict 
punishment on the incumbent through hit-and-run strikes while avoiding direct battle when 
possible” while “seek[ing] to win the allegiance of at least some portion of the noncombatant 
population” (Lyall and Wilson 2009, 70).  
Conventional warfare occurs when organizations “militarily confront states using heavy 
weaponry such as field artillery and armor” (Kalyvas and Balcell 2010, 419). “[M]ilitary confrontation 
is direct, either across well-defined front lines or between armed columns; clashes often take the 
form of set battles, trench warfare, and town sieges” (Ibid.).  
Terrorism is indiscriminate violence used to target governments’ civilian constituencies at 
random; attacks take place in public spaces; entail use of explosive devices; and are meant to coerce 
governments rather than civilians.30 Targeting civilians for the purposes of coercing them to 
cooperate is an inherent part of guerrilla tactics and is considered separate from terrorist tactics 
(Galula 1964; Huntington 1968). Hence, MEI and GIA targeting of civilians do not constitute what 
I define as terrorism.  
                                                





 Repression is “the actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or 
organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the purpose of imposing a cost on the 
target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to 
government personnel, practices or institutions...Repression involves applications of state power 
that violate First Amendment–type rights, due process in the enforcement and adjudication of law, 
and personal integrity or security”(Davenport 2007, 2). 
 
4. Reasons for  Bargaining Fai lure  also Reasons for  Organizat ions Employing Violent  Tact i cs  
A central tenet of bargaining theory is that if organizations and governments could anticipate the 
outcome of a military clash between them in advance, they would be better off reaching an 
agreement, the terms of which represented the outcome of such armed combat, instead of only 
doing so after paying the costs entailed in fighting as well (Fearon 1995).31  
Understanding when and why bargaining in peacetime, if initiated, fails, allows one to 
ascertain why organizations sometimes employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics and other 
times do not.  
 The reason reaching a mutually acceptable agreement in peacetime sometimes fails is due to 
three bargaining obstacles: 1) Private information about capability and resolve and efforts to 
misrepresent them; 2) Issue-indivisibility; and 3) Commitment problems. 
                                                
31 Given the immense influence of Fearon’s (1995) article to the scholarship on interstate war onset, it is easy 
to forget that the original theory developed by Hicks (1963) sought to explain why certain labor negotiations 
resulted in deals whereas others failed, resulting in strikes. For more on bargaining theory as it applies to 






Of these three bargaining obstacles, I focus on private information about capability and 
resolve.32 Because I consider issue-indivisibility a kind of information problem,33 I suggest the latter 
is the most common bargaining obstacle.  
 
Private Information about Capability and Resolve and Incentives to Misrepresent 
Bargaining theory posits that for successful bargaining in peacetime to be possible, organizations 
must first find a way to credibly convey information about their latent military capability and resolve 
to fight to governments (Fearon 1995). Sometimes the only way of sending such a costly, and 
therefore credible, signal, is to start using guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics (Wagner 2000).   
 Fighting allows adversaries to transfer information about their respective military capability 
and resolve. Once enough information has been transferred for parties to update their beliefs and 
agree on the likely outcome of fighting, they can also reach a mutually acceptable solution ending the 
conflict (Blainey 1988; Filson and Werner 2002, 2004; Iklé 2005; Pillar 1983; Powell 2002; Slantchev 
2003; Walter 2006, 2009). 
 Peacetime information problems are especially challenging in intrastate conflicts for two 
reasons: 1) Assessing organizations’ latent military capabilities is hard for governments as well as for 
organizations; and 2) Even if both parties have perfect information about the relative balance of 
military power, they may nevertheless not agree about the likely outcome of armed combat due to 
private information about resolve (Walter 2009). 
 Information about government military capability is easier for organizations to obtain than 
vice versa (Ibid.). Whereas states can engage in public military drills to showcase their military 
                                                
32 I do not discuss commitment problems because mobilization theory does not depend on it and I consider 
information problems more common and central to negotiations in peacetime failing.  
 






prowess (Fearon 1995), organizations may be reluctant to convey information about their military 
capabilities for fear of a preemptive strike (Walter 2009). Since organizations know that 
demonstrating their latent military power and willingness to use these capabilities to obtain their 
political objectives is likely to make them appear threatening to the state, they may do just the 
opposite, namely seek to appear less militarily potent than they are.34 
 Another complicating factor is that organizations have imperfect information about their 
own strength (Walter 2009). The main function of guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics is for 
compellent purposes, but when initially employed they also serve an important mobilizing function 
(Huntington 1968, Galula 1963, Zedong 1961).35 Although organizations may be able to roughly 
estimate the extent of their popular support, they do not know exactly how much of it will translate 
into support capable of being mobilized for armed combat until after the organization starts using 
violent tactic (Walter 2009).  
 
Issue-Indivisibility Really an Information Problem 
Conflicts of interests about who have the right to strategically (Fearon 1995), culturally and/or 
religiously important territory (Goddard 2006; Hassner 2003; Toft 2001), or who rules (Betts 1994), 
are often perceived as indivisible or zero-sum by the parties involved. This makes these conflicts of 
interests especially hard to solve through peacetime negotiation, and hence more likely to escalate to 
violent conflict (Fearon 1995).  
 Theoretically, negotiated settlements featuring side-payments should be able to solve this 
type of bargaining obstacle (Ibid.). Yet, empirically, overcoming the issue-indivisibility problem 
                                                
34 Misrepresenting yourself as weaker than you actually are is likely to be harder if you have conventional 
warfare capabilities.  
 





appears harder than implied by the side payment solution: Armed conflicts characterized as zero-
sum tend to last longer than other types of conflicts (Walter 2009). 
 I argue that indivisibility on its own is unlikely to pose an obstacle to peaceful conflict 
resolution. What makes it a hard issue to find a compromise solution to is that both parties are 
highly resolved to obtain the entire “prize” rather than settling for a side-payment (Fearon 1995).  
Conflicts of interests over an object perceived as indivisible should be easier to solve when the 
parties do not care deeply about the issue. Hence, it is the salience of the object at stake - i.e. the 
relative balance of resolve (Betts 1987) - that determines whether these conflicts are amenable to a 
peaceful solution or not.  
Assuming perfect information about military capabilities, issue indivisibility only poses a 
problem to conflict resolution in peacetime when both parties are highly resolved, but there is 
incomplete information about who cares most about the issue, making it unclear who should accept 
a side-payment and who should obtain the “prize” involved. Since the real problem inherent in 
issue-indivisibility is imperfect information about resolve, this bargaining obstacle is a kind of 
information problem.  
 
Inability to Initiate Bargaining in Peacetime Due to the Peacetime Bargaining Dilemma 
Although private information poses a serious hurdle to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement in 
peacetime once negotiations started, I argue a more permissive reason for bargaining failure is 
negotiations never being initiated in peacetime.  
In order for bargaining in peacetime to start, organizations must make a compellent threat 
before they start administering the punishment, i.e. start using violent tactics (Schelling 1966). Despite 
governments’ and organizations’ mutual incentives to avoid the costs of warfare by solving conflicts 





incentives for each party to act in ways that makes initiating bargaining in peacetime difficult. The 
peacetime bargaining dilemma consists of two parts: 1) The identification problem; and 2) The saving 
face/reputation for resolve problem.   
  
The Identification Problem  
The information problem is only a problem to negotiations succeeding provided they are actually 
initiated in peacetime. Walter (2009) assumes that a key problem facing governments is to identify 
which, among a plethora of organizations making compellent threats in peacetime, are bluffing and 
which ones should be taken seriously. Empirically, I argue, organizations are unlikely to identify 
themselves by making explicit and public compellent threats in peacetime. This is since doing so 
automatically brands organizations national security threats, and is more likely to result in a military 
crackdown than an invitation to negotiate.  
Organizations being reluctant to identifying themselves as willing to use force by stating an 
explicit compellent threat in peacetime means governments may only find out which organizations 
are willing to do so upon their starting to use violent tactics. Indeed, none of the organizations 
surveyed in the theory-generating case studies made compellent threats to use violence prior to 
actually engaging in armed conflict. The identification problem is the first part of the peacetime 
bargaining dilemma.  
 
The Saving Face/Reputation for Resolve Problem 
Even if organizations were able to state their political demands in the form of a public explicit 
compellent threat without risking a preemptive government crackdown, peactime bargaining is 





 Compellent threats are more difficult to succeed than deterrent threats, because acquiescing 
in compellence requires actively doing something, whereas giving into deterrence can be 
accomplished through inaction (Schelling 2008, 124, 128). This means governments acquiescing in 
compellence are more easily observable to third parties, something the former would like to avoid 
since they worry about losing face and their reputation for resolve (Ibid.). 
 Governments care about their reputation for resolve because it is likely to influence whether 
other organizations will try to challenge it using compellence (Walter 2006). Seeing organizations 
using compellence to succeed in making governments acquiesce may influence other organizations 
to pose explicit compellent threats to obtain their political objectives, something governments would 
like to avoid (Walter 2006). 
 This means that governments may be more comfortable giving in to compellent demands 
after armed combat has started, since this demonstrates not only their resolve, but also the military 
capabilities of the organization, more clearly, thus allowing governments to save face if acquiescing 
in demands.  Other organizations may not emulate guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics if it is clear 
that they are militarily much weaker than the organization that received concessions.36  
  
Implications of the Peacetime Bargaining Dilemma 
The peacetime bargaining dilemma means that organizations may conclude that the prospect of 
initiating bargaining in peacetime is low. Those willing to use guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics 
to obtain their objectives may instead jumpstart the bargaining process by making their compellent 
demands at the same time as starting to employ violent tactics. In this scenario, organizations skip 
                                                
36 I suggest that the reason why terrorism is unlikely to succeed in attaining political goals is because this tactic 
requires so few resources to employ. Giving in to organizations using a tactic that can be employed by a 
majority of organizations largely regardless of their resource endowments would set a dangerous precedent, 





formal, explicit bargaining in peacetime, resulting in the government not being aware of their 
existence, political demands and willingness to use force until after they do so.   
Doing so allows organizations to make compellent threats backed up by military force while 
being less exposed to governments’ repressive response than they would have if they made the 
threat in peacetime. The benefits of making compellents threat simultaneously as using force is that 
organizations, now mobilized and in hiding, are better able to withstand governments’ military 
response than they would be in peacetime. Counter-intuitively, this means that organizations may 
view a compellence strategy that initiates the bargaining process in wartime, rather than in 
peacetime, as the safer option. Fighting also allows organizations to overcome the most serious 
bargaining problem had negotiations started, namely the information problem.   
 
4. Mobil izat ion Theory :   
Nonvio lent  Tact i cs  as Solut ion to Peacet ime Bargaining Dilemma and Information Problem  
Given the peacetime bargaining dilemma and the information problem, do organizations resolved 
enough to use violent tactics always end up doing so? Not necessarily.  
I argue that there are ways organizations can reveal enough information about their political 
demands, latent military capability, and resolve to use guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, to allow 
governments to identify them as suitable bargaining partners in peacetime in a way that does not put 
them at the same risk of a preemptive attack, while also allowing governments to initiate bargaining 
and even acquiesce in political demands without jeopardizing their reputation for resolve.   
Doing so entails organizations using nonviolent tactics as a signaling device capable of 
transferring credible information about capability and resolve. The ability for nonviolent tactics to 
serve this function means that since all rational resolved organizations prefer solving conflicts of 





number of participants and it is permissible from a security standpoint.  These were also two key 
insights derived from the Algeria and South Africa theory generating case studies.  
 
Nonviolent Protest as an Implicit Compellent Threat and Signaling Device 
Under certain conditions organizations can overcome the peacetime bargaining dilemma and 
ameliorate the information problem by using nonviolent protest to communicate implicit compellent 
threats.37   
If compellent threats are implicit rather than explicit, organizations can communicate their 
political demands with less of a risk of a government crackdown. In addition, when faced with an 
implicit, rather than explicit, compellent threat, governments are less worried that negotiating with 
organizations or even acquiescing to political demands will be interpreted as giving in to 
compellence with the potential of creating a domino effect of copycat organizations.38  
 
Signaling Capability and Resolve 
Nonviolent protest can serve as a credible means of signaling organizational capability and resolve, 
thus ameliorating the information problem inherent in bargaining.  
                                                
37 Organizations may prefer to make implicit rather than explicit compellent threats to maintain some 
flexibility in their response if the compellent threat ends up not working. They too are likely to have a 
reputation for resolve that they care to uphold in the eyes of domestic audiences as well as with the 
government. Like autocracies, even organizations with no prior history of making compellent threats have 
reason to care about their reputation for resolve to ensure they are taken seriously in interactions with the 
government in the future. Therefore, they would prefer to not position themselves into a situation were they 
have no choice but to start using violent tactics were the government to not yield to compellent threats. 
 
38 Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argue that one of the benefits of using nonviolent tactics is that 
governments are more willing to negotiate with organizations employing nonviolent protest for largely moral 
reasons. My discussion suggests the same, but for different reasons. Here, it is demonstrations ability to 
function as implicit compellent threats that make it easier for governments to acquiesce in political demands, 





The number of protesters participating in demonstrations is information allowing 
organizations to signal their latent military power.  A crucial part of guerrilla/conventional warfare 
tactics entails logistics and maintaining of bases, something rebels rely on civilian supporters to do. 
Hence, the total number of demonstrators provides the government with information that can be 
used as a rough proxy for organizations’ latent military power. 
 The size of demonstrations only matters if organizations can also credibly signal how much 
they care about obtaining their political demands. For demonstrations to credibly signal resolve to 
use violent tactics, using nonviolent tactics has to be costly. Holding demonstrations despite their 
being illegal, and therefore likely to be met by violent government repression, sends a much stronger 
signal of resolve than using them in a setting where they are sanctioned.  
The extent to which an organization can credibly signal resolve to use violent tactics by 
holding demonstrations is hence positively correlated with the danger entailed in doing so. Yet, the 
ability to send a strong signal of resolve by using demonstrations is counterproductive if the price of 
doing so means the event will be met by lethal government repression. When governments’ 
willingness and ability to use lethal repression suggest that making implicit compellent threats by 
holding demonstrations is too dangerous, organizations willing to use force are likely to forego 
employing nonviolent tactic for violent ones, thereby going directly to the wartime bargaining phase.  
This logic resonates with the finding that both South African anti-apartheid organizations 
and Algerian Islamist organizations preferred using nonviolent tactics to violent tactics despite a 
repressive climate as long as it was not deemed too dangerous, and as long as they could mobilize 
enough people. It also explains FIS’ decision to forego holding a rally after the coup d’état due to 
fear of lethal government repression.  
It also explains why latently militant organizations like MIA and Takfir wa Hijra only started 





recruit, and using nonviolent protest was no longer a viable option due to lethal government 
repression. Likewise, ANC only escalated to violent tactics upon concluding that they had enough 
popular support, but lethal government repression had made nonviolent tactics “suicidal.” 
 
Demonstrations as Implicit Compellent Threats Made Credibly by Brinkmanship 
The ability to credibly signal both resolve and capability through nonviolent tactics should give  
governments a sense of the latent military threat posed by organizations. Yet, why should one 
assume that such a implicit military threat would not just remain latent? Why should caring for the 
issue at hand enough to risk a violent government crackdown be interpreted as the organizations’ 
willingness to use violence to obtain their political objective?  
 For demonstrations to pose an implicit compellent threat of organizations’ willingness to 
escalate to violent tactics, governments have to believe that their latent military power could be 
effectively mobilized for armed conflict with the potential of posing a considerable military 
challenge. Guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics require trained fighters and a highly organized 
command and control structure. The organizational skills needed to employ these tactics are far 
beyond what it is required for organizations to organize a demonstration (Tilly and Tarrow 2006).39 
In addition, demonstrations are public events open for anyone to join, regardless if they are formally 
affiliated with the organizations arranging the protest event or not. If organizations do not even 
know the individuals participating in their events, how can they be expected to mobilize and 
coordinate them for the purposes of armed struggle?  
  I suggest organizations’ inability to fully control the action of participants in protest events 
is the reason why demonstrations under certain conditions can serve the function of credible, albeit 
                                                
39 For an argument claiming that the organizational capacity needed for employing nonviolent protest is 
greater than for employing violent tactics, see Pearlman (2011). This may be true for terrorism, but is unlikely 





implicit, compellent threat of violence. It does so through the compellent technique of 
brinkmanship (Schelling 2008, 91).   
 Rather than threatening to impose punishment because of political demands not being met, 
brinkmanship entails “setting afoot an activity that may get out of hand, initiating a process that 
carries some risk of unintended disaster” (Ibid., 91). The risk inherent in demonstrations is that they 
will somehow turn violent. As noted by Gurr, “demonstrations and general strikes have always had 
the potential for escalating into violent confrontations” (2000, 156). The way that demonstrations 
can turn violent is less important than that there is a risk that they can result in violent conflict, with 
the potential of escalating into more serious sustained armed conflict.40  
 This risk is something that organizations can use to their advantage by “encourag[ing] 
observers to fear that if nonviolent claims [sic] go unmet, violence will follow” (Ibid., 155). Were the 
events to turn violent, organizations may have little to no ability to call for cessation of hostilities. 
This is a reason why organizations that forswear violence can still be able to use demonstrations as 
implicit compellent threats to use force. 
 Tipping point models of collective action suggest that civilians’ decision of whether to 
participate in protest is determined by how many people are already engaged in the activity. Civilians 
join in waves with the potential of setting off a cascade of mobilization once a certain threshold is 
reached (Granovetter 1978; Lohman 1994). The size of demonstrations can therefore provide crucial 
information to civilians who support the cause and are trying to decide whether the time to join is 
right. As the size of demonstration increases, political demands may escalate as well.  
                                                
40 One danger with organizations not being able to control the evolution of demonstrations is that they also 
may be perceived as unable to effectively bargain for the masses. This may cause problems if governments 
want to negotiate, since organizations may be seen as unsuitable bargaining parties due to their being unable 






 The prospect of a growing crowd with escalating demands is another reason why 
governments may feel the need to crack down on illegal demonstrations, despite being aware of the 
risk of an escalation of violence. If giving in to political demands is considered potentially less costly, 
governments may consider acquiescing instead. As noted by Schelling “[i]f the clash of a squad with 
a division can lead to unintended war, or of a protest marcher with an armed police officer to an 
unwanted riot, their potencies are equal in respect to threats that count” (2008, 103).  
 
Necessary Conditions for Nonviolent Protest to Serve as Effective Compellent Threat 
For demonstrations to serve as implicit compellent threats made credible through brinkmanship, 
two conditions must hold.  
 First, demonstrations must be large enough to pose a challenge to riot police were events to 
turn violent. Only by appearing to carry a risk of escalating into something much more serious, that 
the government would very much like to avoid, are demonstrations capable of serving the purpose 
of an implicit compellent threat (DeNardo 1985).  
 Small demonstrations may carry a risk of becoming violent as well, but because riot police 
are likely to be able to contain them, they have less risk than larger demonstrations of escalating 
beyond government control.  
Smaller demonstrations are also unlikely to get the same media attention as their larger 
counterparts. Without media covering the event, governments willing to use force indiscriminately 
can do so without having to worry about it being brought to the attention of domestic and 
international audiences, something that may result in the type of moral backlash that could cause 
previously inactive domestic audiences to take up arms.  
 Second, governments are unlikely to interpret demonstrations as implicit compellent threats 





willing to employ violence to obtain their objectives. Holding a large demonstration without the 
potential of signaling resolve because there is little risk of a violent government crackdown is 
unlikely to have a compellent effect.  
 Theoretically, such large demonstrations can still compel through brinkmanship. But since 
the government has no reason to assume that the majority of participants care enough about the 
issue to be willing to use violence, brinkmanship is also less likely to work.  
Hence, in order for demonstrations to be a safe enough option for organizations to employ 
as part of a compellence strategy, yet still capable of signaling resolve in a credible way, they have to 
be large, while also carrying some risk of eliciting a violent government crackdown.   
 When government repression is anticipated to be lethal, organizations willing to use force to 
obtain their objectives will prefer employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics instead.  
Consequently, demonstrations are most likely to be employed as part of a compellence 
strategy by latent militant organizations targeting regimes that have outlawed demonstrations, but 
where governments’ repressive reaction to nonviolent protest is unlikely to be lethal.  
 The above discussion explains why ANC only opted for guerrilla tactics after concluding not 
only that nonviolent protest had become too dangerous to employ because of anticipated 
government lethal repression, but also that its membership base was large enough to employ 
guerrilla tactics. It also explains why FIS used nonviolent tactics despite of government repression, 
but escalated to guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics once the nonviolent option was no longer 









6. Demonstrat ions as Protes t  for  Persuasion 
Demonstrations are frequently employed by organizations with maximalist political demands that 
are unwilling to resort to violence, and where the anticipated level of repression of nonviolent 
protest is low. In these circumstances, the causal mechanism by which demonstrations seek to 
obtain political objectives is through persuasion.  
 In contrast to compellence, persuasion strategy seeks to make governments give in to 
political demands by appealing to international (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Sikkink 1999) or 
domestic political elites to either adopt the cause, or if more closely associated with the government, 
reconsider their loyalty and defect (Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Beissinger 2007; Chenoweth and 
Stephan 2011; Schock 2005; Sharp 1963). To gain the attention of these instrumental third parties, 
political organizations send in petitions, and/or organize demonstrations and sit-ins.  
 In democracies, “protest for persuasion” (Andrews 2001) seeks to gain enough media 
attention to create sympathetic allies among the public as well as political elites, who then argue in 
favor of organizations in front of the government. In this political setting, the immediate goal of 
demonstrations and petitions is to influence agenda setting (Amenta 2008; Andrews 2001). Whether 
political demand will be met or not depends on whether there is political and public support for the 
issue. It is assumed that the greater the number of participants employing nonviolent tactics for the 
purposes of persuasion, the greater the chances of success (Guigni 2004).  
 In less than democratic regimes, strategies of persuasion can target numerous types of third 
parties depending on organizations’ political demands. When political demands resonate with 
Western ideals, such as those related to human rights, civil liberties, and democracy, domestic 
political organizations will seek to capture the attention of foreign and international NGOs, as well 
as domestic political elites and security forces (Risse and Sikkink 1999).  





of the logic behind the so-called “boomerang effect” (Keck and Sikkink 1998). NGOs persuaded to 
take on the cause of domestic political organizations serve as force multipliers to organizations on 
the ground, as well as internationally. International NGOs lobby their governments to pressure the 
target government, which, if successful, can result in diplomatic denunciations and even economic 
sanction. Pressure from “above” is complemented by pressure from “below” (Ackerman and Duvall 
1995; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Sikkink 1999). Domestic 
campaigns of “naming and shaming” works as a kind of persuasion (Keck and Sikkink 1998) by 
making political elites question the legitimacy of current policies or political institutions (Beissinger 
2007; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).  
 When working according to plan, persuasion strategy is capable of making political leaders 
defect or re-brand themselves as supporters, something that was common among political elites 
during the height of glasnost (Beissinger 2007). 
 
7. Core Tenets  o f  Mobi l izat ion Theory  
Insights from the discussion above constitute the core tenets of mobilization theory. They suggest 
that organizations should have a bias toward nonviolent tactics and against violent ones, and only 
employ violent tactics when nonviolent protest is deemed out of the question for either security 
reasons or because organizations cannot mobilize enough participants for a large demonstration, but 
enough for guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.   
 Drawing on this logic, I propose that organizations’ choice of tactic depends largely on two 
factors: 1) The level of popular satisfaction with the status quo, and 2) Anticipated repression of 
nonviolent protest. Both factors are closely linked to organizations’ ability to mobilize participants, 
and influence whether they employ nonviolent tactics, guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, or if 





Level of Popular Satisfaction With the Status Quo and Ability to Mobilize 
The level of popular satisfaction with the status quo determines the size of the constituency 
organizations can draw on for mobilization purposes. All else equal, the greater the fraction of the 
population that is unhappy with the current status quo the easier it should be for organizations to 
mobilize participants.  
 The number of people organizations are able to mobilize in turn determines the ability to 
employ different tactics effectively. Nonviolent protest (Amenta et al. 2010; Andrews 2001) and 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics are both likely to be more effective the more people can be 
mobilized to use the tactic. All else equal, the bias towards nonviolent tactics should however make 
it more likely that organizations capable of mobilizing many people will employ nonviolent tactics 
rather than guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.  
This explains why South African anti-apartheid movements all opted for nonviolent tactics 
as their initial tactic, and why the Algerian organizations Al-Qiyam, Dawa wa Tabligh, Takfir wa 
Hijra and FIS did the same.  
ANC only escalated to guerrilla tactics tactics upon realizing that it had a large enough 
member base, and that using non-violent tactics would jeopardize the existence of the organization 
and its members.  
MIA, MEI, and Takfir wa Hijra all escalated to guerrilla tactics after laying dormant prior 
and during FIS electoral campaign. They opted for guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics only when 
government lethal repression made clear that nonviolent tactics was too dangerous to employ, but 
elections had conveyed information about the extent of FIS’ support, which they believed they 
could draw on for mobilization purposes.  
BC and UDF did not escalate to violent tactics even in face of severe repression, because 





given that the majority of South Africans willing to use violence had already joined, or was in the 
process of joining, the already militant ANC.  
Terrorism, on the other hand, can arguably be employed effectively even with a small 
number of active participants.41 Hence, I assume that organizations that employ terrorism are those 
with a limited constituency, since had they more popular support they would opt for either 
guerrilla/conventional warfare or nonviolent tactics. Despite the permissive logistical demands of 
terrorism, the strategy behind using it for the purposes of coercion requires targeting civilians that 
can influence their governments, conditions most commonly found in democracies (Pape 2005).42  
 Organizations that are less capable of mobilizing people are also less likely to employ 
nonviolent tactics for the purposes of making compellent threats. This is since if organizations can 
only muster small demonstrations they are unlikely to be perceived as serious latent military threats 
by governments. The original MIA and MEI in Algeria gave up using nonviolent tactics and instead 
turned to violent tactics partly because they couldn’t generate enough support for nonviolent tactics.  
 Governments in rentier states are especially ardent about seeking to keep popular 
satisfaction with the status quo high in order to keep dissent about the lack of democracy and civil 
liberties low. They seek to do so by providing ample amount of public goods and rents (Beblawi 
1990). If they are able to do so successfully, one should expect organizations to be especially inactive 
in rentier states. This explains why there was little to no Islamic contestation in Algeria until after the 
decline in oil-prices in the mid-1980s.  
 
 
                                                
41 More participants should make it harder for organizations to stay covert to the extent needed for the 
effective employment of terrorism.  
 





The logic of mobilization theory is represented by the following path-diagram (Van Evera 1997): 
  Level of popular satisfaction with status quo                                               
                    ↓                                                    Anticipated repression of                                                                                                                
      Size of constituency                                                     nonviolent protest                                                                               
                            ↓                                                                    ↓              
        Organizational ability to employ                               Ability to mobilize constituency           
                  different tactics                                                     for nonviolent protest 
                                 ⤷             Organizations’ use of tactic                ⤶ 
    
This discussion suggests the following testable hypotheses:   
 
H1: Organizations active in political environments where anticipated level of government repression of nonviolent  
       protest is low, and popular satisfaction with the status quo is low, are more likely to use nonviolent tactics.  
 
H2: Organizations active in political environments where anticipated level of government repression of nonviolent  
       protest is high, and popular satisfaction with the status quo is low, are more likely to use guerrilla  
       warfare/conventional warfare.   
 
H3: Organizations active in political environments where anticipated level of government repression of nonviolent  
       protest is low, and where popular satisfaction with the status quo is high, are more likely to use nonviolent tactics.  
 
H4: Organizations active in political environments where anticipated level of government repression of nonviolent  
       protest is high, and popular support of the status quo is high, are more likely to abstain from using nonviolent,      
      guerrilla/conventional warfare, or terrorist tactics.  
 
H5: Organizations with a small constituency in relation to the size of the overall populace are more likely to employ  
       terrorism, and those with a large constituency in relation to the size of the overall populace are more likely to              
       employ nonviolent tactics.  
  
H6: Organizations in rentier states are more likely to abstain from using tactics. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the core hypotheses of mobilization theory: 
Table 1. Core Hypotheses 
Mobilization Theory 
High Repression Low Repression  
 
Low Popular Satisfaction 










High Popular Satisfaction 
With the Status Quo 
 




















Chapter  6  
Data Sources ,  Empir i ca l  Strategy ,  and Conceptual izat ion and Coding o f  Variables   
 
1.  Introduct ion and Outl ine o f  Chapter  
Having laid out the logic of mobilization and opportunity structure theory and presented their 
testable hypotheses I now turn to the statistical analysis. Prior to commencing hypotheses testing, 
however, I need to describe the data sources used for the analyses, discuss the empirical strategy 
employed, and how I conceptualize and code the dependent and independent variables. This is the 
purpose of this chapter, which is divided into four sections.  
 I begin by reviewing the data sources, unit of analysis and empirical strategy employed. 
Second, I explain how the MENA and Africa datasets are composed and how I conceptualize and 
code the dependent variable. Third, I discuss the conceptualization and coding of independent and 
control variables. I conclude by addressing issues of scope condition, selection effects, endogeneity 
and multicollinearity.  
 
2.  Data Sources   
I employ two datasets for empirical testing of mobilization and opportunity structure theory 





 The MENA dataset is a time-series cross-sectional dataset that tracks tactical choice among 
53 organizations in high state capacity countries with maximalist political grievances representing 
ethnic minority interests in Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Turkey 
from 1980-2004. It is based on the publicly available Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior 
(MAROB) dataset (Asal et al. 2008). 
 The Africa dataset is a time-series cross-sectional dataset featuring 167 organizations with 
maximalist political grievances across 37 African low state capacity countries from 1990-2010.   
It is a new dataset assembled for the purposes of this project. As far as the author knows, as of May 
2014, there are no other datasets featuring information about organizations’ chouce of tactics among 
as many organizations and countries as the Africa dataset. It covers eight years more than the Africa 
Conflict Location Event Dataset (ACLED),43 and close to 25 more countries than MAROB. 
The Africa dataset draws on event count data made publicly available through three sources; 
1) Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) (Hendrix and Saleyhan et al. 2012); 2) Uppsala 
Conflict Geo-Referenced Event Dataset Point (UCDP) (Sundberg et al. 2010); and 3) Global 
Terrorism Dataset (GTD) (LaFree and Dugan 2007).  
                                                
43 To the author’s knowledge, there are currently three datasets that feature information about use of both 
violent and nonviolent tactics: 1) Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO 1.1.) (Chenoweth and 
Stephan 2011); African Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) (Raleigh et al. 2011); and Minorities at 
Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB) (Asal et al 2008). NAVCO and ACLED are unsuitable dataset 
candidates for me to employ for the purposes of this dissertation, making MAROB the best option. The 
NAVCO dataset is not ideal for me to use for two reasons. First, NAVCO’s unit of analysis is the country 
year in which a nonviolent or violent campaign peaked. It does not track organizations’ choice of tactics across 
time. Second, violent campaigns included are an unrepresentative sample of the larger universe of cases. Only 
violent campaigns coded as having reached the limit of a civil war according to the Correlates of War dataset 
(COW, Sarkees et al. 2000) - requiring “1,000 battle deaths to have occurred during the course of the 
conflict” – were included in NAVCO. This subset of violent conflicts is likely to represent the tail end of the 
distribution of violent campaigns, excluding the likely much broader subset of violent conflicts of lesser 
intensity. ACLED would have been an ideal dataset to use, was it not for the way they code protest events: 
The decision to code protests that turn violent as “riots” makes it impossible to differentiate between riots 





Because I am interested in predicting organizations’ use of tactics across time, rather than 
the exact date tactics were used, I convert the original format for the unit of analysis in the datasets 
from event-date to organization-year.  
 
3. Unit  o f  Analys is  and Dependent  Variable  
My research question addresses choice of tactics among organizations with maximalist political 
demands across space as well as over time. The unit of analysis of interest is therefore the tactic used 
by an organization in a given year.   
The dependent variable consists of four categorical variables; 1) None of the tactics used;              
2)Nonviolent tactics; 3) Guerrilla/Conventional warfare tactics; and 4) Terrorism. 
 
4. Empir i ca l  Strategy :  The Model  and Steps o f  the Stat is t i ca l  Analys is   
Statistical Model: Multinomial Logit 
Since the dependent variable is polychotomous, categorical, and choice-dependent I use a 
multinomial logit model with robust standard errors. I fit a model featuring country clusters in order 
to take into account that organizations within the same country may not be independent of each 
other.44  
 Although it is generally recommended to include a lagged dependent variable to control for 
temporal dependency when analyzing time-series data (Beck, Katz et al., 1998), I do not because it is 
not warranted for theoretical reasons - I assume that factors that determine organizations’ initial 
                                                





choice of tactic also determine potential changes in tactics over time - and because it dramatically 
changes the specification of the model.45  
Including a lagged dependent variable entails assuming that whatever causes organizations to 
employ a particular tactic one year is the same reason they used that tactic the previous year, which 
in turn is caused by the same reasons that caused them to pick the tactic the previous year, etc. If so, 
including a lagged dependent variable makes it hard to ascertain the effect of the key independent 
variables in the current year, assuming they are the same as they were the previous year and actually 
what is driving organizations’ use of tactics, since they will be represented within the lagged 
dependent variable.46  
Because I use a statistical model that requires values of the dependent variable to be 
independent from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) I run Small-Hsiao and Hausman tests on the MENA 
and Africa models.47 About half of the test statistics for each model reports support for the null 
hypothesis that odds of different outcome categories are independent of other alternatives. For the 
full results of these tests see, the Appendix. 
Because the Hausman and Small-Hsiao tests can report contradictory findings, some 
scholars recommend instead looking at your theory to assess whether choices “can plausibly be 
assumed to be distinct and weighted independently...”(McFadden (1973) quoted in Long 2007, 243). 
Despite including a combined guerilla and conventional warfare tactics category together, I believe 
there is theoretical support for the notion that the tactics represented in the dependent variable are 
                                                
45 The findings generally stay robust when I run the models with a lagged dependent variable, although 
differences are more marked in the MENA 1 and 2 analyses.   
 
46 I am grateful to Page Fortna for pointing this out.  
 





distinct, as represented by the large literature devoted to each in the political science literature. I 
therefore proceed to assume that I am not in violation of the IIA rule and that using a multinomial 
logit model is statistically appropriate. 
 
Steps of the Statistical Analysis 
My statistical analysis is divided into three steps. I begin by analyzing the MENA dataset using fairly 
precise proxy independent variables related to mobilization theory’s key hypotheses. The primary 
MENA analysis is referred to as MENA 1.  
 I want to be able to compare the generalizability of the MENA findings to another region 
and a broader set of organizations, but cannot use the more fine-grained proxy measurements I use 
in MENA 1 when analyzing the Africa dataset. Therefore, I conduct a second MENA analysis using 
cruder proxies for key hypotheses of mobilization theory that can also be used in the Africa analysis. 
The secondary MENA analysis, the findings of which I then compare to those of the Africa analysis, 
is referred to as MENA 2. 
 In contrast to MENA 1, MENA 2 also excludes organizations that do not use any tactics of 
interest during the time they are present in the dataset. This is done to make the inclusion rules in 
the MENA 2 dataset better replicate the Africa dataset, which does not include such organizations 
for the only reason that it cannot identify them.  
 Despite my efforts to make the MENA 2 and Africa statistical analysis as comparable as 
possible, I am unable to do so comprehensively. Although the MENA 2 and Africa analysis use the 
same proxies to evaluate mobilization theory’s key hypotheses, and exclude organizations that 
abstain from using tactics during their presence in the datasets, the datasets differ in two, arguably 





while the Africa dataset includes only organizations in low state capacity states; and 2) Organizations 
in the MENA datasets have been active for at least three years and represent ethnic groups, whereas 
the Africa dataset includes a broader set of organizations using a tactic at least once during a year.   
 Upon concluding the MENA 1, MENA 2, and Africa analyses, I compare the Africa 
findings with those of MENA 2 in order to assess to what extent the results are comparable.  
 Similar findings across datasets indicate that the MENA 2 findings may be generalizable to 
another region and broader set of organizations beyond those representing ethnic groups.  
 Disparate findings between MENA 2 and Africa, on the other hand, may indicate that 
culture and/or level of state capacity influence organizations’ tactical choice. 
 
5. Composi t ion o f  Datasets :  Inc lus ion Criter ia for  Organizat ions in Datasets  
General Inclusion Rules  
Three general conditions must apply for organizations to be included in the datasets: 
Organizations…1) Must call themselves by a specific name and be of domestic origin; 2) Cannot 
have been created by the government, or be represented or running for office; and 3) Must have 
maximalist political demands aimed at their domestic government.  
 
MENA 1 and 2 
Inclusion in the original dataset (MAROB) used to compose the MENA 1 and 2 datasets requires an 
organization to fulfill five criteria. These entail that the organization 1)“makes explicit claims to 
represent the interests of one or more ethnic groups and/or the organization’s members are 
primarily members of a specific ethnic minority”; 2)“is political in its goals and activities”; 3)“is 
active at a regional and/or national level”; 4)”not [be] created by a government”; and 5) “is active 





 The MAROB dataset is unique in that it allows me to identify “dogs that don’t bark” (Doyle 
1892), namely organizations that do not use any of the tactics of interest, but still technically fulfill 
my inclusion criteria for organizations.  
Various organizations representing Palestinian interests have bases in more than one country in 
the dataset. The main political objectives of the majority of these are usually directed towards the 
Israeli government. Hence, I only include entries of these organizations’ domestic activity in Israel.48  
 Several organizations representing Palestinian interests seek to make Israel acquiesce in 
political demands are in exile and/or located in neighboring countries but not in Israel. Since I want 
organizations’ structural constraints to be as similar as possible I do not include such organizations.  
Finally, organizations must have maximalist political demands to be included in the dataset. 
To make sure this is the case, I rely on MAROB’s coding of political grievances. I only include those 
with issue areas that entail requests for political self-determination and territorial autonomy, since 
these are maximalist political demands. I incorporate the majority of cases of political grievances 





                                                
48 I do not include entries that have organizations coded vis-a-vis their host country governments (typically 






In addition to the general inclusion rules, inclusion in the Africa dataset requires organizations49 to 
employ strikes, demonstrations, guerrilla/conventional warfare, or terrorist tactics. 
 Data on organizations’ use of nonviolent tactics for the Africa dataset is obtained from 
SCAD, while information on organizations’ use of violent tactics come from UCDP and GTD.  
UCDP only includes events involving non-state actors whose use of violent tactics in 
fighting governments killed at least 25 people during any one year. Once organizations qualify for 
inclusion in UCDP, all violent events from 1990-2010 involving this actor are included in the dataset 
as long as they incurred at least one death. UCDP does not specify the type of violent tactic 
employed, resulting in my assuming that it is either guerrilla or conventional warfare tactics. This 
means that I refer to these two military tactics jointly as “guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.” 
 Although UCDP inclusion rule should allow me to identify most organizations using violent 
tactics against governments, it is nevertheless possible that I am failing to include those whose 
armed engagement did not reach the 25 fatalities cut-off specified. In an effort to include 
organizations not reaching this inclusion threshold, I also employ GTD.50 
 GTD includes information on violent events that for the purposes of this project can be 
considered either guerrilla/conventional or terrorist tactics. I discuss the coding of these separate 
                                                
49 Qualified organizations can be political as well as unions and professional associations. Professional 
associations and unions often take on the function of political parties and/or organizations in less than 
democratic countries where rules of associations and civil liberties are severely constrained. For a discussion 
of this phenomena as applied to the Middle East see Carapico, Ch.4, Angrist Ed. (2010). 
 
50 Because the original coding material for 1993 went missing, the GTD dataset only include an estimated 
15% of all attacks in 1993. Consequently, the entire year’s entry was excluded from the dataset since it was 






tactics in more detail below. For now, suffice to say that I only include entries from GTD that fulfill 
my criteria of either guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics or terrorism.  
 I only include domestic organizations fighting their domestic government within the territory 
of their country of origin.51  
 Finally, organizations are only included in my dataset if they have maximalist political 
demands. For the Africa dataset, I obtain information about political demands from SCAD and 
UCDP. The political demands of organizations only featured in GTD are obtained by conducting 
Nexis searches of news wires. 
 
Organizations in Each Dataset 
Once the inclusion rules have been enforced, the MENA 1 dataset includes 53 and the MENA 2 
dataset 40 organizations52 with maximalist political grievances across nine MENA countries and the 
Africa dataset includes 167 organizations with maximalist political grievances across 37 African 
countries.   
As is evident from graph 1 and 2, organizations are unevenly distributed across countries. In 
the MENA 1 dataset, Iraq and Israel have the most number of organizations. The counterparts in 
                                                
51 For example, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) originated in Uganda, but has perpetrated violent acts in 
neighboring countries. Subsequently, I only include events that involved the LRA in Uganda. It also means I 
exclude attacks by multinational organizations, such as for example Al Qaeda, which is active in Africa but 
originated in Saudi Arabia. It also means I exclude events where organizations fight domestic governments 
outside of their borders. For example, the government of Uganda has fought the LRA outside of Uganda.  
 
52 The organizations excluded from the MENA 2 analysis include Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie 
(Algeria); National Liberation Movement of Southern Azerbaijan (Iran); Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulus Partisi 
and Democratic Mass Party (Turkey); Kurdish Islamic Group, Islamic Labor Organization, Iraqi Islamic 
Party, Iraqi National Alliance, Iraqi Homeland Party, and Democratic Centrist Tendency (Iraq); Islamic Unity 






the Africa dataset are Chad and the Democratic Republic of Congo.  For a complete list of 
organizations and their tactical choices across time, see the Appendix. 
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6. Coding the Dependent  Variable  
If MAROB indicates that organizations use nonviolent tactics in a given year I code the dependent 
variable “1”. Nonviolent tactics include strikes, demonstrations, petitions and sit-ins.53 I code the 
dependent variable “2” if MAROB reports that organizations uses guerrilla warfare tactics, and “3” 
if it says organizations used terrorism.  Since MAROB does not define terrorism beyond stating that 
it entails targeting civilians, I impose two additional constraints: 1) Civilian targeting that constitutes 
ethnic cleansing is not considered terrorism; and 2) Terrorism entails attacks on civilians conducted 
using either a bomb or suicide bomber.  I obtain this information from MAROB.  
  I consult SCAD to code the nonviolent tactics part of the dependent variable in the Africa 
dataset. The dependent variable is coded “1” if the tactic used is either demonstrations54 or strikes.55  
 The inclusion rules for nonviolent tactics are broader in the MENA dataset than in the 
Africa dataset: The MENA dataset includes sit-ins and petitions as well. This is because I have more 
information about nonviolent tactics for the MENA dataset. Rather than truncating the dependent 
variable in a way that is unrepresentative of the empirical reality and discarding information (King et 
al. 1994, 130), I code the nonviolent part of the dependent variable differently across datasets.  
  I consult GTD and UCDP to code whether organizations used guerrilla/conventional 
warfare or if they used terrorism in the year being coded. I code all events from UCDP that involve 
                                                
53 MAROB codes demonstrations, rallies and riots as “demonstrations” without giving the user an ability to 
ascertain which of these were used. I assume riots started off as demonstrations and turned violent, not that 
they were premeditated violent events.   
 
54 SCAD defines an “organized demonstration” as an event where [d]istinct, continuous, and largely peaceful 
action [is] directed toward members of a distinct “other” group or government authorities [and where a] clear 
leadership or organization(s) can be identified.” (Codebook V. 3.0, Saleyhan et al. 2012, 2). SCAD’s definition 
of an organized demonstration is rather broad, resulting in my going through all entries to make sure that I 
only include the types of nonviolent events that qualify as mass protest events. I exclude entries where hunger 
strikes by individuals were coded as demonstrations. 
 






battles between organizations and governments within the borders of the state they are associated 
with as “2” for guerrilla/conventional warfare. I continue coding the guerrilla/conventional warfare 
part of the dependent variable using GTD. GTD features a wide variety of events, some of which 
do not fulfill my criteria for terrorism but are suitable candidates for the guerrilla/conventional 
warfare tactics category. I code GTD events characterized as “armed attacks” that are targeting 
either police and/or military as guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.  
 The dependent variable is coded “3” for terrorism if events in GTD include explosive 
devices and target the general public, restaurants, shops or public transportation.   
 
Dealing with Use of Multiple Tactics in the Same Year 
Sometimes organizations employ more than one tactic in the same year.  
There are 28 observations in the MENA56 dataset and five observations in the Africa57 
dataset of organizations employing violent and nonviolent tactics in the same year.  
There are 17 observations in MENA58 dataset and 27 observations in the Africa59 dataset of 
organizations using terrorism and guerrilla warfare/conventional warfare in the same year.  
                                                
56 These organizations include Polisario (Morocco), Organization of Revolutionary Toilers in Iranian 
Kurdistan, Kurdistan (Kurdish) Democratic Party of Iran (Iran), the Partiya Karkari Kurdistan (PKK) 
(Turkey), the Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah of Iraq, the Iraqi Communist Party, the Islamic Action 
Organization (Iraq), and Hamas (Israel).  
 
57 These organizations include UNITA (Angola), the Islamic Party of Kenya (Kenya) and the African 
National Congress (South Africa). 
 
58 These organizations are the PKK (Turkey), Ansar al-Islam and Hizb al-Da’wa al-Islamiyya (Iraq) and 
Hamas (Israel). 
 
59 These observations represents the MIA and Al Queda in Mesopotamia (the latter is included because it 
originated as a domestic group) (Algeria), UNITA (Angola), al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (Egypt), AIAI and OLF 
(Ethiopia), FPR (Rwanda), MDFC (Senegal), ANC and Pan African Congress (PAC) (South Africa), 






The multinominal logit model requires that values of the dependent variable are categorically 
distinct. Hence, I cannot include a mixed category in my model without theoretically being in 
violation of the IIA rule.  
 Rather than excluding these entries, I assign them across different categories of the 
dependent variable. Year entries where organizations used both violent and nonviolent tactics are 
assigned to the nonviolent category and year entries where organizations employed both terrorism 
and guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics in the same year is coded as guerrilla/conventional 
warfare tactics.60  
 For an overview of the dependent variables for MENA 1, MENA 2 and Africa see graph 3, 
4 and 5, respectively. As is evident from comparing the graphs, it is much more common for 
MENA organizations to abstain from using tactics. This is partly due to my including organizations 
that do not employ any of the tactics of interest in the MENA 1 dataset, whereas this is not possible 
in the Africa dataset.  As can be seen in graph 4, representing MENA 2, the propensity to abstain 
from using tactics is still high when I exclude these organizations.   
Another difference is the frequency by which guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics is used 
in the Africa dataset, as seen in graph 5. Indeed, this tactic is used more than twice as often in Africa 
than it is in MENA. Terrorism is about twice as frequent in MENA compared to Africa. Nonviolent 




                                                
60 I initially assigned these observations across two dependent variables, with the second being coded the 
opposite way as the one referred to in the text. I decided which dependent variable to include based on 
comparing the respective AIC/BIC values. AIC/BIC values are a better estimator of model fit than pseudo 
R-squared for multinomial logit models. Since the AIC/BIC value for dependent variable two is lowest for 





Graph 3: Values of the Dependent Variable, MENA 1 
 
Graph 4: Values of the Dependent Variable, MENA 2 
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7. Operat ional izat ion and Coding o f  Key Independent  Variables  
Mobilization Theory  
The key explanatory variables for mobilization theory are: 1) Level of anticipated repression of 
nonviolent protest; and 2) Level of popular satisfaction with the status quo. Because I have more 
detailed information on organizational characteristics for the MENA dataset, I operationalize and 
code these variables differently for the MENA 1 versus the MENA 2 and Africa analyses. Each way 
has certain strengths and weaknesses.  
 For the MENA 1 analysis I use lethal repression by the state against the organization as a proxy for 
anticipated repression of nonviolent tactics. Organizations that have been targeted with lethal force 
in the previous year are likely to believe that they will be targeted with lethal force if using 
nonviolent protest in the current year. I obtain this information from MAROB.  
Lacking such information for the Africa dataset, I use respect for human rights as a crude proxy 
for anticipated repression of nonviolent tactics for the MENA 2 and Africa analysis. Data on the 
level of human rights within the country is obtained from the Political Terror Scale (Gibney et al. 
2008), which codes the level of human rights in ascending scale from 1 to 5 using reports from 
Amnesty and the State Department.61  
                                                
61 An alternative measurement of human rights is the CIRI (Cingranelli-Richards) Human Rights Dataset. 
Although this dataset is somewhat superior to the Political Terror Scale because it has a public codebook, it 
does not code many Middle Eastern countries. The Political Terror Scale codes the Middle East as well as 
Africa. For a somewhat biased discussion of how the two datasets compare to each other see Gibney and 






The positive aspects of operationalizing anticipated lethal repression of nonviolent protest as 
I do for MENA 1 is that it is likely to be a more accurate predictor. The drawback of using this 
measure is that it can only be coded for organizations that employed a tactic the previous year.  
The MENA 2 and Africa operationalization, on the other hand, is a more general assessment 
of anticipated repression of nonviolent protest that can be applied to all organizations. But it may be 
an imperfect proxy because it assumes that governments treat all organizations using nonviolent 
protest the same way, something they may not (Lust-Okar 2004). Nevertheless, for the purposes of 
this project it is the best proxy available. 
 Political discrimination suffered by the ethnic groups represented by the organization serves as a proxy for 
popular satisfaction with the status quo for the MENA 1 dataset. I code this variable using data 
from the Minorities at Risk (2009) data project.62  Low values of political discrimination are believed 
to correlate with high levels of popular satisfaction with the status quo and vice versa. The 
discrimination proxy implicitly assumes that organizations’ constituency does not extend beyond the 
ethnic group represented by them.  
 I use annual growth in GDP as a crude proxy for popular satisfaction with the status quo for 
the MENA 2 and Africa dataset. I obtain data on this variable from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI). Needless to say, this is a very crude measure of popular satisfaction 
with the status quo.63 It also suffers from the same type of drawbacks as the human rights measure: 
                                                
62 For a discussion about methodologically appropriate and inappropriate ways to employ the Minorities at 
Risk dataset, see Hug (2013). 
 






Using it makes the assumption that the populace is a monolith from which organizations can recruit. 
Nevertheless, due to a lack of better alternatives, this measure will have to suffice.  
 Because I have theoretical reasons to believe that anticipated repression of nonviolent tactics 
and level of popular satisfaction with the status quo have a joint effect on organizations’ choice of 
tactics that is different from the effect of each individual variable, I construct them as interaction 
terms. Seeking to simplify an otherwise complicated model, I construct these as dummies in order to 
make the statistical results somewhat easier to interpret substantively. 
 For MENA 1 I create a dummy variable named High Repression indicating whether 
organizations were targets of lethal government violence in the previous year. An organization 
targeted by lethal government violence in the previous year is coded “1”, and if it was not, “0.” 
I code values higher than the mean as high discrimination, i.e. Low Satisfaction With the Status 
Quo. If satisfaction with the status quo is low it is coded as “1,” and “0” otherwise. 
 For MENA 2 and Africa, I average the score between the two human rights reports and 
create a dummy variable for low human rights, i.e. High Repression, coded “1” if the score is equal or 
greater than four, and “0” otherwise.  Countries are coded as four in the Political Terror Scale if 
“[c]ivil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, 
disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror 
affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas; and five when “[t]error has expanded to 
the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness 
with which they pursue personal or ideological goals” 64 
                                                





 Since I have theoretical reasons to believe that negative and positive GDP growth are likely 
to have different effects, I create a dummy variable for negative GDP growth. This dummy takes on 
the value of “1” when GDP growth is negative, i.e. low popular satisfaction with the status quo, and 
“0” otherwise.  
 Having coded these variables, I proceed to create one set of interaction terms for each 
dataset: High Repression and Low Satisfaction with the Status Quo.65 The omitted base category is Low 
Repression and High Satisfaction with the Status Quo. 
 I lag all explanatory variables a year in an effort to deal with endogeneity problems.  
 
Opportunity Structure Theory 
The key independent variables of opportunity structure theory are: 1) Government regime type; and 
2) State capacity.  
 I code target government regime type using the Polity2 version of PolityIV (Marshall and 
Jaggers 2002). I do so even though Polity IV’s political participation measures are problematic. 
These measures are less than ideal because they incorporate violent conflict as part of the definitions 
of political participation (Vreeland 2008),66 something that causes problems when analyzing 
dependent variables related to armed conflict. Because many organizations included in the datasets 
are active during civil war, and only the Polity2 version of Polity IV codes regime type during these 
circumstances, I use Polity2 rather than the less problematic XPolity (Vreeland 2008).  
                                                
65 For a discussion about the correct and incorrect way to interpret interaction terms, see Braumoeller (2004). 
 





The manner that the Polity2 version of Polity IV codes regime type during “interregnum” 
periods – which most often take place during civil war – however, is also problematic. During 
periods of civil war all regimes are given the regime coding “0”, hence effectively coding them as 
anocracies (Vreeland 2008). Since guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics are very likely to be used 
during periods of civil war, I need to code regime type during these periods so as not to truncate the 
dependent variable in a way that is unrepresentative of the empirical reality (King et al. 2001). Yet, 
accepting Polity2’s coding of regime type during civil war is too misleading.  
To address this problem, I begin by recoding all entries in which Polity2 codes regime type 
as anocracies because the country is in an interregnum period/civil war, as missing. I then recode 
these entries using two rules. First, I code missing entries that are either preceded or followed by a 
regime type coding the same way. In cases where I have a missing value that is both preceded and 
followed by a regime type coding, I opt to code the missing entry according to the preceding year. 
This coding rule allows me to code several, but not all, of the missing regime type entries.  
Polity2 ranges from -10 to 10. I create two regime type dummy variables: anocracy and 
autocracy. Following convention in the literature, regimes are coded as anocracies if Polity2 ranges 
from -5 to 5, and autocracy if Polity2 is less than -5. The omitted base category is democracy, which 
ranges from 6 to 10.  
Recoding Polity2 allows me to fill some, but not all of the missing entries in the regime type 
coding. For remaining missing entries, I use Vanhanen’s (2000) Polyarchy dataset. It focuses on 





I translate Vanhanen’s regime type entries as regime type dummy variables. Vanhanen notes 
that entries over 5 should be considered democracies. Based on this, I make the explicit assumption 
that anocracies range from 2.5-5, and autocracies range from less than 2.5.  
Because Vanhanen’s dataset is only coded until 2000 and has its own missing data entries, I 
am unable to code missing entries taking place during civil wars after that.  
Following the norm in the literature, I use GDP per capita as a proxy for government state 
capacity.67 Drawing on the World Bank’s classification of economies, I code economies classified as 
low to lower middle income as low state capacity and those classified as upper middle income or 
higher as high state capacity. 68 
The majority of countries in the MENA dataset qualify as high state capacity states and 
those in the Africa dataset as low state capacity states. Because I have little meaningful variation in 
state-capacity in MENA and Africa countries, respectively, I only include organization-year entries in 
which MENA countries are coded as high state capacity states, and vice versa for African countries. 
Doing so precludes the need to generate an interaction term for government regime type and state 
capacity. Hence, I only test opportunity structure hypotheses about the effect of high state capacity 
using the MENA 1 and MENA 2 datasets, and low state capacity using the Africa dataset.  
 I include a variable measuring the size of the ethnic group represented by the organization in 
proportion to the overall population, and a variable measuring whether the organization received 
                                                
67 For an argument critiquing the use of GDP/capita as a proxy for state capacity see Hendrix (2010). 
 
68 Economies are classified according to 2012 GNI per capita, using the World Bank’s Atlas method of 
calculating Gross National Income (GNI). Economies that have GNI/capita of $1,035 or less are classified as 
low income, those with a GNI/capita of $1,036 - $4,085 as lower middle income; those with GNI/capita of 
$4,086 - $12,615 as upper middle income and those exceeding  $12,616 as high income.  






foreign state financial support in the previous year. Finally, I include a variable measuring the 
proportion of rural population relative to the overall population.  
I get data on ethnic group proportion from the Minorities at Risk dataset, information about 
foreign state financial support from MAROB, and data on rural population from WDI. Hypotheses 
about foreign state financial support and ethnic group proportion can only be analyzed using the 
MENA dataset due to lack of data for the Africa dataset.  
 I am statistically only able to test the rentier state hypothesis in the Africa dataset. The 
rentier state dummy variable is coded using information from WDI data on natural resources rents.69
 
Following convention in the literature, states whose combined rent income exceeds 30% of GDP 
are coded as rentier states. 
I lag all variables a year to minimize endogeity problems.  
 
Control Variables 
A Cold War dummy variable is included in the MENA 1 and 2 analyses. I assume that the Cold War 
was over by 1990.   
 
8. Issues o f  Selec t ion Effec t s ,  Endogenei ty ,  Mult i co l l ineari ty ,  and Scope Condit ions 
Selection Effects 
 
The existence of the unit of analysis - organizations - is highly related to government regime type. It 
is easier for organizations to emerge in democracies than in autocracies, given that the latter tend to 
                                                





impose harsh restraints on collective action, right to assembly and organizing. Although this presents 
a selection bias (Geddes 1990), it is possible that this bias is balanced out by a selection bias in the 
other direction: Organizations that have maximalist grievances, especially those calling for regime 
change70 are likely to be more common among less than democratic regimes.71  
 As is clear from graph 6, showing MENA organizations with all types of political demands, 
and graph 7, showing only those with maximalist political demands, the general pattern of their 
being most organizations in democracies, followed by autocracies and then anocracies, is similar in 
the two graphs. This suggests no major selection effect is at work.  
Graph 6: Organizations across Regime Type, All issue Areas, MENA  
 
Graph 7: Organizations Across Regime Type, Maximalist Issue Areas Only, MENA 
 
                                                
70 This is potentially less so for organizations calling for political self-determination, since organizations in 
democracies are known to call for secession and increased political autonomy as well.  
 























Graphs 8 and 9 show that most African organizations are located in anocracies, both when 
looking at all issue areas and maximalist issue areas only. There are more organizations in 
democracies than autocracies, but only when looking at all issue areas, as seen in graph 8. Graph 9 
tells us that the number of organizations with maximalist issue areas in democracies and autocracies 
are close to the same, with somewhat more organizations in autocracies. Hence, there may be a 
partial selection effect at work here.  
Graph 8: Organizations across Regime Type, All Issue Areas, Africa 
 


































It is possible that some of the explanatory variables are caused by organizations’ use of tactics.  
The level of political discrimination and repression against an organization representing 
ethnic groups may be precipitated by organizations using violent or nonviolent tactics.  
Likewise, it is possible that domestic instability resulting from organizations using violent 
tactics is causing the government to become more repressive or authoritarian, or alternatively, affect 
GDP growth, the MENA 2 and Africa proxy for popular satisfaction with the status quo. Domestic 
instability in the form of organizations employing violent tactics is also likely to influence popular 
satisfaction with the status quo at large.  
In order to control for these many potential sources of endogeneity, I lag the explanatory 





To what extent is regime type correlated with proxies for popular satisfaction with the status quo in 
the MENA 1, MENA 2, and Africa analyses? 
My proxy for Popular Satisfaction With the Status Quo in the MENA 1 analysis - total level of 
discrimination suffered by the ethnic group represented by the organizations – and Regime Type is 
68.8%. This is high and can be problematic in models with a lot of variables.  Yet, because neither of 
the two disaggregated measures -economic and political discrimination - can be turned into dummies 
that are not so collinear with other variables that the statistical package drops them, this measure 
must nevertheless be used.  
The correlation between my proxy for Popular Satisfaction With the Status Quo for the MENA 2 
analysis and Regime Type is significantly lower, at 14.8%. The corresponding value for the Africa 





 The correlation between Repression as measured in MENA 1 and Regime Type is    
-8.2%. The correlation between repression and regime type as measured in the MENA 2 analysis 
and regime type is pretty high at -45.3%. The corresponding Africa correlation is 17.69%. 
 To what extent is my proxy for Popular Satisfaction With the Status Quo in the MENA 1 analysis 
- level of total discrimination- and level of Repression correlated with each other and to what extent 
are they exogenous and independent of each other? The correlation between political discrimination 
suffered by the ethnic group represented by the organization and the extent to which the 
organization is a target of government repression is about 22.4%. The corresponding value for the 
MENA 2 analysis is -15.08%, and 14.15% for Africa.  
 Finally, it is possible that foreign state financial support is correlated with the Cold War. The 
correlation between the level of foreign state financial support and the Cold War is only 2%.   
None of these correlations are high enough to be considered too multicollinear.72  
 
Scope Conditions  
The MAROB dataset is unique in being the only publicly available dataset that allows me to track 
variation in organizations’ use of tactics across both time and country. Despite being the best 
publicly available dataset available, there are two drawbacks to using this data.  
 First, MENA is one of the most conflict-prone, and undemocratic regions in the world. 
Authoritarian governments’ efforts to stifle civil society activism through legal means and the heavy 
punishments levied on individuals seeking to organize for political purposes have made collective 
                                                
72 According to Kennedy (2003, 209) correlations have to be .8 to .9 for multicollinearity to be a cause for 
statistical concern. I do not believe Achen’s (2005) criticism about garbage-can regressions apply in this case, 
since I do not control for a wide variety of variables. It is true that the model includes many variables, but 





action organizing incredibly difficult.73 Organizations active in such extreme settings may be 
qualitatively different from organizations active elsewhere.    
 For the purposes of initial analysis and theory testing, however, some level of homogeneity 
among the organizations analyzed may be preferable. Indeed, one of the strengths of the MENA 
dataset is that it holds organization type and region constant.  
 Second, the particular sample of organizations included in the dataset may or may not be 
comparable to the overall universe of organizations and is likely to limit the generalizability of my 
findings. Hence, any conclusions about what explains variation in organizations’ choice of tactics 
reached in the MENA 1 and MENA 2 analyses can only confidently be said to hold for this 
particular subset of organizations.  
 It may be possible to ascertain to what extent MENA findings translate to a different region 
and broader universe of cases. This is primarily what is attempted in the section that compares the 
MENA 2 findings with those of Africa. The Africa dataset has greater breadth in terms of country 
spread and includes a larger number of organizations, making it appropriate for such purposes.  
 Another important drawback influencing scope conditions is that the Africa dataset includes 
only low state capacity states and the MENA dataset the opposite.  Since opportunity structure 
theory considers the level of state capacity an explanatory variable, I have to look at results from 
both the MENA 2 and Africa analyses to assess the overall explanatory power of opportunity 
structure theory. Hence, I can only test mobilization theory equally across both datasets. 
 
 
                                                
73 Restrictions on political organizing have resulted in organizations such as labor unions, professional 
associations, and sometimes even sports clubs taking on the role traditionally served by political parties. For 
more on limitations to civil society organizing in the Middle East and the coping mechanisms employed by 










Chapter  7  
Variat ion in Tact i cs  in the Middle  East and North Afri ca:  A Stat is t i ca l  Analys is   
 
1.  Introduct ion and Chapter  Outl ine 
This chapter assesses the extent to which mobilization and opportunity structure theory receive 
statistical support for predicting tactical choice among organizations in nine MENA countries: 
Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, and Turkey. 
 The chapter consists of four parts. I begin by presenting the findings of the MENA 1 
analysis. Second, I discuss findings of the MENA 2 analysis. Third, I talk about the results from 
MENA 1 and 2 analyses from a comparative perspective. I conclude by discussing the reasons why 
MENA 1 and 2 results differ.   
 
2. Stat is t i ca l  Findings ,  MENA 1 Analys is  
Statistical Findings Presented as Changes in Predicted Probabilities 
Given the difficulties involved in interpreting the results using the normal output for multinomial 
logit, I present and discuss the results exclusively as changes in predicted probabilities.74 For the full 
results of the multinomial logit model, see the Appendix.   
                                                





 While the pseudo R-squared is an imperfect measure of model fit, it does nevertheless tell us 
something about how much of the variation in the dependent variable is being explained. The 
pseudo R-squared of the regular multinomial logit results is .3639, which is relatively high given that 
I am trying to ascertain four different outcomes; Whether organizations are using nonviolent, 
guerrilla/conventional, terrorist tactics, or none of these tactics.  
 I only calculate changes in predicted probabilities for independent variables that are 
statistically significant in the regular multinomial logit results. All explanatory variables of interest, 
except Rural Population, are statistically significant.  
 I calculate changes in predicted probabilities with a 90% confidence interval while holding 
all variables, except the variable of interest, at their median.  
 Merely because an explanatory variable is statistically significant in the multinomial logit 
output does not mean that I will be successful in calculating changes in predicted probabilities in a 
way that is statistically significant, as will be seen below.75   
   
Changes in Predicted Probabilities: Mobilization Theory, MENA 1  
Core Hypotheses 
I use an interaction term to analyze the core hyptheses of mobilization theory. To ameliorate ease of 
interpretation, I identify four different “profiles,” each representing a political condition 
corresponding to a core mobilization theory hypothesis. By comparing the predicted probabilities of 
these four profiles I can ascertain whether the core hypotheses made by mobilization theory are 
supported. Table 1 shows how each profile correspond to a specific condition and hypothesis.  
                                                
75 The changes in predicted probabilities are calculated in a way that allows me to see the overall changes in 
predicted probabilities of each tactic being used, as opposed to calculating the changes in predicted 
probabilities differently depending on what base category is omitted in either of the various multinomial logit 
models. In other words, it does not matter what base category is omitted in the regular model; the results are 
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Hypothesis Associated with Profile 1:  
High Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and Low Repression → Nonviolent Tactics 
Hypothesis Associated with Profile 2:  
Low Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and Low Repression → Nonviolent Tactics 
When political conditions are permissible, organizations can overcome the identification and saving 
face problem inherent in the peacetime bargaining dilemma by using nonviolent tactics, which also 
ameliorates the information problem. The theory posits that organizations active under Profile 1 and 
Profile 2 conditions should be more likely to employ nonviolent tactics. Since the hypotheses 
associated with Profile 1 and 2 conditions predict the same outcome, there is no need to compare 
their predicted probabilities to each other. 
 Graph 1 shows that contrary to the theory’s expectations, organizations employ nonviolent 
tactics more often (0.11%) when active in political environments characterized by high popular 
satisfaction with the status quo and high anticipated repression (Profile 3 conditions), as well as 
those characterized by low popular satisfaction with the status quo and high anticipated repression 













 Graph 2 shows that compared to organizations active under Profile 2 conditions, 
nonviolent tactics are employed more frequently (6.74%) under Profile 4 conditions, but slightly less 
frequently (-1.33%) under Profile 3 conditions. Both results are statistically insignificant.  
 Based on this, I conclude that the hypothesis for Profile 1 is unsupported, while the one 
for Profile 2 receives weak support.  

































































Hypothesis Associated with Profile 3: 
High Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and High Repression → Abstain from Using Any Tactic 
Hypothesis Associated with Profile 4: 
Low Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and High Repression → Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare  
When anticipated repression of nonviolent tactics is high, organizations cannot safely employ this 
tactic to overcome the peacetime bargaining dilemma. This means they either abstain from using 
tactics, or they anticipate the saving face problem and the low likelihood that governments will 
bargain with organizations making compellent threats in peacetime, and employ 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics to jumpstart the bargaining process.  Their ability to mobilize 
participants determines which of these options they employ.  
 When anticipated repression of nonviolent protest is high and popular satisfaction with the 
status quo is high (Profile 3 conditions), organizations will, despite being willing to use 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, be unable to mobilize enough people to effectively employ 
this tactic. Consequently, the will abstain from using any tactic at all.   
 This hypothesis is not supported. Graph 3 shows that organizations under both Profile 1 
(44.01%), 2 (48.12%), and 4 (5.7%) conditions are more prone to abstaining from using any tactic 












Graph 3. Changes in Predicted Probability, Profile 3, MENA 1 
 
 The theory predicts that when anticipated repression of nonviolent protest is high and 
popular satisfaction with the status quo is low (Profile 4 conditions), organizations are unable to 
employ nonviolent tactics safely, but capable of mobilizing enough participants to employ 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, resulting in their doing so.   
 Graph 4 tells me that organizations are more prone (32.48%) to employing 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics under Profile 4 than Profile 1 conditions. The finding is in the 
right direction but not statistically significant, meaning it is only weakly supported.  
 A comparison of the propensity to use guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics under Profile 
2 versus Profile 4 conditions shows that organizations are more likely (35.68%) to employ 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics under Profile 4 conditions, as seen in the same graph.  This 
finding is statistically significant, implying it is strongly supported.  
 The same graph also demonstrates that contrary to theoretical predictions, organizations 
are more prone (12.97%) to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics under Profile 3 
conditions than under Profile 4 conditions.  
 Since the hypothesis receives strong support in one case, weak support in another, and is 
unsupported in a third, I conclude that it is weakly supported overall.   

































Graph 4. Changes in Predicted Probability, Profile 4, MENA 1 
 
 
Summary: Findings Core Hypotheses, Mobilization Theory, MENA 1 
Mobilization theory is a fairly poor predictor of organizations’ use of tactics in the primary MENA 
analysis, as can be seen in summary table 2. Only two of four core hypotheses receives support, 
albeit weakly so. Organizations active under political conditions characterized by high anticipated 
repression of nonviolent protest and low popular satisfaction with the status quo are indeed more 
prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare, and organizations active under political 
conditions characterized by low anticipated repression of nonviolent protest and low popular 
satisfaction with the status quo are more likely to use nonviolent tactics.  
Table 2. MENA 1 






Low Popular Satisfaction 
With the Status Quo 
Guerrilla/Conventional 
√ Weakly supported 
Nonviolent 
√ Weakly supported 
High Popular Satisfaction 
With the Status Quo 
None of the tactics used 
x Not supported 
Nonviolent 







































Hypothesis Associated with Group Proportion: 
Group Proportion ↑ → Nonviolent 
Group Proportion ↓→Terrorism 
Beyond the core hypotheses, mobilization theory also suggests that the larger the size of 
organizations’ constituency – measured here as ethnic group proportion – the more likely 
organizations representing them are to employ nonviolent tactics. Conversely, the smaller the size of 
the constituency, the more likely organizations representing them are to employ terrorism.  
 Whereas graphs 5 shows that the hypothesis about nonviolent tactics is weakly supported, 
graph 6 demonstrates that the hypothesis predicting terrorism is unsupported.76  










                                                





























Graph 6: Effect of Ethnic Group Proportion on Use of Terrorism, MENA 1 
 
 
Changes in Predicted Probabilities: Opportunity Structure Theory, MENA 1  
Core Hypotheses 
The overall thesis of opportunity structure theory predicts that organizations will only employ tactics 
when conditions for doing so are strategically opportune. Opportunity structure theory’s core 
hypotheses, representing this overall thesis, are represented in table 3.  
 Since the MENA dataset includes high state capacity countries exclusively, I only test the 
hypotheses related to high state capacity here. I test the remaining hypotheses about the effect of 
low state capacity with the Africa dataset, since it only includes countries of such state capacity.  
Table 3. Core Hypotheses 
Opportunity Structure Theory, MENA 











































Hypothesis: High State Capacity Autocracy → None of the Tactics Used  
The theory posits that organizations in high state capacity autocracies are more likely to be deterred 
from using any tactic, since these regimes have a strong domestic security apparatus that monitors 
and represses status quo challengers. 
 This prediction bears out: Graph 7 shows that organizations are much more likely 
(24.02%) to abstain from using tactics in high state capacity autocracies than other high state 
capacity regimes. Because the finding is statistically significant, the hypothesis is strongly supported.   
Graph 7. Changes in Predicted Probability, High State Capacity Autocracy, MENA 1
 
 
Hypothesis: High State Capacity Anocracy → Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare Tactics 
The hypothesis stating that guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics should be more commonly 
employed by organizations in high state capacity anocracies than in other types of high state capacity 
regimes because anocracies have inherently weak bureaucracies, does not receive support.  
 Contrary to what is predicted by the theory, organizations are in fact less likely (-8.81%) to 

































Graph 8. Changes in Predicted Probability, High State Capacity Anocracy, MENA 1 
 
 
Hypothesis: High State Capacity Democracy → Nonviolent Tactics & Terrorism 
The open political system in both low and high state capacity democracies is believed to encourage 
organizations to employ nonviolent tactics. Yet, because such democratic governments are also 
more averse to civilian fatalities and sensitive to public opinion, conditions to employ terrorism are 
also opportune, thus influencing organizations to employ this tactic.    
 Just as theorized and shown in graph 9, organizations are indeed more prone (31.61%) to 
employing nonviolent tactics in high state capacity democracies. The finding is statistically 
significant, causing me to conclude the hypothesis is strongly supported.  
 Graph 9 also tells me that organizations in high state capacity democracies are more 
(6.96%) likely to employ terrorist tactics. This finding is in the right theoretical direction, but not 






































Summary: Findings Core Hypotheses, Opportunity Structure Theory, MENA 1 
Three of four opportunity structure core hypotheses receive some level of support, as seen in table 
4. This suggests the theoretical framework was largely successful in predicting tactical choices among 
organizations in high state capacity regimes. The only hypothesis not receiving support predicts that 
organizations in high state capacity anocracies are more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional 
warfare tactics.  
Table 4. MENA 1 
Results Core Hypotheses 
Opportunity Structure Theory 
 




None of the tactics used 










√ Strongly supported 
Terrorism 



































Hypothesis: Foreign State Financial Support → Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare Tactics 
Contrary to opportunity structure theoretical predictions, organizations in high state capacity 
regimes receiving foreign state financial support are less prone (-5.9%) to employing 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, as seen in graph 10.  
Graph 10. Changes in Predicted Probability, Foreign State Financial Support, MENA 1 
 
 
3.  Stat is t i ca l  Findings ,  MENA 2 Analys is  
Despite using somewhat cruder proxies for the key explanatory variables of mobilization theory in 
the MENA 2 analysis, the pseudo R-squared remains relatively high (.3255) and only slightly lower 
than that of the MENA 1 analysis. For full multinomial logit results, see the Appendix.  
 Because the statistical program is unable to calculate the output for all base categories,77 I 
infer what variables are statistically significant from the multinomial logit output using the 
                                                
77 This is due to due to the matrix being highly singular or non-symmetric. When this occurs, the regression 
results display coefficient estimates but no standard errors. According to the STATA list-serve this usually 
happens because a variable is “sparse”, meaning that is coded as greater than 1 for a very small number of the 







































nonviolent base category only. Calculating changes in predicted probabilities is not a problem, since 
the statistical command calculates the results the same way regardless of what base category is 
chosen. The variables Ethnic Group Proportion and Rural Population are not statistically significant, 
resulting in my omitting to calculate changes in predicted probabilities for these variables.  
 
Changes in Predicted Probabilities: Mobilization Theory, MENA 2  
Hypothesis Associated with Profile 1:  
High Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and Low Repression → Nonviolent Tactics 
Hypothesis Associated with Profile 2:  
Low Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and Low Repression → Nonviolent Tactics 
Mobilization theory predicts that organizations active under Profile 1 and Profile 2 conditions 
should be more prone to using nonviolent tactics. 
 As expected, graph 11 demonstrates that organizations are less likely (-6.08%) to employ 
nonviolent tactics under Profile 3 conditions than under Profile 1 conditions. This finding is 
statistically significant.  
 Likewise, the propensity for organizations to employ nonviolent tactics is lower  
(-4.75%) under Profile 4 conditions than Profile 1 conditions. This finding is not statistically 
significant, causing me to conclude that it is only weakly supported.  
 With one finding strongly supported and the second weakly supported, I conclude that the 









Graph 11.  Changes in Predicted Probability, Profile 1, MENA 2 
 
According to graph 12, organizations are less likely (-17.83%) to employ nonviolent tactics 
under Profile 3 conditions than they are under Profile 2 conditions.  
Likewise, organizations active under Profile 4 conditions are less likely (16.51%) to employ 
nonviolent tactics compared to Profile 2.  
Since both findings are in the right direction, but not statistically significant, I conclude that 
the hypothesis receives weak support, overall.  
































































Hypothesis Associated with Profile 3:  
High Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and High Repression → Abstain from Using Tactics 
The hypothesis predicting that organizations should to be more prone to abstaining when active in 
political environments characterized by high popular satisfaction with the status quo and high 
repression (Profile 3 conditions) is unsupported.    
 According to graph 13, organizations are less likely (-22.92%) to abstain from using tactics 
under Profile 3 conditions than they are under Profile 1 conditions. The same graph also shows that 
compared to organizations active under Profile 2 conditions, organizations active under Profile 3 
conditions are less likely (-13.55%) to abstain from using tactics. Finally, it looks as if organizations 
are more (17.61%) prone to abstaining from using tactics under Profile 4 conditions than under 
Profile 3 conditions.  










































Hypothesis Associated with Profile 4:  
Low Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and High Repression → Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare 
A final core hypothesis of mobilization theory suggests that organizations should be especially prone 
to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics under Profile 4 conditions.   
 According to graph 14, organizations active under Profile 4 conditions are more likely 
(10.47%) to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics than under both Profile 1 and Profile 2 
conditions. These findings are statistically significant.  
 Contrary to what is expected by opportunity structure theory, the same graph shows that 
organizations active under Profile 4 conditions are actually less prone (-19.25%) to employing 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics than organizations active under Profile 3 conditions.   
 Since the hypothesis receives strong support in two out of three cases, I conclude that it is 
strongly supported overall.  
 







































Summary: Findings Core Hypotheses, Mobilization Theory, MENA 2 
Results for mobilization theory’s core hypotheses are summarized in table 5. The theory does 
relatively well in the MENA 2 analysis, receiving support for three out of four of its core 
hypotheses. The only unsupported hypothesis predicts that organizations active under conditions of 
high popular satisfaction with the status quo and high anticipated repression of nonviolent protest 
should be more prone to abstaining from using tactics.  
 
Table 5. MENA 2 






Low Popular Satisfaction 
With the Status Quo 
Guerrilla/Conventional 
√ Strongly supported 
Nonviolent 
√ Weakly supported 
High Popular Satisfaction 
With the Status Quo 
None of the tactics used 
x Not supported 
Nonviolent 
√ Strongly supported 
 
Changes in Predicted Probabilities: Opportunity Structure Theory, MENA 2  
Core Hypotheses 
Hypothesis: High State Capacity Autocracy → Abstain from Using Tactics  
Opportunity structure theory predicts that organizations in high state capacity autocracies should be 
especially deterred from employing any tactics.  
Judging from graph 15, this appears to be the case. Organizations are more likely (21.37%) 
to abstain from using tactics in high state capacity autocracies than other high state capacity regimes. 
Since the findings is in the right direction, but not statistically significant, I conclude that the 








Graph 15. Changes in Predicted Probability, High State Capacity Autocracy, MENA 2 
 
 
Hypothesis: High State Capacity Anocracy → Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare Tactics 
Contrary to what is predicted by opportunity structure theory, organizations in high state capacity 
anocracies are less likely (- 1.93%) to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, according to 
graph 16. This hypothesis is thus unsupported.  
 
































































Hypothesis: High State Capacity Democracy → Nonviolent Tactics & Terrorism 
According to graph 17, organizations in high state capacity democracies are more likely (45.62%) to 
employ nonviolent tactics than organizations in other high state capacity regimes. This finding is 
statistically significant and in accordance with opportunity structure theory.  
 In the same graph, and also in line with the theory’s predictions, is the finding that 
organizations in high state capacity democracies are more likely (10.13%) to employ terrorism than 
organizations in other high state capacity regimes. This finding is not statistically significant, meaning 
that the hypothesis is only weakly supported.  
 Based on these results, I conclude that the hypothesis on nonviolent tactics is strongly 
supported and the hypothesis on terrorism is weakly supported.  
 







































Summary: Findings Core Hypotheses, Opportunity Structure Theory, MENA 2 
The MENA 2 statistical testing of the core hypotheses of opportunity structure theory show the 
theory receiving fairly good support, as seen in table 6. Only the hypothesis predicting that 
organizations in high state capacity anocracies are more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional 
warfare tactics is found unsupported.   
Table 6. MENA 2 
Results Core Hypotheses 
Opportunity Structure Theory 
 










Guerrilla/Conventional:  x Not supported 
 
Democracy 
Nonviolent:  √ Strongly supported 
 
Terrorism:   √ Weakly supported 
 
Hypothesis: Foreign State Financial Support → Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare Tactics 
Judging from graph 18, contrary to what is expected by opportunity structure theory, organizations 
in high state capacity regimes receiving foreign state financial support are less likely (22.17%) to 
employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics than organizations in high state capacity regimes that 
than do not receive such support.  

































5.  Summary o f  Stat is t i ca l  Findings f rom a Comparat ive  Perspec t ive ,  MENA 1 and 2  
How do the statistical findings from the MENA 1 and 2 analyses compare? I discuss the results for 
each analyses and theory, starting with opportunity structure theory.  
 
Opportunity Structure Theory, MENA 1 and 2 Analyses 
Opportunity structure theory receives relatively strong statistical overall support in both the MENA 
1 and 2 analyses, as can be seen in summary table 7.  
 The hypothesis predicting that organizations in high state capacity autocracies are more 
inclined to abstain from using tactics is supported, albeit the two analyses disagreed on the extent to 
which this was the case: The MENA 1 analysis finds strong support for this hypothesis, whereas the 
MENA 2 analysis finds only weak support for it. 
 Contrary to what is expected by the theory, organizations in high state capacity anocracies 
are not more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics than organizations 
elsewhere.  
 Both analyses concur on finding support for the hypotheses arguing that organizations in 
high state capacity democracies are more likely to employ both nonviolent tactics (strongly 
supported) and terrorism (weakly supported).  
 Finally, neither analysis finds statistical support for the hypothesis predicting that 
organizations receiving foreign state financial support are more prone to employing 








Table 7. Results MENA 1 & 2 
Opportunity Structure Theory 
High State Capacity 
 
Autocracy 
None of the tactics used 
MENA 1: √ Strongly supported 




MENA 1: x Not supported 





MENA 1: √ Strongly supported 
MENA 2: √ Strongly supported 
Terrorism  
MENA 1: √ Weakly supported 
MENA 2: √ Weakly supported 
Foreign State Financial Support                             Guerrilla/Conventional 
                                                          MENA 1: x Not supported 
                                                          MENA 2: x Not supported 
 
Mobilization Theory, MENA 1 and 2 Analyses 
Mobilization theory receives more divergent statistical support, as can be seen in summary table 8. 
The theoretical framework is better able to explain variation in tactics among organizations in the 
MENA 2 analysis than in the MENA 1 analysis. I return to discussing what may account for these 
disparate results across analyses further below.  
 Both analyses find support for the hypothesis that organizations in political environments 
characterized by low popular satisfaction with the status quo and high anticipated repression of 
nonviolent protest rule out nonviolent tactics, and, because they are able to mobilize enough people, 
employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics rather than abstain from using any tactics.   
 Mobilization theory argues that organizations that cannot employ nonviolent protest for 
fear of repression and that cannot mobilize enough people to make guerrilla/conventional warfare 
tactics viable, abstain from using any tactic.  
 Contrary to this prediction, both analyses find that organizations active in environments 





prone to abstaining from using tactics.  
 Central to mobilization theory is the prediction that organizations should have a bias 
towards nonviolent tactics and against violent tactics, assuming that the level of anticipated 
repression of nonviolent tactics is not too high. The two analyses disagree slightly on the hypotheses 
predicting that organizations should employ nonviolent tactics.  
 The MENA 1 analysis only finds weak support for the hypotheses predicting that 
organization active in political environments characterized by low anticipated repression of 
nonviolent protest and low popular satisfaction with the status quo are more prone to employ 
nonviolent tactics receives weak support. But no support is found for the notion that organizations 
active in political environments characterized by low anticipated repression of nonviolent protest 
and high popular satisfaction with the status quo are more prone to employing nonviolent tactics 
 The hypothesis predicting that organizations employ nonviolent tactics when active in 
political environments characterized by high popular satisfaction with the status quo and low 
anticipated repression of nonviolent tactics is strongly supported in the MENA 2 analysis, and the 
hypothesis predicting that organizations are more prone to using nonviolent protest in political 
environments characterized by low popular satisfaction with the status quo and low anticipated 
repression receives weak support.  
 The MENA 1 analysis finds no support for the hypothesis predicting that the smaller the 
ethnic group constituency, the more likely organizations are to employ terrorist tactics. It does, 
however, find weak support for the notion that organizations become more prone to employing 
nonviolent tactics the larger the size of the ethnic group constituency.  
 Since the MENA 2 analysis found Ethnic Group Proportion statistically insignificant, the 






Table 8. Results 







Satisfaction With the 
Status Quo 
Guerrilla/Conventional 
MENA 1: √ Weakly supported 
MENA 2: √ Strongly supported 
Nonviolent 
MENA 1: √ Weakly supported 
MENA 2: √ Weakly supported 
High Popular 
Satisfaction With the 
Status Quo 
None of the tactics used 
MENA 1: x Not supported 
MENA 2: x Not supported 
Nonviolent 
MENA 1: x Not supported 
MENA 2: √ Strongly supported 
Group Proportion                       Nonviolent                                           Terrorism 
                                         MENA 1: √ Weakly supported             MENA 1: x Not supported 
                                          MENA 2:  x Not supported:               MENA 2: x Not supported 
 
Conclusion 
What should one make of the disparate statistical results of the two MENA analyses, especially with 
regards to the mobilization theory results?  
There are two potential reasons why divergent findings across analyses are not surprising;  
1) Different proxies were used to conceptualize mobilization theory’s key independent variable; and 
2) The same set of organizations was not included in both datasets.  
 In contrast to MENA 1, MENA 2 uses more generalizable proxies for the key independent 
variables of mobilization theory, and excludes organizations that do not use any tactic during their 
presence in the dataset.  This is done in order to make the MENA 2 analysis as similar as possible to 
the analysis of the Africa dataset (undertaken in the following chapter), thereby making it possible to 
compare those findings against each other.  
 To ascertain which of these two factors is most likely to account for differences in findings 
across the datasets, I perform two additional statistical tests. The first model (MENA A) uses the 
more fine-grained MENA 1 proxies but excludes organizations that do not use any tactics at all 
during their presence in the dataset. The second model (MENA B) uses the more crude MENA 2 





then compare the results to see when the findings start diverging from MENA 1 and oscillate 
towards MENA 2 findings.  
  The highlighted result in the lower right quadrant in table 9 suggests that MENA B is the 
step in the analysis where results between MENA 1 and 2 start diverging. This implies different 
proxies for the key independent variable of mobilization theory are likely to account for MENA 1 
and 2 differences in findings. 
Table 9. Results Check 








Satisfaction with the 
Status Quo 
Guerrilla/Conventional 
MENA 1: √ Weakly supported 
MENA A: x Not supported 
MENA B: √ Strongly supported 
MENA 2: √ Strongly supported 
Nonviolent 
MENA 1: √ Weakly supported 
MENA A: x Not supported 
MENA B: x Not supported 
MENA 2: √ Weakly supported  
 
High Popular 
Satisfaction With the 
Status Quo 
None of the tactics used 
MENA 1:  x Not supported 
MENA A: x Not supported 
MENA B: x Not supported 
MENA 2:  x Not supported 
Nonviolent 
MENA 1:   x Not supported 
MENA A:  x Not supported 
MENA B: √ Strongly supported 
MENA 2:   Strongly supported 
 
  The conclusion that different proxies account for differences in findings is further supported 
by the results I obtain when correlating the proxies used in each dataset to each other. The two 
repression proxies are only correlated 12.26%, whereas the satisfaction with the status quo proxies 
are correlated a mere 2.81%. 
   I suggest that the MENA 2 proxies may be better suitable to represent the level of 
anticipated repression of nonviolent protest and popular satisfaction with the status quo for 
organizations in general, and less suitable as proxies for organizations representing ethnic groups. 
Nevertheless, since I do not have better proxies to employ for the MENA 2 and Africa analysis, the 









Chapter  8  
Variat ion in Tact i cs  in Afri ca:  A Stat is t i ca l  and Comparat ive  Analys is  
 
1.  Introduct ion and Chapter  Outl ine 
This final statistical chapter addresses four questions, each discussed in consecutive sections of the 
chapter; 1) To what extent do mobilization and opportunity structure theories predict organizations’ 
use of tactics in 37 low state capacity African countries from 1990-2010?; 2) How do the Africa 
findings compare to those of the MENA 2 analysis?; 3) What can be concluded from these 
comparative findings?; and 4) What accounts for different results across datasets?   
 
2. Stat is t i ca l  Findings ,  Afri ca Analys is  
 
As in the previous chapter, presentation of the statistical findings focuses on changes in predicted 
probabilities. In contrast to the MENA analyses, the pseudo R-squared for the Africa analysis in the 
regular multinomial logit results is very low (.0783). This means the Africa data fits the model much 
more poorly than the MENA data. For full multinomial logit results, see the Appendix.    
The independent variables Autocracy, Anocracy, Democracy and High Repression are statistically 






Changes in Predicted Probabilities: Mobilization Theory, Africa  
Core Hypotheses 
Mobilization theory predicts that organizations will seek to overcome the peacetime bargaining 
dilemma by using nonviolent tactics whenever possible from a safety perspective. Hence, the theory 
predicts that organizations active in political environments characterized by low anticipated levels of 
repression of nonviolent protest and either high or low levels of popular satisfaction with the status 
quo will employ nonviolent tactics.  
 Although organizations have a bias towards nonviolent tactics and against violent ones, 
they will adopt guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics when anticipated levels of repression of 
nonviolent protest are high, provided that they are able to mobilize enough participants to employ 
this tactic. This is possible when the level of popular satisfaction with the status quo is low.  
 In contrast, when anticipated levels of repression of nonviolent tactics are high, and levels 
of popular satisfaction with the status quo are high, organizations will be deterred from using any of 
the tactics.   
 The core hypotheses and corresponding profiles of mobilization theory are represented in 
table 1. 
 Because the variable High Repression is found statistically insignificant, I know that there is 
no statistically significant relationship between the key interaction variable High Repression and High 
Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and organizations’ choice of tactics. Hence, the hypothesis 
associated with Profile 3 conditions is not only unsupported, I should also abstain from calculating 

























Satisfaction With the 
Status Quo 
 






Hypothesis Profile 1:  
High Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and Low Repression → Nonviolent Tactics 
Hypothesis Profile 2:  
Low Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and Low Repression→ Nonviolent Tactics 
Mobilization theory predicts that organizations will prefer employing nonviolent tactics when the 
level of anticipated repression of nonviolent protest is low, regardless of whether the level of 
popular satisfaction with the status quo is high (Profile 1) or low (Profile 2), since this allows them 
to overcome the peacetime bargaining dilemma and potentially the information problem as well.  
 As is evident from graph 1, organizations under Profile 4 conditions are more likely (4.61%) 
to employ nonviolent tactics than they are under Profile 1 conditions. This is contrary to theoretical 
expectations.  



































 In contrast to predictions by mobilization theory, graph 2 tells me that organizations under 
Profile 4 conditions employ nonviolent tactics more often (2.98%) than organizations under Profile 
2 conditions.  
 This means both hypotheses predicting nonviolent tactics are unsupported. 
Graph 2. Changes in Predicted Probabilities, Profile 2, Africa
 
 
Hypothesis Prediction Profile 4:  
 Low Popular Satisfaction with the Status Quo and High Repression → Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare  
In accordance with mobilization theory, organizations under Profile 4 conditions are more prone 
(5.99%) to using guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics than they are under Profile 1 conditions, as 
seen in graph 3.  This finding is weakly supported.   
 The same graph also tells me that organizations are much more (28.02%) likely to employ 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics under Profile 4 conditions than are organizations under Profile 
2 conditions. This finding is strongly supported.  
 Given that the positive findings received weak to strong statistical support, I conclude that 




































Graph 3. Changes in Predicted Probabilities, Profile 4, Africa 
 
 
Summary: Findings Core Hypotheses Mobilization Theory, Africa 
Mobilization theory has limited ability to predict organizations’ choice of tactics in African low state 
capacity countries. The only hypothesis receiving statistical support predicts that organizations active 
in political environments characterized by high anticipated repression of nonviolent protest and low 
popular support with the status quo are more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare.  
 The results of the statistical testing of mobilization theory employing the Africa dataset are 
summarized in table 8. 
Table 2. Africa 






Low Popular Satisfaction 
with the Status Quo 
Guerrilla/Conventional 
√ Strongly supported 
Nonviolent 
x Not supported 
High Popular Satisfaction 
with the Status Quo 
None of the tactics used 
x Not supported 
Nonviolent 





































Changes in Predicted Probabilities: Opportunity Structure Theory, Africa  
Core Hypotheses  
Since opportunity structure theory assumes that organizations will employ guerrilla/conventional 
warfare tactics when political conditions are opportune, it predicts that organizations will do so in 
low state capacity autocracies and anocracies. 
  Conditions to employ nonviolent tactics are more opportune in democracies, since this 
regime type encourages this mode of contestation. Nevertheless, because democracy also provides 
optimal conditions for employing terrorist tactics, organizations in low state capacity democracies 
will be more prone to employing both nonviolent and terrorist tactics.  
 The core hypotheses of opportunity structure theory are represented in table 3, below.  
 Since the key independent variables of opportunity structure theory - anocracy, autocracy 
and democracy - are statistically insignificant, I conclude that none of the theory’s core hypotheses 
are supported in the Africa dataset. Table 3 thus features results as well.  
 
Table 3. Africa 
Results Core Hypotheses 
Opportunity Structure Theory 
 















x Not supported 
 
Terrorism: 








Hypotheses Rentier State:  
Opportunity Structure Theory: Rentier State → Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare Tactics 
Mobilization Theory: Rentier State → Abstain from Using Any of the Tactics 
The two theories have different predictions about what determines organizations’ choice of tactics 
in rentier states.  
 Opportunity structure theory hypothesizes that because rentier states have inherently low 
state capacity on account of their weak bureaucracies, conditions to employ guerrilla/conventional 
warfare tactics there are favorable and should encourage organizations to use this tactic.  
 Not so, argues mobilization theory. Because rentier state governments pay off the 
populace through generous welfare plans etc. in an effort to buy dissident quiescence, organizations 
in such states should be more likely to abstain from using any tactics.  
 Whereas I find weak support for the opportunity structure theory hypothesis, I find no 
support for the mobilization theory counterpart. As can be seen in graph 4, organizations are more 
likely (14.26%) to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, but less likely (-6.11%) to abstain 
from using tactics in rentier states than non-rentier states. Neither of the findings is statistically 
significant.  



































Hypotheses Rural Population:  
Rural Population ↑→ Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare Tactics 
Rural Population ↓(Urban Population ↑) → Nonviolent Tactics and Terrorist 
Finally, opportunity structure theory posits that the level of rural population in relation to the overall 
populace should influence organizations’ choice in tactics.  
 The propensity to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics will increase in relation to 
the proportion of rural population, because a large rural population should make it easier for 
organizations to mobilize participants to use this tactic.    
 Since nonviolent protest is easier to organize at higher levels of urban population – civilian 
population is denser and demonstrations are most likely to have an effect in cities - organizations 
active under such conditions should be more prone to using nonviolent tactics.  
 But higher proportions of urban population should also make conditions to employ 
terrorist tactics more opportune, since targeting civilians in urban areas should be less difficult.  
 Graph 5 shows us that there is indeed support for the hypothesis that organizations 
become more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics the higher the percentage 
of rural population. 




























As theorized, graph 6 demonstrates that organizations are more likely to employ nonviolent tactics 
the lower the percentage of rural population.  
Graph 6: Effect of Rural Population on Use of Nonviolent Tactics, Africa
 
  
Contrary to theoretical predictions, there is no linear relationship between organizations’ tendency to 
employ terrorist tactics and the level of rural population, as can be seen in graph 7.  
























































3. Summary o f  Comparat ive  Stat is t i ca l  Findings ,  Afri ca and MENA 2 
This section summarizes the statistical findings from a comparative perspective and then discusses 
what accounts for different results across the Africa and MENA 2 analyses.   
 
Opportunity Structure Theory: Africa and MENA 2 
Since the Africa dataset only includes low state capacity countries, while the MENA 2 dataset only 
includes high state capacity countries, I need to combine the findings from each analysis to ascertain 
to what extent empirical support is found for opportunity structure theory as a whole.   
 Overall, the theory receives mixed support, as can be seen in summary table 4. 
Opportunity structure theory gets no support for its core hypotheses in the Africa analysis. In 
contrast, three of four core hypotheses receive support in the MENA 2 analysis.  
 Both analyses concur that, contrary to theoretical expectations, organizations in anocracies 
are not more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.  
 But they disagree on the effect of democracy: whereas the MENA 2 analysis finds that 
organizations in democracies are more prone to using nonviolent tactics and terrorism, the Africa 
analysis dismisses both hypotheses.  
 The findings suggest that the theories’ overall logic apply better to MENA high state 
capacity countries than African low state capacity ones.  I return to addressing what may account for 














High State Capacity 
 
Low State Capacity 
 
Autocracy 
None of the Tactics Used 
 
MENA 2: √ Weakly supported 
Guerrilla/Conventional 
 





MENA 2: x Not supported 
Guerrilla/Conventional 
 





MENA 2: √ Strongly supported 
 
Terrorism 
MENA 2: √ Weakly supported 
Nonviolent 
Africa: x Not supported 
 
Terrorism: 
Africa: x Not supported 
Foreign State Financial Support  Guerrilla/Conventional: MENA 2: x Not supported 
Rentier State                                  Guerrilla/Conventional: Africa: √Weakly supported 
Rural Population                           MENA 2:  
                                                        Nonviolent: x Not supported 
                                                        Guerrilla/Conventional: x Not supported 
                                                        Terrorism: x Not supported  
                                                          
                                                        Africa:  
                                                        Nonviolent: √ Strongly supported 
                                                        Guerrilla/Conventional: √ Strongly supported 
                                                        Terrorism: x Not supported 
  
 With regards to auxiliary hypotheses, no support is found for the hypothesis predicting the 
organizations receiving foreign state financial support are more prone to employing 
guerilla/conventional warfare tactics. This hypothesis is not tested with the Africa data. 
 The notion that organizations in rentier states are more prone to employing 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics receives weak support. This hypothesis is only tested in the 
Africa analysis.  
 Interestingly, the set of hypotheses suggesting that level of rural population influences 
organizations’ choice of tactics receive divergent results across analyses. 
 Whereas results from the MENA 2 analysis dismiss all three hypotheses, strong support is 





capacity organizations become more prone to using nonviolent tactics with lower levels of rural 
population, and more likely to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics with higher levels of 
rural population.  
 The hypothesis that organizations are more prone to employing terrorism the higher the 
level of urban population is dismissed in both the MENA 2 and Africa analysis.  
  
Mobilization Theory: Africa and MENA 2  
Mobilization theory is the only theory whose core hypotheses are tested equally across both datasets. 
Judging from summary table 5, the theory is clearly better at explaining variation in tactics among 
organizations in MENA high state capacity countries than African low state capacity countries. I 









Satisfaction with the 
Status Quo 
Guerrilla/Conventional 
MENA 2: √ Strongly supported 
Africa: √ Strongly supported 
Nonviolent 
MENA 2: √ Weakly supported 
Africa: x Not supported 
High Popular 
Satisfaction with the 
Status Quo 
None of the tactics used 
MENA 2: x Not supported 
Africa: x Not supported 
Nonviolent 
MENA 2: √ Strongly supported 
Africa: x Not supported 
Group Proportion                       Nonviolent                                      Terrorism  
                                       MENA 2: √ Weakly supported          MENA 2: x Not supported 
Rentier State                      None of the Tactics Used    
                                              Africa: x Not supported 
  
Concurring Result, Core Hypotheses Mobilization Theory, Africa and MENA 2 
Findings from both analyses confirm the hypothesis suggesting that organizations resort to 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics when political conditions for employing nonviolent tactics are 
prohibitively dangerous (i.e. high anticipated level of repression of nonviolent protest) and when 





 Contrary to mobilization theory, neither analysis finds support for the hypothesis that 
organizations active in political environments characterized by high popular satisfaction with the 
status quo and high anticipated repression of nonviolent protest are more prone to abstaining from 
employing tactics.  
 
Divergent Results, Core Hypotheses, Mobilization Theory, Africa and MENA 2 
A main assumption of mobilization theory is that organizations will have a bias towards nonviolent 
tactics and against violent ones, and will use the former when it is considered safe enough to do so. 
Nonviolent tactics can, if employed under optimal conditions, solve the peacetime bargaining 
dilemma and as well as ameliorate the information problem, thus making bargaining and potentially 
conflict resolution in peacetime more likely. This causes mobilization theory to predict that 
organizations active under political conditions characterized by low repression and either high or 
low levels of popular satisfaction with the status quo should be more prone to employing nonviolent 
tactics.  
 Yet, whereas the two hypotheses predicting nonviolent tactics receive support in the 
MENA 2 analysis, they are dismissed in the Africa analysis.  
 
Results Auxiliary Hypotheses, Mobilization Theory  
According to mobilization theory, the greater the size of organizations’ constituency, the higher the 
propensity of their employing nonviolent tactics. Conversely, the smaller the size of organizations’ 
constituency, the higher the propensity of their employing terrorism. These hypotheses are only 
tested with the MENA dataset.  
 Overall, the hypotheses predicting that organizations’ choice of tactics is influenced by 





represent ethnic groups - receive mixed support. Whereas the MENA 2 analysis finds that 
organizations representing ethnic groups are indeed more prone to employing nonviolent tactics the 
larger the ethnic group, it does not find that organizations with smaller constituencies are more likely 
to opt for terrorism.  
 Finally, mobilization theory argues that since rentier states seek to buy off popular dissent 
with payoffs in the form of social welfare programs etc., organizations active in such states should 
be especially prone to abstaining from using any tactic. However, results from the Africa analysis 
show no support for this hypothesis.  
 
4. Conclusion  
When discussing the comparative statistical findings with regards to more general conclusions, I seek 
to address two overarching questions: 1) To what extent does these theories succeed in explaining 
variation in organizational use of tactics?; 2) What accounts for differences in findings across the 
datasets?  
 
How Much Do the Theories Explain?  
Overall, I find that mobilization and opportunity structure theory are better able to explain variation 
in tactics in high state capacity MENA countries than low state capacity African countries.  
 I begin by discussing positive findings as applied to high state capacity MENA countries, 
and end with talking about negative results of each theory as applied to low state capacity African 








Explaining Tactical Choice in High State Capacity MENA Countries: Positive Findings and Caveats 
 
Mobilization and opportunity structure theories are generally successful in predicting choice in 
tactics among organizations.  
As predicted by mobilization theory, organizations’ use of tactics in high state capacity 
MENA countries appears largely driven by the anticipated level of repression of nonviolent protest 
and popular satisfaction with the status quo.   
Low popular satisfaction with the status quo and high repression of nonviolent protest make 
organizations more prone to employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, and low repression of 
nonviolent protest, regardless of the level of popular satisfaction with the status quo, makes 
organizations more prone to employing nonviolent tactics.  
In addition, the level of rural population appears to have an effect on organizations’ 
propensity to use nonviolent protest, with lower levels of rural population correlating with higher 
organizational propensity of employing nonviolent tactics. The prediction that organizations with 
smaller constituencies are more likely to employ terrorist tactics is dismissed, however.  
The theory fails to explain when organizations in high state capacity MENA countries 
abstain from using tactics.  
Opportunity structure theory is largely correct in predicting that organizations’ use of tactics 
in high state capacity MENA countries is partly explained by regime type.  Findings suggest 
organizations in high state capacity MENA countries are more prone to abstaining from using any 
tactics in autocracies, and that organizations are more likely to use nonviolent tactics and terrorism 
in democracies.  
The prediction that organizations are more likely to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare 





that foreign financial support, rentier states, or rural population influence organizations’ choice of 
tactics.  
 
Explaining Tactical Choice in Low State Capacity African Countries: Negative Findings and Caveats 
Mobilization and opportunity structure theory do not apply well to low state capacity countries in 
Africa.  
Contrary to predictions by mobilization theory, organizations are not more prone to 
abstaining from using any tactics in political environments characterized by high popular satisfaction 
with the status quo and high anticipated repression of nonviolent protest. Nor are organizations in 
low state capacity African countries more prone to using nonviolent tactics when the level of 
anticipated repression of nonviolent protest is low, regardless of the level of popular satisfaction 
with the status quo.  
But mobilization theory is correct in predicting that organizations are more prone to 
employing guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics in environments characterized by high anticipated 
repression and low popular satisfaction with the status quo in low state capacity African countries.  
Finally, there appears to be no support for the prediction that organizations in rentier states 
have an increased propensity to abstain from using tactics. 
The Africa results dismiss opportunity structure theory’s core hypotheses; Organizations in 
low state capacity African countries are not more prone to using guerrilla/conventional warfare 
tactics in autocracies or anocracies, nor are they more likely to using nonviolent tactics or terrorism 
in democracies.  
But the theory correctly predicts that organizations’ choice to use guerrilla/conventional 
warfare and nonviolent tactics are related to the level of rural population: High levels of rural 





tactics, and low levels of rural population to make organizations more likely to employ nonviolent 
tactics.  
  
What Accounts for Different Finding Across Africa and MENA 2 Analyses?  
Divergent findings for the Africa and MENA 2 analyses are likely due to differences in the datasets. 
Despite trying to make the two analyses as similar as possible, the datasets differ in two key regards: 
1) One dataset includes only MENA countries, whereas the other includes only African ones; 2) The 
MENA dataset includes only high state capacity countries, while the Africa dataset includes only low 
state capacity countries.  
 The latter difference implies that the factors influencing organizations’ choice in tactics in 
high versus low state capacity countries may be fundamentally dissimilar, whereas the first suggests 
that organizational propensity to employ different tactics varies across regions, and potentially 
cultures. I address each possible explanation in turn, starting with the cultural argument.   
 
Culture as Explaining Organizations’ Choice of Tactics 
I may observe divergent findings because there may be something fundamentally different about the 
way in which organizations employ tactics in Africa versus MENA. Organizations of disparate 
cultural background may have varied propensities to employ tactics given similar stimuli because of 
cultural parameters about what is considered normatively acceptable behavior differing. This logic 
resonates with monadic cultural arguments emphasizing culturally unique repertoires of contention.  
 If culture is indeed what explains variation in findings across regions, failure to predict 
what accounts for variation in tactics may be due to mobilization and opportunity structure theory 
applying better to MENA than African cultures. It is possible that the South African case study, 





general rule of what determines organizations’ tactical choices in Africa. If so, we may need a new, 
separate theory of African contestation, as well as additional ones covering organizations’ use of 
tactics in other regions. Such theory building efforts will require scholars to be regional experts, 
focusing on contestation. Since I do not have African regional expertise, I am unfortunately ill suited 
to suggest a new theory here.  
 
State Capacity as Explaining Organizations’ Choice of Tactics  
Although there is no reason to dismiss culture as a potential explanation, I recommend that scholars, 
before engaging in new ambitious theory-building projects, first consider whether differences in 
findings may be due to variance in state capacity.  
  It is possible that bargaining with low state capacity governments may be very different 
from doing so with high state capacity ones. Low state capacity governments are likely to be not 
only more fragile, but may also go about interacting with organizations in profoundly different ways 
than their high state capacity counterparts.  
 Although mobilization and opportunity structure theories were largely unable to provide 
us with good answers as to what determines organizations’ choice of tactics in Africa - the exception 
being mobilization theory’s prediction of when organizations employ guerrilla/conventional warfare 
tactics – they do provide insights into what does not make organizations more likely to employ various 
tactics. I suggest one can draw on these negative findings in trying to understand how organized 
contention may be different in low state capacity countries than high state capacity ones.  
 The results tell me that organizations are not more prone to employing nonviolent tactics 
in political environments characterized by low anticipated repression of nonviolent protest, no 
matter if popular satisfaction with the status quo is low or high, and that organizations in low state 





 What is it about low state capacity countries that make organizations active under the 
conditions specified above less prone to employing nonviolent tactics? It is possible that the 
peacetime bargaining dilemma applies differently to high and low state capacity states, and that this 
may explain divergent findings across datasets: Whereas organizations can employ nonviolent 
protest to successfully overcome the peacetime bargaining dilemma, and especially the saving face 
problem, in high state capacity countries, doing so in low state capacity countries may be harder.  
Weak governments may fear that giving in to political demands, even when communicated 
through implicit compellent threats in the form of nonviolent tactics, are going to make other 
domestic organizations view them as push-overs. Such a perception may risk setting off a domino 
effect of contention among organizations, something a low state capacity government may be unable 
to deal with.  
 High state capacity regimes may be less worried about this scenario because they, due to 
their obvious power advantage over organizations, are better capable of making it look like initiating 
bargaining and potentially acquiescing to political demands to organizations using nonviolent tactics 
is done by benevolence rather than compellence. Hence, whereas nonviolent tactics provide a face-
saving way by which to give in to demands for high state capacity regimes, they may be less capable 
of doing so for low state capacity regimes.  
If organizations in low state capacity regimes that are active under political circumstances 
characterized by low anticipated repression of nonviolent protest can anticipate this government 
reaction to nonviolent protest they will react accordingly: Organizations that would otherwise use 
nonviolent tactics for the purposes of protest for persuasion will abstain from using tactics; and 
those planning to use nonviolent protest for the purposes of compellence will instead jump-start the 
bargaining process and employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics instead, provided popular 





This explanation may also account for why organizations are more prone to employing 
nonviolent tactics in high state capacity democracies but not in low state capacity democracies. 
Although democratic institutions promote nonviolent contestation, very weak democratic 
governments may be worried that acquiescing to organizations employing nonviolent tactics will set 
off a cascade of copycat challengers. Anticipating that low state capacity democratic governments 
will not give in to demands communicated through nonviolent tactics, organizations may instead opt 
to engage in conventional politics in seeking to change the political status quo.  
Although this explanation may suggest a plausible answer to why organizations do not 
employ nonviolent tactics more often in low state capacity African states, it does not provide a good 
answer to why organizations in low state capacity democracies do not employ terrorism more 
frequently when they do so in high state capacity ones.  I leave that puzzle for other scholars to 




















Chapter  9 
Conclusion 
  
1.  Introduct ion and Chapter  Outl ine 
Why do some organizations with maximalist political demands employ nonviolent tactics such as 
demonstrations and strikes, whereas others employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, and others 
still, terrorism? This project has sought to be a systematic exercise in addressing this question, the 
answer to which is central not only to policy makers seeking to prevent the outbreak of domestic 
armed conflict and radicalization of organizations, but also to the wide array of political science 
literature devoted to analyzing interstate conflict and contestation.  
 This final chapter is divided into five sections. I begin by summarizing the findings of the 
statistical analysis. I then elaborate on how the results have implications for policy. I proceed to talk 
about whether the findings confirm or challenge existing literature. Fourth, I discuss some of the 
limitations of the dissertation and its subsequent findings. I conclude by suggesting future research 









Findings, High State Capacity MENA Countries 
I find that the level of popular satisfaction with the status quo, the level of anticipated repression of 
nonviolent protest, and regime type largely determine whether organizations employ nonviolent, 
guerrilla/conventional warfare, or terrorist tactics.  
Results suggest that low popular satisfaction with the status quo and high anticipated 
repression of nonviolent protest make organizations more prone to employing 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics. The finding resonates with the notion that organizations that 
cannot overcome the peacetime bargaining dilemma are more likely to employ 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, as predicted by mobilization theory.  
Low anticipated repression of nonviolent protest, regardless of the accompanying level of 
popular satisfaction with the status quo, however, makes organizations more likely to use nonviolent 
tactics. This suggests that organizations do indeed have a bias towards nonviolent tactics and against 
violent ones, and, since it will help solve the peacetime bargaining dilemma and ameliorate the 
information problem, will choose nonviolent tactics if permissible from a security standpoint. This is 
all in accordance with mobilization theory.  
As predicted by opportunity structure theory, organizations’ use of tactics is partly driven by 
regime type. Organizations are more prone to abstaining from using any tactics in high state capacity 
autocracies, and more likely to use nonviolent tactics and terrorism in democracies.  
With the exclusion of the finding about guerrilla/conventional warfare, however, these 
findings are limited in scope, only applying to high state capacity MENA countries. Whereas both 
mobilization and opportunity structure theory are largely able to explain variation in organizations’ 
tactical choices in high state capacity MENA countries, they are much less able to do so in low state 





Findings, Low State Capacity African Countries 
Contrary to mobilization theory predictions, organizations in low state capacity African countries are 
not more likely to use nonviolent tactics when active in political environments characterized by low 
levels of anticipated repression of nonviolent protest, regardless of the level of popular satisfaction 
with the status quo.  
Nor are organizations more prone to abstaining from using tactics when popular satisfaction 
with the status quo is high and anticipated repression of nonviolent protest is high. This is true in 
high state capacity MENA countries as well.  
However, just as in high state capacity MENA countries, organizations in low state capacity 
African countries are more likely to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics when anticipated 
repression of nonviolent protest is high and popular satisfaction with the status quo is low.  
Opportunity structure theory’s core hypotheses fail to receive any support among 
organizations in low state capacity African countries.   
 
 
Additional Observations  
 
In addition to these overall findings, three additional observations are worth emphasizing.  
First, although terrorism is often referred to as a weapon of the weak (Betts 2002, 20; 
Crenshaw 1981, 387), no theoretical support is found for the mobilization theory hypothesis 
suggesting that organizations become more prone to employing this tactic the smaller their 
constituency.  
Second, organizations appear to select their tactics differently depending on whether they are 
active in low or high state capacity democracies. Whereas organizations in high state capacity 
MENA democracies appear to favor nonviolent and terrorist tactics, this tendency is not present 





Finally, despite the finding that anocracies are more likely to experience civil war (Fearon 
and Laitin 2003), organizations in anocracies are not more prone to employing 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.  
 
 
3.  Impl i cat ions for  Pol i cy  
How can these findings help inform policy? The introductory chapter mentions how understanding 
what accounts for variation in organizations’ choice of tactics is relevant to three issues in particular: 
1) Preventing radicalization of organizations; 2) Preventing the outbreak of domestic armed conflict; 
and 3) Developing effective counter-terrorism policy. 
 In order to prevent radicalization of organizations, one needs to understand why some 
organizations escalate from using nonviolent to violent tactics. To prevent the outbreak of domestic 
armed conflict one needs to comprehend what factors make organizations more prone to employing 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics instead of using nonviolent tactics, or alternatively, abstaining 
from using tactics. Finally, formulating policies aimed at deterring organizations from adopting 
terrorism require insights into what makes organizations more prone to employing this tactic rather 
than alternatives.  
Findings in this dissertation suggest that organizations are more likely to employ 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics when active in political environments where there is low 
popular satisfaction with the status quo and where anticipated repression of nonviolent protest is 
high. Results also suggest that organizations are more prone to using terrorism in high state capacity 
democracies.  
 There are two ways in which to prevent organizations from employing violent tactics:  
1)By inducing organizations to use nonviolent tactics instead; or 2)By making them more prone to 





To make sure that organizations do not escalate to using guerrilla/conventional warfare 
tactics, governments must be careful not to use lethal repression against nonviolent protest. If they 
succeed in doing so, they can be fairly sure that organizations will use nonviolent protest instead, 
even if overall popular satisfaction with the status quo is low. Since preventing the radicalization of 
organizations should be in every government’s interest, even highly repressive governments should 
be amenable to restraining their lethal use of force against nonviolent protest.   
In terms of policy recommendations, this suggests that what is most needed is information. 
Informing governments of the link between lethal government repression of nonviolent protest and 
organizations’ propensity to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics may help in making sure 
governments do not act in ways that encourage organizations to using this tactic.  
Governments restraining themselves in this manner may be easier said than done, however. 
As noted in the theory chapter, nonviolent protest, and especially large, illegal demonstrations can 
appear very threatening to governments due to their ability to take on a life of their own.  
To minimize the occurrence of lethal encounters between protesters and security forces, 
governments can do their utmost to make sure that riot policing is as organized, disciplined, and 
professional as possible. Training riot police in how to best control masses without escalating to use 
of lethal force could be something countries could assist each other with. Hence, expanding 
programs in which countries with highly professional and adept riot policing practices help other 
states with less well-trained forces to raise their standards, would be highly recommended. 
Another way of encouraging organizations to use nonviolent tactics rather than 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics is for governments to take active steps towards becoming a 
high state capacity democracy, since organizations are more prone to using nonviolent tactics in 
such regimes. This may entail not only the need to democratize, but also accruing wealth, given that 





drawback in becoming a high state capacity democracy, however, is that organizations are also more 
likely to employ terrorist tactics against this type of regime.  
Low state capacity African governments could potentially dissuade organizations from using 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics and steer them towards using nonviolent tactics by speeding 
up the process of urbanization: Findings suggests that organizations in this region are more prone to 
using nonviolent protest at higher levels of urban population and more likely to employ 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics at higher levels of rural population. This relationship is not 
present in high state capacity MENA countries.  
Governments that would like to prevent organizations from using violent tactics, but that are 
less enthusiastic about encouraging nonviolent protest, could instead seek to become a high state 
capacity autocratic regime, since organizations active in such regimes are more likely to abstain from 
using any of the tactics of interest. This may require governments to become both wealthier and 
more authoritarian.  Accomplishing the latter may be easier than the former, especially since the 
international community may be less willing to do business with states that are actively trying to 
become less democratic.  
The international community, as well as governments, would also like to prevent 
organizations from adopting terrorist tactics. Organizations are more prone to employing terrorism 
in high state capacity democracies. But high state capacity democracies are also more prone to see 
organizations employing nonviolent tactics, something the international community is generally 
supportive of.  
Technically, to prevent terrorism, high state capacity democracies could become more 
authoritarian, since being a high state capacity authoritarian regime appears to make organizations 





Although it is unlikely that any government would voluntarily seek to become poorer, high 
state capacity democracies undergoing a recession may inadvertently decrease the odds that 
organizations employ terrorist tactics, since organizations are not more prone to using terrorism in 
low state capacity democracies.   
The findings reached in this dissertation may therefore not be helpful in recommending 
counter-terrorism policy that is viable and/or in accord with international norms promoting 
democracy and the right to assemble and protest.  
 
4.  Impl i cat ions for  Theory 
To what extent do the findings of this dissertation confirm or challenge existing literature? 
 Up until now, very few studies have sought to address the research question posed in this 
dissertation. None of the existing large-N studies analyzing what makes organizations opt between 
violent and nonviolent tactics (Asal et al. 2013, Cunningham-Gallagher 2013) breaks down tactics 
into nonviolent, guerrilla/conventional warfare, and terrorist tactics, which is what is done here.  
This study is also the only one examining what determines organizations’ choice of tactics beyond 
those representing ethnic and/or secessionist groups.   
Although one can discern loose contours of opportunity structure theory within the 
literature, this is the first time someone has derived hypotheses that seek to explain variation in 
tactics in the way I have from it, and proceeded to test them.78  
 Another contribution of this dissertation is that it constitutes a first effort to incorporate 
nonviolent tactics within the larger logic of bargaining theory.  
                                                
78 Sambanis (2008) conducts an analysis using essentially what I refer to as opportunity structure theory, but is 
only interested in understanding what accounts for overall propensity of a country experiencing either civil 





In short, by testing not only opportunity structure theory, but also the new, supplementary, 
mobilization theory, this dissertation constitutes an arguably important first step to analyzing tactical 
choice among organizations in a holistic fashion. 
The findings of the dissertation challenge some theoretical insights about what makes 
organizations more or less prone to using either nonviolent, guerrilla/conventional warfare or 
terrorist tactics, while confirming others.  
Results from this study suggest that low popular satisfaction with the status quo and high 
anticipated repression of nonviolent protest make organizations more prone to employing 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics. This is true in both high and low state capacity countries. 
These results suggest that the relative deprivation argument and the repression argument 
emphasizing efficacy and substitution are partly right, but only when both of these factors are taken 
into account jointly, as specified by mobilization theory. These findings suggest that organizations 
that cannot overcome the peacetime bargaining dilemma by using nonviolent tactics turn to violent 
tactics instead, as theorized by mobilization theory.    
Despite the well-established finding that anocracies are more likely to experience civil war 
(Fearon and Laitin 2003), I find that organizations in anocracies are not more prone to employing 
guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics.  
Another result that clashes with what is often considered a truism in the civil war literature 
regards the effect of foreign state financial support. Whereas the civil war literature, and indeed 
opportunity structure theory, predicts that organizations that receive foreign state financial support 
should be more likely to employ guerrilla/conventional warfare tactics, I find this not to be the case.  
 The results also suggest that low repression of nonviolent protest, regardless of the 





using nonviolent tactics. This suggests that organizations tend to have a bias towards nonviolent 
tactics as long as the security situation in which to use this tactic is not too dire. 
These findings only apply to organizations active in high state capacity MENA countries, 
and not low state capacity African countries. The divergent findings across dataset are due to two 
crucial differences in the datasets: 1) Each dataset contains countries from separate regions; and 2) 
Each dataset only include high versus low state capacity countries, respectively.  
The social movements/contentious politics literature can potentially explain these regionally 
diverse findings by referring to culturally distinct repertoires of contention.  
But to the author’s knowledge, there are currently no rationalist arguments in the existing 
literature equipped to address why we are more likely to see organizations employ nonviolent tactics 
in high state capacity countries where the anticipated level of repression of nonviolent protest is low, 
but not in low state capacity countries characterized by the same level of anticipated repression of 
nonviolent protest. 
 I find support for the opportunity structure theory hypothesis predicting organizations will 
be deterred from using tactics in high state capacity autocracies because these regimes are likely to 
have a well developed repressive capacity that deters as well as allows governments to quickly crack 
down on organizations challenging the status quo. But since I control for repression in my analysis, 
the rationale for organizations not using tactics in high state capacity autocracies becomes less clear.  
If the reasons why organizations abstain from using tactics in high state capacity autocracies 
are not related to repression, what accounts for the propensity of doing so? One possible answer is 
that high state capacity governments, despite technically not being rentier states, may nevertheless 
successfully be using their wealth to buy off popular dissent.  
 Also in accordance with opportunity structure theory is the finding that organizations are 





limited in scope to high state capacity MENA democracies, and does not apply to low state capacity 
African democracies.  
Again, whereas the social movements/contentious politics literature may be able to address 
this discrepancy by referring to culturally distinct repertoires of contention, the literature on 
terrorism does currently not have any answers for why we should be more likely to see organizations 
using this tactics in high state capacity, but not low state capacity democracies.  
The literature on terrorism stressing the importance of democracy as crucial to its strategic 
logic pays little heed to culture and state capacity.  The key reason cited as to why terrorism is more 
effective when directed towards democracies is due to this regime type being more sensitive to 
civilian fatalities and public opinion (Pape 2005, Reiter and Stam 2002). Yet, these factors should be 
equally important in high and low state capacity democracies. Hence, additional theorizing about 
what may account for why organizations are more prone to employing terrorism in high state 
capacity, but not low state capacity democracies, is warranted.  
Whereas opportunity structure theory provides a good argument why we should expect to 
see organizations using nonviolent tactics as well as terrorism in democracies, it is less capable of 
explaining what determines whether organizations use one or the other. Unfortunately, beside 
suggesting that the propensity to employ nonviolent protest and terrorism is higher in high state 
capacity democracies, the findings reached here do little to illuminate this puzzle.  
Finally, although terrorism is frequently referred to as a weapon of the weak (Betts 2002, 20; 
Crenshaw 1981, 387), no theoretical support is found for the mobilization theory prediction that 
organizations are more prone to employing this tactic the smaller their constituency. This 
conclusion, in addition to findings by Fortna (forthcoming 2014), suggests that we may need to 






5. Limitat ions o f  Findings  
 
As is the case with all projects, this dissertation suffers from some theoretical and methodological 
limitations that may cast some doubt on the validity of the findings.  This section discusses five of 
the most serious ones.  
First, neither theory tested in this project takes into account that governments, especially 
those that are less than democratic, are strategic in how they react to individual organizations using 
nonviolent tactics, choosing to co-opt some and repress others.  
The problem of this study ignoring that governments are strategic and selective in the way 
they respond to nonviolent organizations may be less of a problem than it seems. Since I only 
include organizations that have maximalist political demands in my datasets, this is likely to 
streamline the type of organizations governments are likely to interact with, potentially making a 
governmental habit of employing a divide-and-rule strategy less common among this subset of 
organizations.  
Second, neither of the theoretical explanations considers the effect of there existing other 
organizations with similar political demands on organizations’ choice of tactics.  
It is highly probable that the existence of other organizations with similar maximalist 
grievances is a factor capable of influencing organizations’ decision of which tactic to employ. 
Although this is a fascinating aspect worth exploring further, there is a case to be made here for 
parsimony: Incorporating this aspect into mobilization theory would make an already complicated 
theory even more so.  
Third, neither theory takes differences in organizational characteristics enough into account. 
By largely ignoring organizational differences, the theories assume that all organizations targeting the 





I absolutely agree with this critique. Unfortunately, I am unable to take organizational 
characteristics more into consideration due to lack of data: Although the MENA 1 analysis uses 
explanatory variables that are specific to each organization, such information is not available for 
organizations in the Africa dataset.  
Fourth, findings may be unreliable because the proxies used for the MENA 2 and Africa 
analyses are too crude, something suggested by MENA 2 proxies not correlating well with their 
MENA 1 counterparts. 
This critique stands un-refuted: The only excuse I can offer here is that I used the best 
proxies available for the study in order to test the generalizability of the findings across disparate 
regions and datasets. 
Fifth, because the statistical analysis was not followed up by process-tracing case studies, one 
cannot be sure that the causal mechanisms arguably at work in the two theories actually are what is 
driving organizations’ choice of tactics.  
I am fully aware that correlation does not mean causation. Yet, it is beyond the scope of this 
project to conduct further case studies in addition to the two theory-generating ones. What statistical 
analysis does well is disprove some hypotheses, while also suggesting that there may be more to 
those receiving support. I argue that this function is especially valuable when testing a new theory, 
and leave additional enquiry using process tracing case studies for other scholars to pursue.  
 
6. Future Research Suggested by Findings  
Several avenues of future research are suggested by these findings. Here, I suggest six such possible 
research projects.  
The first project to consider is to theorize and analyze whether contestation in high and low 





the argument presented in the previous chapter, which suggests that there may be something about 
the face-saving problem that makes it apply differently across high and low state capacity states, 
thereby accounting for the divergent findings presented here.  
A second way to build on these findings would be to seek to obtain better generalizable 
proxies for mobilization theory’s key explanatory variables and proceed to conduct additional 
statistical tests using the same data sets. 
A third follow-up project could test the two theories against a new, expanded dataset of 
contestation. Such a dataset would preferably feature contestation in a region beyond MENA and 
Africa that includes countries with varying state capacity, since this would potentially allow us to test 
whether different findings across datasets are driven by state capacity or culture.  
Another potential research project could address the puzzle why organizations are more 
likely to employ nonviolent tactics in high state capacity, but not low state capacity, democracies.  
A related project would be to study what accounts for organizations’ choice between 
nonviolent tactics and terrorism in high state capacity democracies.  
Since the results tells us that democracy in itself does not make organizations more prone to 
employing terrorism, the causal story behind why organizations employ this tactic gets blurry. 
Hence, explaining why organizations are more prone to employing terrorism in high state capacity 
democracies than in low state capacity democracies requires a theoretical logic that does not rely as 
heavily on regime type as does Pape’s (2005). This could constitute another future project.  
All these research projects would benefit from considering the cultural argument as an 
alternative explanation to more structural, rationalist accounts.  
Given the importance of this research question to policy and theory, and considering the 
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Table 1.  Tact i ca l  Choice  over  Time:  MENA Organizat ions 
Country  Organization Year Tactic 
Algeria Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie 2001 None 
Algeria Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie 2002 None 
Algeria Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie 2003 None 
Algeria Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylie 2004 None 
Algeria Rally for Culture and Democracy  2003 NV 
Iran National Liberation Movement of Southern Azerbaijan 1998 None 
Iran National Liberation Movement of Southern Azerbaijan 2001 None 
Iran National Liberation Movement of Southern Azerbaijan 2002 None 
Iran National Liberation Movement of Southern Azerbaijan 2003 None 
Iran National Liberation Movement of Southern Azerbaijan 2004 None 
Iran National Revival Movement of Southern Azerbaijan 2002 NV 
Iran National Revival Movement of Southern Azerbaijan 2003 NV 
Iran National Revival Movement of Southern Azerbaijan 2004 None 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 1980 NV/G/C 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 1981 NV/G/C 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 1982 NV/G/C 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 1983 NV/G/C 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 1984 NV/G/C 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 1985 G/C 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 1986 G/C 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 1987 G/C 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 1988 G/C 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 1989 None 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 1990 None 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 1991 None 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 1992 None 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 1993 None 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 1994 None 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 1995 None 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 1996 G/C 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 1997 None 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 1998 None 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 1999 None 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 2000 None 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 2001 None 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 2002 None 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 2003 None 
Iran Organization of Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan 2004 None 





Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  1981 NV/G/C 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  1982 NV/G/C 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  1983 NV/G/C 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  1984 NV/G/C 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  1985 G/C 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  1986 G/C 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  1987 G/C 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  1988 G/C 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  1989 None 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  1990 None 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  1991 None 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  1992 None 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  1993 None 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  1994 None 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  1995 None 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  1996 None 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  1997 None 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  1998 None 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  1999 None 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  2000 None 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  2001 None 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  2002 None 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  2003 None 
Iran The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran  2004 None 
Iraq Ansar al-Islam 2001 None 
Iraq Ansar al-Islam 2002 T 
Iraq Ansar al-Islam 2003 T 
Iraq Ansar al-Islam 2004 G/C 
Iraq Conservative Party 1995 NV 
Iraq Conservative Party 1996 NV 
Iraq Conservative Party 1997 None 
Iraq Conservative Party 1998 None 
Iraq Conservative Party 1999 None 
Iraq Democratic Centrist Tendency 2003 None 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 1980 T 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 1981 T 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 1982 G/C 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 1983 G/C 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 1984 G/C 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 1985 G/C 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 1986 G/C 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 1987 G/C 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 1988 G/C 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 1989 None 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 1990 G/C 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 1991 G/C 





Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 1993 G/C 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 1994 None 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 1995 None 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 1996 None 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 1997 None 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 1998 None 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 1999 G/C 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 2000 None 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 2001 None 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 2002 None 
Iraq Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya 2003 None 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  1980 NV 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  1981 NV 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  1982 G/C 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  1983 G/C 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  1984 G/C 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  1985 G/C 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  1986 G/C 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  1987 G/C 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  1988 G/C 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  1989 None 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  1990 None 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  1991 G/C 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  1992 G/C 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  1993 None 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  1994 None 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  1995 None 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  1996 None 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  1997 None 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  1998 None 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  1999 NV 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  2000 NV 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  2001 NV/G/C 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  2002 None 
Iraq Iraqi Communist Party  2003 NV 
Iraq Iraqi Homeland Party  2003 None 
Iraq Iraqi Islamic Party  2001 None 
Iraq Iraqi Islamic Party  2002 None 
Iraq Iraqi Islamic Party  2003 None 
Iraq Iraqi National Accord 1991 None 
Iraq Iraqi National Accord 1992 None 
Iraq Iraqi National Accord 1993 None 
Iraq Iraqi National Accord 1994 T 
Iraq Iraqi National Accord 1995 T 
Iraq Iraqi National Accord 1996 T 
Iraq Iraqi National Accord 1997 None 





Iraq Iraqi National Accord 1999 None 
Iraq Iraqi National Accord 2000 None 
Iraq Iraqi National Accord 2001 None 
Iraq Iraqi National Accord 2002 None 
Iraq Iraqi National Accord 2003 None 
Iraq Iraqi National Alliance 2002 None 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  1982 None 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  1983 None 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  1984 T 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  1985 None 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  1986 None 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  1987 None 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  1988 None 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  1989 None 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  1990 None 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  1991 NV/G/C 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  1992 None 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  1993 None 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  1994 None 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  1995 T 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  1996 None 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  1997 None 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  1998 None 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  1999 T 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  2000 None 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  2001 None 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  2002 None 
Iraq Islamic Action Organization  2003 None 
Iraq Islamic Labor Organization  2003 None 
Iraq Islamic Labor Organization  2004 None 
Iraq Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan 1988 G/C 
Iraq Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan 1989 None 
Iraq Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan 1990 None 
Iraq Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan 1991 G/C 
Iraq Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan 1993 None 
Iraq Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan 1994 None 
Iraq Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan 1995 None 
Iraq Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan 1996 None 
Iraq Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan 1997 None 
Iraq Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan 1998 None 
Iraq Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan 1999 None 
Iraq Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan 2000 None 
Iraq Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan 2001 None 
Iraq Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan 2002 None 
Iraq Kurdish Islamic Group  2001 None 
Iraq Kurdish Islamic Group  2002 None 





Iraq Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah 1985 G/C 
Iraq Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah 1986 G/C 
Iraq Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah 1987 G/C 
Iraq Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah 1988 NV/G/C 
Iraq Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah 1989 G/C 
Iraq Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah 1990 None 
Iraq Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah 1991 G/C 
Iraq Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah 1992 None 
Iraq Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah 1993 None 
Iraq Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah 1994 None 
Iraq Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah 1995 None 
Iraq Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah 1996 None 
Iraq Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah 1997 None 
Iraq Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah 1998 None 
Iraq Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah 1999 None 
Iraq Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah 2000 None 
Iraq Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah 2001 None 
Iraq Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah 2002 None 
Iraq Kurdish Revolutionary Hezbollah 2003 None 
Iraq Kurdistan Democratic Party  1980 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan Democratic Party  1981 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan Democratic Party  1982 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan Democratic Party  1983 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan Democratic Party  1984 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan Democratic Party  1985 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan Democratic Party  1986 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan Democratic Party  1987 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan Democratic Party  1988 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan Democratic Party  1989 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan Democratic Party  1990 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan Democratic Party  1991 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan Islamic Union  1994 None 
Iraq Kurdistan Islamic Union  1995 None 
Iraq Kurdistan Islamic Union  1996 None 
Iraq Kurdistan Islamic Union  1997 None 
Iraq Kurdistan Islamic Union  1998 None 
Iraq Kurdistan Islamic Union  1999 None 
Iraq Kurdistan Islamic Union  2000 None 
Iraq Kurdistan Islamic Union  2001 None 
Iraq Kurdistan Islamic Union  2002 NV 
Iraq Kurdistan People's Democratic Party  1980 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan People's Democratic Party  1981 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan People's Democratic Party  1982 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan People's Democratic Party  1983 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan People's Democratic Party  1984 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan People's Democratic Party  1985 G/C 





Iraq Kurdistan People's Democratic Party  1987 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan People's Democratic Party  1988 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan People's Democratic Party  1989 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan People's Democratic Party  1990 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan People's Democratic Party  1991 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party  1986 None 
Iraq Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party  1987 None 
Iraq Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party  1988 None 
Iraq Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party  1989 None 
Iraq Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party  1990 None 
Iraq Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party  1991 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party  1993 None 
Iraq Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party  1994 None 
Iraq Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party  1995 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party  1996 G/C 
Iraq Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party  1997 None 
Iraq Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party  1998 None 
Iraq Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party  1999 None 
Iraq Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 1980 G/C 
Iraq Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 1981 G/C 
Iraq Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 1982 G/C 
Iraq Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 1983 G/C 
Iraq Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 1984 None 
Iraq Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 1985 G/C 
Iraq Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 1986 G/C 
Iraq Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 1987 G/C 
Iraq Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 1988 G/C 
Iraq Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 1989 G/C 
Iraq Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 1990 G/C 
Iraq Workers' Communist Party of Iraq 1998 None 
Iraq Workers' Communist Party of Iraq 1999 None 
Iraq Workers' Communist Party of Iraq 2001 None 
Iraq Workers' Communist Party of Iraq 2002 None 
Iraq Workers' Communist Party of Iraq 2003 NV 
Iraq Workers' Communist Party of Iraq 2004 None 
Israel Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  1984 T 
Israel Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  1985 T 
Israel Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  1986 None 
Israel Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  1987 None 
Israel Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  1988 None 
Israel Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  1989 NV 
Israel Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  1990 None 
Israel Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  1991 None 
Israel Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  1992 None 
Israel Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  1993 NV 
Israel Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  1994 NV 





Israel Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  1996 NV 
Israel Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  1997 NV 
Israel Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  1998 None 
Israel Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  1999 NV 
Israel Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  2000 NV 
Israel Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  2001 NV/T 
Israel Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  2002 NV 
Israel Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  2003 NV/T 
Israel Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine  2004 NV 
Israel Fatah the Uprising 2000 T 
Israel Fatah the Uprising 2001 None 
Israel Fatah the Uprising 2002 None 
Israel Fatah the Uprising 2003 None 
Israel Fatah the Uprising 2004 None 
Israel Fatah/PLO 1980 T 
Israel Fatah/PLO 1981 None 
Israel Fatah/PLO 1982 T 
Israel Fatah/PLO 1983 T 
Israel Fatah/PLO 1984 None 
Israel Fatah/PLO 1985 NV 
Israel Fatah/PLO 1986 T 
Israel Fatah/PLO 1987 NV 
Israel Fatah/PLO 1988 NV/T 
Israel Fatah/PLO 1989 NV 
Israel Fatah/PLO 1990 NV 
Israel Fatah/PLO 1991 NV 
Israel Fatah/PLO 1993 NV 
Israel Fatah/PLO 1994 NV 
Israel Hamas 1987 None 
Israel Hamas 1988 NV 
Israel Hamas 1990 NV 
Israel Hamas 1997 NV/G/C/T 
Israel Hamas 1998 NV/G/C/T 
Israel Hamas 1999 NV/T 
Israel Hamas 2000 NV/T 
Israel Hamas 2001 NV/T 
Israel Hamas 2002 NV/T 
Israel Hamas 2003 NV/T 
Israel National Movement for Change 1995 None 
Israel National Movement for Change 1997 None 
Israel National Movement for Change 1998 NV 
Israel National Movement for Change 1999 None 
Israel National Movement for Change 2000 None 
Israel National Movement for Change 2001 None 
Israel National Movement for Change 2002 None 
Israel National Movement for Change 2003 None 





Israel Palestine Democratic Union 1997 None 
Israel Palestine Democratic Union  1991 None 
Israel Palestine Democratic Union  1992 None 
Israel Palestine Democratic Union  1993 NV 
Israel Palestine Democratic Union  1994 NV 
Israel Palestinian Hezbollah  2000 None 
Israel Palestinian Hezbollah  2001 T 
Israel Palestinian Hezbollah  2002 None 
Israel Palestinian Hezbollah  2003 None 
Israel Palestinian Hezbollah  2004 None 
Israel Palestinian Islamic Jihad 1986 None 
Israel Palestinian Islamic Jihad 1987 None 
Israel Palestinian Islamic Jihad 1988 None 
Israel Palestinian Islamic Jihad 1989 NV 
Israel Palestinian Islamic Jihad 1990 NV/T 
Israel Palestinian Islamic Jihad 1991 T 
Israel Palestinian Islamic Jihad 1992 NV/T 
Israel Palestinian Islamic Jihad 1993 NV/T 
Israel Palestinian Islamic Jihad 1994 NV/T 
Israel Palestinian Islamic Jihad 1995 T 
Israel Palestinian Islamic Jihad 1996 T 
Israel Palestinian Islamic Jihad 1997 NV/T 
Israel Palestinian Islamic Jihad 1998 NV/T 
Israel Palestinian Islamic Jihad 1999 NV 
Israel Palestinian Islamic Jihad 2000 T 
Israel Palestinian Islamic Jihad 2001 T 
Israel Palestinian Islamic Jihad 2002 NV/T 
Israel Palestinian Islamic Jihad 2003 T 
Israel Palestinian Islamic Jihad 2004 T 
Israel Palestinian Liberation Front 1996 None 
Israel Palestinian Liberation Front 1998 NV 
Israel Palestinian Liberation Front 1999 None 
Israel Palestinian Liberation Front 2000 None 
Israel Palestinian Liberation Front 2001 NV 
Israel Palestinian Liberation Front 2002 NV 
Israel Palestinian Liberation Front 2003 NV 
Israel Palestinian Liberation Front 2004 NV 
Israel Palestinian National Initiative 2002 NV 
Israel Palestinian National Initiative 2003 NV 
Israel Palestinian People's Party 1982 None 
Israel Palestinian People's Party 1983 None 
Israel Palestinian People's Party 1984 None 
Israel Palestinian People's Party 1985 None 
Israel Palestinian People's Party 1986 None 
Israel Palestinian People's Party 1987 None 
Israel Palestinian People's Party 1988 NV 





Israel Palestinian People's Party 1990 None 
Israel Palestinian People's Party 1991 None 
Israel Palestinian People's Party 1992 None 
Israel Palestinian People's Party 1993 NV 
Israel Palestinian People's Party 1994 NV 
Israel Palestinian People's Party 1997 None 
Israel Palestinian People's Party 1998 NV 
Israel Palestinian People's Party 1999 NV 
Israel Palestinian People's Party 2000 NV 
Israel Palestinian People's Party 2001 None 
Israel Palestinian People's Party 2002 None 
Israel Palestinian People's Party 2003 None 
Israel Palestinian Popular Struggle Front 1994 NV 
Israel Palestinian Popular Struggle Front 1996 None 
Israel Palestinian Popular Struggle Front 1997 None 
Israel Palestinian Popular Struggle Front 1998 None 
Israel Palestinian Popular Struggle Front 1999 None 
Israel Palestinian Popular Struggle Front 2000 NV 
Israel Palestinian Popular Struggle Front 2001 NV 
Israel Palestinian Popular Struggle Front 2002 None 
Israel Palestinian Popular Struggle Front 2003 NV 
Israel Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 1984 T 
Israel Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 1986 None 
Israel Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 1987 None 
Israel Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 1988 None 
Israel Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 1989 None 
Israel Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 1990 NV 
Israel Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 1991 NV/T 
Israel Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 1992 NV/T 
Israel Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 1993 NV 
Israel Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 1994 NV 
Israel Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 1995 NV 
Israel Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 1996 NV 
Israel Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 1997 NV 
Israel Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 1998 NV 
Israel Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 1999 NV 
Israel Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 2000 NV 
Israel Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 2001 NV/T 
Israel Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 2002 NV/T 
Israel Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 2003 NV/T 
Israel Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 2004 NV/T 
Israel Progressive List for Peace 1995 None 
Israel Progressive List for Peace 1997 None 
Israel Progressive List for Peace 1998 None 
Israel Sons of the Village 1987 None 
Israel Sons of the Village 1988 None 





Israel Sons of the Village 1994 None 
Israel Sons of the Village 2000 None 
Israel Sons of the Village 2001 NV 
Israel Sons of the Village 2002 None 
Israel Sons of the Village 2004 None 
Jordan Jordanian People's Democratic Party  1994 NV 
Jordan Jordanian People's Democratic Party  1995 NV 
Jordan Jordanian People's Democratic Party  1996 NV 
Jordan Jordanian People's Democratic Party  1997 None 
Jordan Jordanian People's Democratic Party  1998 None 
Jordan Jordanian People's Democratic Party  1999 None 
Jordan Jordanian People's Democratic Party  2000 None 
Jordan Jordanian People's Democratic Party  2001 NV 
Jordan Jordanian People's Democratic Party  2002 None 
Jordan Jordanian People's Democratic Party  2004 None 
Jordan Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front 1980 None 
Jordan Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front 1981 None 
Jordan Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front 1982 None 
Jordan Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front 1983 None 
Jordan Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front 1997 None 
Jordan Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front 1998 None 
Jordan Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front 1999 NV 
Jordan Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front 2000 NV 
Jordan Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front 2001 NV 
Jordan Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic Action Front 2002 NV 
Lebanon Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia 1980 None 
Lebanon Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia 1981 None 
Lebanon Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia 1982 None 
Lebanon Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia 1983 None 
Lebanon Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia 1984 None 
Lebanon Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia 1985 None 
Lebanon Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia 1986 None 
Lebanon Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia 1987 None 
Lebanon Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia 1988 None 
Lebanon Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia 1989 None 
Lebanon Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia 1990 None 
Lebanon Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia 1991 None 
Lebanon Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia 2002 None 
Lebanon Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia 2003 None 
Lebanon Al-Jama'a al-Islamioyia 2004 None 
Lebanon al-Takfir wa al-Hijra 2000 G/C 
Lebanon al-Takfir wa al-Hijra 2001 None 
Lebanon al-Takfir wa al-Hijra 2002 None 
Lebanon al-Takfir wa al-Hijra 2003 None 
Lebanon al-Takfir wa al-Hijra 2004 None 
Lebanon Asbat al-Ansar 1985 None 





Lebanon Asbat al-Ansar 1987 None 
Lebanon Asbat al-Ansar 1988 None 
Lebanon Asbat al-Ansar 1989 None 
Lebanon Asbat al-Ansar 1990 None 
Lebanon Asbat al-Ansar 1991 None 
Lebanon Asbat al-Ansar 1992 None 
Lebanon Asbat al-Ansar 1993 None 
Lebanon Asbat al-Ansar 1994 None 
Lebanon Asbat al-Ansar 1995 None 
Lebanon Asbat al-Ansar 1996 None 
Lebanon Asbat al-Ansar 1997 None 
Lebanon Asbat al-Ansar 1998 None 
Lebanon Asbat al-Ansar 1999 G/C 
Lebanon Asbat al-Ansar 2000 G/C 
Lebanon Asbat al-Ansar 2001 None 
Lebanon Asbat al-Ansar 2002 None 
Lebanon Asbat al-Ansar 2003 None 
Lebanon Asbat al-Ansar 2004 None 
Lebanon Islamic Unity Movement 1982 None 
Lebanon Islamic Unity Movement 1983 None 
Lebanon Islamic Unity Movement 1984 None 
Lebanon Islamic Unity Movement 1985 None 
Lebanon Islamic Unity Movement 1986 None 
Lebanon Islamic Unity Movement 1987 None 
Lebanon Islamic Unity Movement 1988 None 
Lebanon Islamic Unity Movement 1989 None 
Lebanon Islamic Unity Movement 1990 None 
Lebanon Islamic Unity Movement 1991 None 
Lebanon Islamic Unity Movement 2002 None 
Lebanon Islamic Unity Movement 2003 None 
Lebanon Islamic Unity Movement 2004 None 
Lebanon Progressive Socialist Party  1984 NV 
Lebanon Progressive Socialist Party  1985 G/C 
Lebanon Progressive Socialist Party  1986 G/C 
Lebanon Progressive Socialist Party  1987 None 
Lebanon Progressive Socialist Party  1988 None 
Lebanon Progressive Socialist Party  1989 None 
Morocco Polisario 1980 NV/G/C 
Morocco Polisario 1981 G/C 
Morocco Polisario 1982 G/C 
Morocco Polisario 1983 G/C 
Morocco Polisario 1984 G/C 
Morocco Polisario 1985 G/C 
Morocco Polisario 1986 G/C 
Morocco Polisario 1987 G/C 
Morocco Polisario 1988 G/C 





Morocco Polisario 1990 G/C 
Morocco Polisario 1991 G/C 
Morocco Polisario 1992 None 
Morocco Polisario 1993 None 
Morocco Polisario 1994 None 
Morocco Polisario 1995 None 
Morocco Polisario 1996 None 
Morocco Polisario 1997 None 
Morocco Polisario 1998 None 
Morocco Polisario 1999 None 
Morocco Polisario 2000 None 
Morocco Polisario 2001 None 
Morocco Polisario 2002 NV 
Morocco Polisario 2003 None 
Morocco Polisario 2004 None 
Syria Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party 2001 None 
Syria Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party 2002 None 
Syria Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party 2003 None 
Syria Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party 2004 NV 
Turkey Democratic Mass Party  1997 None 
Turkey Democratic Mass Party  1998 None 
Turkey Democratic Mass Party  1999 None 
Turkey Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK) 1980 None 
Turkey Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK) 1981 None 
Turkey Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK) 1982 None 
Turkey Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK) 1983 None 
Turkey Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK) 1984 None 
Turkey Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK) 1985 None 
Turkey Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK) 1986 None 
Turkey Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK) 1987 None 
Turkey Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari(KUK) 1988 None 
Turkey Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK) 1989 None 
Turkey Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK) 1990 None 
Turkey Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK) 1991 None 
Turkey Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK) 1992 None 
Turkey Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK) 1993 None 
Turkey Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK) 1994 None 
Turkey Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK) 1995 None 
Turkey Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulusculari (KUK) 1996 None 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 1980 G/C 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 1981 G/C 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 1982 NV/G/C 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 1983 G/C 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 1984 G/C 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 1985 G/C 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 1986 G/C 





Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 1988 G/C 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 1989 NV/G/C 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 1990 NV/G/C 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 1991 NV/G/C 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 1992 NV/G/C/T 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 1993 G/C 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 1994 G/C 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 1995 NV/G/C/T 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 1996 G/C 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 1997 G/C 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 1998 NV/G/C/T 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 1999 NV/G/C/T 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 2000 G/C 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 2001 NV/G/C 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 2002 G/C 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 2003 NV/G/C/T 
Turkey Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) 2004 NV/G/C/T 
 
Table 2.  Tact i ca l  Choice  across  Time:  Afri can Organizat ions 
Country  Organization Year Tactic 
Algeria Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) 1998 G/C 
Algeria Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) 1999 G/C 
Algeria Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) 2000 G/C 
Algeria Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) 2001 G/C 
Algeria Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) 2002 G/C 
Algeria Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) 2003 G/C 
Algeria Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) 2004 G/C 
Algeria Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) 2005 G/C 
Algeria Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) 2006 G/C 
Algeria Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) 2007 G/C 
Algeria Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) 2008 G/C 
Algeria Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) 2009 G/C 
Algeria Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) 2010 G/C 
Algeria Front du Force Socialist (FFS) 1998 NV 
Algeria Front du Force Socialist (FFS) 1999 None 
Algeria Front du Force Socialist (FFS) 2000 None 
Algeria Front du Force Socialist (FFS) 2001 NV 
Algeria Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA) 1998 G/C 
Algeria Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA) 1999 G/C 
Algeria Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA) 2000 G/C 
Algeria Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA) 2001 G/C 
Algeria Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA) 2002 G/C 
Algeria Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA) 2003 G/C 
Algeria Groupe Islamique Armee (GIA) 2004 G/C 
Algeria Mouvement Islamique Armee (MIA) 1998 T 
Algeria Mouvement Islamique Armee (MIA) 1999 G/C 





Algeria Mouvement Islamique Armee (MIA) 2001 None 
Algeria Mouvement Islamique Armee (MIA) 2002 T 
Algeria Mouvement Islamique Armee (MIA) 2003 None 
Algeria Mouvement Islamique Armee (MIA) 2004 None 
Algeria Mouvement Islamique Armee (MIA) 2005 T 
Algeria Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) 1998 None 
Algeria Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) 1999 None 
Algeria Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) 2000 None 
Angola Frente para a Libertaçâo do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) 1992 G/C 
Angola Frente para a Libertaçâo do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) 1993 None 
Angola Frente para a Libertaçâo do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) 1994 T 
Angola Frente para a Libertaçâo do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) 1995 G/C 
Angola FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) 1994 G/C 
Angola FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) 1995 G/C 
Angola FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) 1996 None 
Angola FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) 1997 G/C 
Angola FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) 1998 G/C 
Angola FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) 1999 None 
Angola FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) 2000 G/C 
Angola FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) 2001 G/C 
Angola FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) 2002 G/C 
Angola FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) 2003 G/C 
Angola FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) 2004 G/C 
Angola FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) 2005 None 
Angola FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) 2006 None 
Angola FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) 2007 G/C 
Angola FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) 2008 G/C 
Angola FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) 2009 G/C 
Angola FLEC-Forces Amardas de Cabinda (FLEC-FAC) 2010 G/C 
Angola FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R) 1994 G/C 
Angola FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R) 1995 G/C 
Angola FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R) 1996 None 
Angola FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R) 1997 G/C 
Angola FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R) 1998 G/C 
Angola FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R) 1999 None 
Angola FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R) 2000 None 
Angola FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R) 2001 G/C 
Angola FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R) 2002 None 
Angola FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R) 2003 None 
Angola FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R) 2004 None 
Angola FLEC-Renovada (FLEC-R) 2005 G/C 
Angola União Nac. para a Indep.Total de Angola (UNITA) 1990 G/C 
Angola União Nac. para a Indep. Total de Angola (UNITA) 1991 T 
Angola União Nac. para a Indep. Total de Angola (UNITA) 1992 None 
Angola União Nac. para a Indep. Total de Angola (UNITA) 1993 G/C 
Angola União Nac. para a Indep. Total de Angola (UNITA) 1994 G/C 





Angola União Nac. para a Indep.Total de Angola (UNITA) 1996 NV/G/C 
Angola União Nac. para a Indep.Total de Angola (UNITA) 1997 G/C 
Angola União Nac. para a Indep.Total de Angola (UNITA) 1998 G/C 
Angola União Nac. para a Indep.Total de Angola (UNITA) 1999 G/C 
Angola União Nac. para a Indep.Total de Angola (UNITA) 2000 G/C 
Angola União Nac. para a Indep. Total de Angola (UNITA) 2001 G/C 
Angola União Nac. para a Indep. Total de Angola (UNITA) 2002 G/C 
Burkina Faso Coordination of Democratic Forces 1991 NV 
Burundi National Council for the Defence of Dem. (CNDD) 1994 G/C 
Burundi National Council for the Defence of Dem. (CNDD) 1995 G/C 
Burundi National Council for the Defence of Dem. (CNDD) 1996 G/C 
Burundi National Council for the Defence of Dem. (CNDD) 1997 G/C 
Burundi National Council for the Defence of Dem. (CNDD) 1998 G/C 
Burundi CNDD-Forc.pour la défense de la dém. (CNDD-FDD) 1998 G/C 
Burundi CNDD-Forc.pour la défense de la dém. (CNDD-FDD) 1999 G/C 
Burundi CNDD-Forc.pour la défense de la dém. (CNDD-FDD) 2000 G/C 
Burundi CNDD-Forc.pour la défense de la dém. (CNDD-FDD) 2001 G/C 
Burundi CNDD-Forc.pour la défense de la dém. (CNDD-FDD) 2002 G/C 
Burundi CNDD-Forc.pour la défense de la dém. (CNDD-FDD) 2003 G/C 
Burundi Front pour la libération nationale (Frolina) 1995 G/C 
Burundi Front pour la libération nationale (Frolina) 1996 None 
Burundi Front pour la libération nationale (Frolina) 1997 G/C 
Burundi Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu) 1991 G/C 
Burundi Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu) 1992 G/C 
Burundi Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu) 1993 None 
Burundi Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu) 1994 None 
Burundi Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu) 1995 G/C 
Burundi Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu) 1996 None 
Burundi Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu) 1997 None 
Burundi Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu) 1998 None 
Burundi Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu) 1999 None 
Burundi Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu) 2000 None 
Burundi Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu) 2001 None 
Burundi Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu) 2002 T 
Burundi Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu) 2003 None 
Burundi Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu) 2004 None 
Burundi Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu) 2005 T 
Burundi Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu) 2006 None 
Burundi Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu) 2007 None 
Burundi Parti pour la libération du peuple Hutu – (Palipehutu) 2008 T 
Burundi Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL) 1997 G/C 
Burundi Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL) 1998 G/C 
Burundi Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL) 1999 G/C 
Burundi Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL) 2000 G/C 
Burundi Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL) 2001 G/C 
Burundi Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL) 2002 G/C 





Burundi Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL) 2004 G/C 
Burundi Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL) 2005 G/C 
Burundi Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL) 2006 G/C 
Burundi Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL) 2007 None 
Burundi Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL) 2008 G/C 
Burundi Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL) 2009 None 
Burundi Palipehutu-Forces Nationales de lib. (Palipehutu-FNL) 2010 NV 
Cameroon Allied Front for Change  1995 NV 
Cameroon Coalition for Nat. Reconciliation and Reconstruction  2004 NV 
Cameroon Patriotic and People's Youth Council 2008 NV 
Cameroon Social Democratic Front 1991 NV 
Cameroon Social Democratic Front 1992 None 
Cameroon Social Democratic Front 1993 None 
Cameroon Social Democratic Front 1994 None 
Cameroon Social Democratic Front 1995 None 
Cameroon Social Democratic Front 1996 NV 
Cameroon Social Democratic Front 1997 None 
Cameroon Social Democratic Front 1998 None 
Cameroon Social Democratic Front 1999 None 
Cameroon Social Democratic Front 2000 None 
Cameroon Social Democratic Front 2001 None 
Cameroon Social Democratic Front 2002 NV 
Cameroon Social Democratic Front 2003 None 
Cameroon Social Democratic Front 2004 None 
Cameroon Social Democratic Front 2005 None 
Cameroon Social Democratic Front 2006 None 
Cameroon Social Democratic Front 2007 None 
Cameroon Social Democratic Front 2008 NV 
Central African Rep. Alliance for Democracy  1992 NV 
Central African Rep. Central African Flame 2000 NV 
Central African Rep. Coord. Com. for the Convocation of a Nat. Conference 1991 NV 
Central African Rep. Movement for Social Evolution in Black Africa 1991 NV 
Chad Alliance National (AN) 2008 G/C 
Chad Comité national de redressement (CNR) 1992 G/C 
Chad Conseil de Salut nat. pour la Paix et la Dém. (CSNPD) 1992 G/C 
Chad Conseil de Salut nat. pour la Paix et la Dém. (CSNPD) 1993 G/C 
Chad Conseil de Salut nat. pour la Paix et la Dém. (CSNPD) 1994 G/C 
Chad Conseil de Salut nat. pour la Paix et la Dém. (CSNPD) 1995 None 
Chad Conseil de Salut nat. pour la Paix et la Dém. (CSNPD) 1996 None 
Chad Conseil de Salut nat. pour la Paix et la Dém. (CSNPD) 1997 None 
Chad Conseil de Salut nat. pour la Paix et la Dém. (CSNPD) 1998 None 
Chad Conseil de Salut nat. pour la Paix et la Dém. (CSNPD) 1999 None 
Chad Conseil de Salut nat. pour la Paix et la Dém. (CSNPD) 2000 G/C 
Chad Forces Armées pour la République Fédérale (FARF) 1994 G/C 
Chad Forces Armées pour la République Fédérale (FARF) 1995 None 
Chad Forces Armées pour la République Fédérale (FARF) 1996 None 





Chad Forces Armées pour la République Fédérale (FARF) 1998 G/C 
Chad Front National Tchadien (FNT) 1992 G/C 
Chad Front Unique pour le Changement Dém. (FUCD) 2005 G/C 
Chad Front Unique pour le Changement Dém.(FUCD) 2006 G/C 
Chad Front Unique pour le Changement Dém.(FUCD) 2007 G/C 
Chad Islamic Legion 1990 G/C 
Chad Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Develop. (MDD) 1991 G/C 
Chad Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Develop. (MDD) 1992 G/C 
Chad Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Develop. (MDD) 1993 G/C 
Chad Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Develop. (MDD) 1994 G/C 
Chad Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Develop. (MDD) 1995 G/C 
Chad Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Develop. (MDD) 1996 None 
Chad Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Develop. (MDD) 1997 G/C 
Chad Mouv. pour la Dém. et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT) 1999 G/C 
Chad Mouv. pour la Dém. et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT) 2000 G/C 
Chad Mouv. pour la Dém. et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT) 2001 G/C 
Chad Mouv. pour la Dém. et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT) 2002 G/C 
Chad Mouv. pour la Dém. et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT) 2003 G/C 
Chad Mouvement Patriotique du Salut (MPS) 1990 G/C 
Chad Front Populaire pour la Renaissance Nationale (PFNR) 2007 G/C 
Chad Front Populaire pour la Renaissance Nationale (PFNR) 2008 None 
Chad Front Populaire pour la Renaissance Nationale (PFNR) 2009 None 
Chad Front Populaire pour la Renaissance Nationale (PFNR) 2010 G/C 
Chad Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques (RAFD) 2006 G/C 
Chad Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques (RAFD) 2007 G/C 
Chad Union des Forces pour la Dém. et le Dévelop.(UFDD) 2006 G/C 
Chad Union des Forces pour la Dém. et le Dévelop.(UFDD) 2007 G/C 
Chad Union des Forces de la Résistance (UFR) 2009 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Alliance des Forces Dém. pour la Libération (AFDL) 1996 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Alliance des Forces Dém. pour la Libération (AFDL) 1997 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) 1998 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) 1999 None 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) 2000 None 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) 2001 None 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) 2002 None 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) 2003 None 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) 2004 None 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) 2005 None 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) 2006 None 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) 2007 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) 2008 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Congrès Nat. pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) 2006 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Congrès Nat. pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) 2007 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Congrès Nat. pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP) 2008 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Congolese Patriots Movement 2006 NV 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Front pour la Restaur. de L’unité et de la Dém. (FRUD) 1991 G/C 





Congo, Dem. Rep. Front pour la Restaur. de L’unité et de la Dém. (FRUD) 1993 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Front pour la Restaur. de L’unité et de la Dém. (FRUD) 1994 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Front pour la Restaur. de L’unité et de la Dém. (FRUD) 1995 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. FRUD- Ahmed Dini faction (FRUD-AD) 1997 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. FRUD- Ahmed Dini faction (FRUD-AD) 1998 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. FRUD- Ahmed Dini faction (FRUD-AD) 1999 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Holy Alliance 1993 NV 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC) 1998 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC) 1999 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC) 2000 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC) 2001 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Nationalist Integrationist Front 2005 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. New Forces of Union and Solidarity  2006 NV 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Rassemblement Congolais pour la Dém.(RCD) 1998 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Rassemblement Congolais pour la Dém.(RCD) 1999 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Rassemblement Congolais pour la Dém.(RCD) 2000 None 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Rassemblement Congolais pour la Dém.(RCD) 2001 G/C 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Unified Lumumbist Party  1997 NV 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Union for Democracy and Social Progress 1990 NV 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Union for Democracy and Social Progress 1991 None 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Union for Democracy and Social Progress 1992 None 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Union for Democracy and Social Progress 1993 None 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Union for Democracy and Social Progress 1994 None 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Union for Democracy and Social Progress 1995 None 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Union for Democracy and Social Progress 1996 NV 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Union for Democracy and Social Progress 1997 NV 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Union for Democracy and Social Progress 1998 None 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Union for Democracy and Social Progress 1999 None 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Union for Democracy and Social Progress 2000 None 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Union for Democracy and Social Progress 2001 None 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Union for Democracy and Social Progress 2006 NV 
Congo, Rep. Cobras 1997 G/C 
Congo, Rep. Cocoyes 1999 G/C 
Congo, Rep. Cocoyes 2000 None 
Congo, Rep. Cocoyes 2001 None 
Congo, Rep. Cocoyes 2002 None 
Congo, Rep. Cocoyes 2003 None 
Congo, Rep. Cocoyes 2004 None 
Congo, Rep. Cocoyes 2005 None 
Congo, Rep. Ninjas 1993 G/C 
Congo, Rep. Ninjas 1994 None 
Congo, Rep. Ninjas 1995 None 
Congo, Rep. Ninjas 1996 None 
Congo, Rep. Ninjas 1997 None 
Congo, Rep. Ninjas 1998 G/C 
Congo, Rep. Ntsiloulous 1998 G/C 





Congo, Rep. Ntsiloulous 2000 None 
Congo, Rep. Ntsiloulous 2001 None 
Congo, Rep. Ntsiloulous 2002 G/C 
Congo, Rep. Ntsiloulous 2003 G/C 
Cote d'Ivoire Forces Républicaines de Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI) 2004 G/C 
Cote d'Ivoire Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MJP) 2002 G/C 
Cote d'Ivoire Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MJP) 2003 G/C 
Cote d'Ivoire Mouvement Patriotique de la Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI) 2002 G/C 
Cote d'Ivoire Mouvement Pop. Ivorian du Grand Ouest (MPIGO) 2002 G/C 
Cote d'Ivoire Mouvement Pop. Ivorian du Grand Ouest (MPIGO) 2003 G/C 
Cote d'Ivoire People's Front  1991 NV 
Cote d'Ivoire Republican Front 1995 NV 
Egypt Muslim Brotherhood 2009 NV 
Egypt Muslim Brotherhood 2010 NV 
Egypt Al Jihad 1991 G/C 
Egypt Al Jihad 1992 G/C 
Egypt al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya 1992 G/C 
Egypt al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya 1993 G/C 
Egypt al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya 1994 G/C 
Egypt al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya 1995 G/C 
Egypt al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya 1996 G/C 
Egypt al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya 1997 G/C 
Egypt al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya 1998 G/C 
Egypt al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya 1999 G/C 
Egypt al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya 2000 G/C 
Egypt Kefaya 2004 NV 
Egypt Kefaya 2005 NV 
Egypt Kefaya 2006 NV 
Egypt Kefaya 2007 NV 
Eritrea Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail ( EIJM-AS) 1993 G/C 
Eritrea Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail ( EIJM-AS) 1994 None 
Eritrea Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail ( EIJM-AS) 1995 None 
Eritrea Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail ( EIJM-AS) 1996 G/C 
Eritrea Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail ( EIJM-AS) 1997 G/C 
Eritrea Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail ( EIJM-AS) 1998 None 
Eritrea Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail ( EIJM-AS) 1999 G/C 
Eritrea Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail ( EIJM-AS) 2000 None 
Eritrea Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail ( EIJM-AS) 2001 None 
Eritrea Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail ( EIJM-AS) 2002 None 
Eritrea Harakat al Jihad al Islami - Abu Suhail ( EIJM-AS) 2003 G/C 
Ethiopia al-Itahad al-Islami (AIAI) 1993 G/C 
Ethiopia al-Itahad al-Islami (AIAI) 1994 G/C 
Ethiopia al-Itahad al-Islami (AIAI) 1995 None 
Ethiopia al-Itahad al-Islami (AIAI) 1996 G/C 
Ethiopia al-Itahad al-Islami (AIAI) 1997 None 
Ethiopia al-Itahad al-Islami (AIAI) 1998 None 





Ethiopia Coalition for Unity and Democracy 2005 NV 
Ethiopia Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) 1990 G/C 
Ethiopia Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) 1991 G/C 
Ethiopia Ethiopian People’s Rev. Dem. Front (EPRDF) 1990 G/C 
Ethiopia Ethiopian People’s Rev. Dem. Front (EPRDF) 1991 G/C 
Ethiopia Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF) 1991 G/C 
Ethiopia Issa and Gurgura Liberation Front (IGLF) 1992 G/C 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 1990 G/C 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 1991 G/C 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 1992 G/C 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 1993 G/C 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 1994 G/C 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 1995 G/C 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 1996 None 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 1997 G/C 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 1998 None 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 1999 G/C 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 2000 G/C 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 2001 G/C 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 2002 G/C 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 2003 G/C 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 2004 G/C 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 2005 G/C 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 2006 G/C 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 2007 G/C 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 2008 G/C 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 2009 G/C 
Ethiopia Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 2010 G/C 
Ethiopia Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 1994 G/C 
Ethiopia Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 1995 G/C 
Ethiopia Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 1996 G/C 
Ethiopia Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 1997 None 
Ethiopia Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 1998 G/C 
Ethiopia Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 1999 G/C 
Ethiopia Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 2000 G/C 
Ethiopia Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 2001 G/C 
Ethiopia Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 2002 G/C 
Ethiopia Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 2003 G/C 
Ethiopia Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 2004 G/C 
Ethiopia Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 2005 G/C 
Ethiopia Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 2006 G/C 
Ethiopia Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 2007 G/C 
Ethiopia Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 2008 G/C 
Ethiopia Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 2009 G/C 
Ethiopia Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) 2010 G/C 
Gabon Bongo Must Go  2009 NV 





Ghana National Union of Ghana Students 1992 None 
Ghana National Union of Ghana Students 1993 None 
Ghana National Union of Ghana Students 1994 None 
Guinea Dadis Must Go Movement 2009 NV 
Guinea Rassemblement des Forces dém. de Guinée (RFDG) 2000 G/C 
Kenya Forum for the Restoration of Democracy 1992 NV 
Kenya Islamic Party of Kenya 1992 NV/G/C 
Kenya Islamic Party of Kenya 1993 NV 
Kenya Law Society of Kenya 2002 NV 
Kenya Mungiki Sect 2007 G/C 
Kenya National Convention Assembly 1997 NV 
Lesotho All Basotho Convention 2008 NV 
Lesotho LCD 1998 NV 
Lesotho Marematlou Freedom Party  1998 NV 
Lesotho Youthful Lesotho 1997 NV 
Madagascar 3FN 2005 NV 
Madagascar Lifeblood Committee 1991 NV 
Malawi Forum for the Defence of the Constitution  2002 NV 
Malawi National Democratic Alliance 2001 NV 
Malawi Public Affairs Committee 2003 NV 
Mali ATNMC 2008 G/C 
Mauritania National Front for the Defense of Democracy  2008 NV 
Mauritania National Front for the Defense of Democracy  2009 NV 
Mauritania Rally for Democratic Forces 2009 NV 
Morocco Polisario 2009 NV 
Morocco Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) 1993 NV 
Mozambique Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) 1992 G/C 
Mozambique Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) 1990 T 
Mozambique Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) 1991 T 
Mozambique Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) 1992 T 
Mozambique Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) 1993 None 
Mozambique Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) 1994 None 
Mozambique Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) 1995 None 
Mozambique Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) 1996 None 
Mozambique Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) 1997 NV 
Mozambique Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) 1998 None 
Mozambique Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) 1999 None 
Mozambique Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) 2000 None 
Mozambique Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) 2001 None 
Mozambique Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) 2002 None 
Mozambique Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) 2003 None 
Mozambique Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO) 2004 None 
Niger Air and Azawak Liberation Front 1991 G/C 
Niger Air and Azawak Liberation Front 1992 T 
Niger Coordination of Democratic Forces for the Republic 2009 NV 
Niger Democratic and Social Convention 1992 NV 





Niger Party for Democracy and Socialism 2009 NV 
Nigeria Campaign for Democracy 1993 NV 
Nigeria Committee for the Defence of Human Rights 1993 NV 
Nigeria Mov. for the Actualization of the Sov. State of Biafra 2000 NV 
Nigeria Mov. for the Actualization of the Sov. State of Biafra 2001 None 
Nigeria Mov. for the Actualization of the Sov. State of Biafra 2002 None 
Nigeria Mov. for the Actualization of the Sov. State of Biafra 2003 None 
Nigeria Mov. for the Actualization of the Sov. State of Biafra 2004 None 
Nigeria Mov. for the Actualization of the Sov. State of Biafra 2005 NV 
Nigeria Mov. for the Actualization of the Sov. State of Biafra 2007 None 
Nigeria Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 2006 T 
Nigeria Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 2008 T 
Nigeria Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People 2001 NV 
Nigeria Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force 2005 NV 
Nigeria Nigeria Labour Congress 2009 NV 
Nigeria United Action for Democracy 1998 NV 
Nigeria Youth Alliance for Good Governance 2006 NV 
Rwanda Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda (ALiR) 1996 G/C 
Rwanda Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda (ALiR) 1997 G/C 
Rwanda Armée pour la Libération du Rwanda (ALiR) 1998 G/C 
Rwanda Forces Dém. de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) 2001 G/C 
Rwanda Forces Dém. de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) 2002 None 
Rwanda Forces Dém. de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) 2003 None 
Rwanda Forces Dém. de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) 2004 G/C 
Rwanda Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) 1991 G/C 
Rwanda Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) 1992 G/C 
Rwanda Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) 1993 G/C 
Rwanda Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) 1994 G/C 
Senegal Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC) 1990 G/C 
Senegal Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC) 1991 None 
Senegal Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC) 1992 G/C 
Senegal Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC) 1993 G/C 
Senegal Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC) 1994 None 
Senegal Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC) 1995 G/C 
Senegal Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC) 1996 G/C 
Senegal Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC) 1997 G/C 
Senegal Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC) 1998 None 
Senegal Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC) 1999 G/C 
Senegal Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC) 2000 G/C 
Senegal Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC) 2001 G/C 
Senegal Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC) 2002 G/C 
Senegal Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC) 2003 G/C 
Senegal Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC) 2004 G/C 
Senegal Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC) 2005 G/C 
Senegal Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC) 2006 G/C 
Senegal Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC) 2007 None 





Senegal Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC) 2009 G/C 
Senegal Mouv. des Forces Dém. de Casamance (MFDC) 2010 G/C 
Sierra Leone Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) 1998 G/C 
Sierra Leone Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) 1999 G/C 
Sierra Leone Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 1991 G/C 
Sierra Leone Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 1992 G/C 
Sierra Leone Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 1993 G/C 
Sierra Leone Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 1994 G/C 
Sierra Leone Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 1995 T 
Sierra Leone Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 1996 None 
Sierra Leone Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 1997 None 
Sierra Leone Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 1998 G/C 
Sierra Leone Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 1999 G/C 
Sierra Leone Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 2000 G/C 
Sierra Leone Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 2001 G/C 
Sierra Leone West Side Boys (WSB) 2000 G/C 
Somalia Al-Shabaab 2008 G/C 
Somalia Al-Shabaab 2009 G/C 
Somalia Al-Shabaab 2010 G/C 
Somalia Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (ARS/UIC) 2006 G/C 
Somalia Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (ARS/UIC) 2007 G/C 
Somalia Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia (ARS/UIC) 2008 G/C 
Somalia Hizbul Islam 2009 G/C 
Somalia Hizbul Islam 2010 G/C 
Somalia Somali National Movement (SNM) 1990 G/C 
Somalia Somali National Movement (SNM) 1991 G/C 
Somalia Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) 1990 G/C 
Somalia Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) 1991 G/C 
Somalia Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) 2001 G/C 
Somalia Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) 2002 G/C 
Somalia United Somali Congress/Somali Nat. All. (USC/SNA) 1991 G/C 
Somalia United Somali Congress/Somali Nat. All. (USC/SNA) 1992 G/C 
Somalia United Somali Congress/Somali Nat. All. (USC/SNA) 1993 G/C 
Somalia United Somali Congress/Somali Nat. All. (USC/SNA) 1994 None 
Somalia United Somali Congress/Somali Nat. All. (USC/SNA) 1995 G/C 
Somalia United Somali Congress/Somali Nat. All. (USC/SNA) 1996 G/C 
Somalia United Somali Congress/Somali Nat. All. (USC/SNA) 1990 G/C 
Somalia United Somali Congress/Somali Nat. All. (USC/SNA) 1991 G/C 
South Africa Afrikaner Resistance Movement 1994 T 
South Africa Afrikaner Volksfront 1993 NV 
South Africa African National Congress (ANC) 1990 NV/G/C/T 
South Africa African National Congress (ANC) 1991 NV 
South Africa African National Congress (ANC) 1992 NV/G/C 
South Africa African National Congress (ANC) 1993 NV/G/C 
South Africa African National Congress (ANC) 1994 NV 
South Africa Azania People's Organization 1990 G/C 





South Africa Azania People's Organization 1992 T 
South Africa Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 1991 NV 
South Africa Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 1992 NV 
South Africa Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 1993 NV 
South Africa Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 1996 NV 
South Africa Inkatha Freedom Party 1991 G/C 
South Africa Pan African Congress (PAC) 1992 G/C 
South Africa Pan African Congress (PAC) 1994 NV 
South Africa People Against Gangsterism and Drugs 1997 None 
South Africa People Against Gangsterism and Drugs 1998 None 
South Africa People Against Gangsterism and Drugs 1999 NV/T 
South Africa South African Communist Party (SACP) 1991 NV 
South Africa South African Communist Party (SACP) 1992 None 
South Africa South African Communist Party (SACP) 1993 None 
South Africa South African Communist Party (SACP) 1994 None 
South Africa South African Communist Party (SACP) 1995 None 
South Africa South African Communist Party (SACP) 1996 None 
South Africa South African Communist Party (SACP) 1997 None 
South Africa South African Communist Party (SACP) 1998 None 
South Africa South African Communist Party (SACP) 1999 None 
South Africa South African Communist Party (SACP) 2000 None 
South Africa South African Communist Party (SACP) 2001 None 
South Africa South African Communist Party (SACP) 2002 None 
South Africa South African Communist Party (SACP) 2003 None 
South Africa South African Communist Party (SACP) 2004 None 
South Africa South African Communist Party (SACP) 2005 None 
South Africa Treatment Action Campaign 2006 NV 
South Africa United Democratic Front (UDF) 1990 NV 
Sudan Democratic Unionist Party  2000 NV 
Sudan Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 2003 G/C 
Sudan Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 2004 G/C 
Sudan Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 2005 None 
Sudan Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 2006 None 
Sudan Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 2007 G/C 
Sudan Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 2008 G/C 
Sudan Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 2009 G/C 
Sudan Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 2010 G/C 
Sudan National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 1996 G/C 
Sudan National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 1997 G/C 
Sudan National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 1998 G/C 
Sudan National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 1999 G/C 
Sudan National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 2000 G/C 
Sudan National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 2001 G/C 
Sudan National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 2002 G/C 
Sudan National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 2003 None 
Sudan National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 2004 None 





Sudan National Redemption Front (NRF) 2006 G/C 
Sudan Popular National Congress 2000 NV 
Sudan Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) 2003 G/C 
Sudan Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) 2004 G/C 
Sudan Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) 2005 G/C 
Sudan Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) 2006 G/C 
Sudan Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) 2007 None 
Sudan Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) 2008 G/C 
Sudan Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) 2009 G/C 
Sudan Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) 2010 G/C 
Sudan SLM/A - Minni Minawi faction (SLM/A-MM) 2006 G/C 
Sudan SLM/A - Minni Minawi faction (SLM/A-MM) 2007 G/C 
Sudan SLM/A - Minni Minawi faction (SLM/A-MM) 2008 None 
Sudan SLM/A - Minni Minawi faction (SLM/A-MM) 2009 None 
Sudan SLM/A - Minni Minawi faction (SLM/A-MM) 2010 G/C 
Sudan SLM/A-Unity 2007 G/C 
Sudan SLM/A-Unity 2008 G/C 
Sudan Sudanese People’s Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A) 1990 G/C 
Sudan Sudanese People’s Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A) 1991 G/C 
Sudan Sudanese People’s Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A) 1992 G/C 
Sudan Sudanese People’s Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A) 1993 G/C 
Sudan Sudanese People’s Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A) 1994 G/C 
Sudan Sudanese People’s Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A) 1995 G/C 
Sudan Sudanese People’s Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A) 1996 G/C 
Sudan Sudanese People’s Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A) 1997 G/C 
Sudan Sudanese People’s Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A) 1998 G/C 
Sudan Sudanese People’s Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A) 1999 G/C 
Sudan Sudanese People’s Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A) 2000 G/C 
Sudan Sudanese People’s Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A) 2001 G/C 
Sudan Sudanese People’s Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A) 2002 G/C 
Sudan Sudanese People’s Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A) 2003 None 
Sudan Sudanese People’s Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A) 2004 G/C 
Sudan Sudanese People’s Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A) 2005 None 
Sudan Sudanese People’s Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A) 2006 None 
Sudan Sudanese People’s Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A) 2007 None 
Sudan Sudanese People’s Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A) 2008 None 
Sudan Sudanese People’s Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A) 2009 NV 
Sudan Sudanese People’s Liberation Mov./Army (SPLM/A) 2010 G/C 
Sudan Ummah Party 2009 NV 
Swaziland People's United Democratic Movement 2002 NV 
Swaziland People's United Democratic Movement 2003 None 
Swaziland People's United Democratic Movement 2004 None 
Swaziland People's United Democratic Movement 2005 None 
Swaziland People's United Democratic Movement 2006 None 
Swaziland People's United Democratic Movement 2007 None 
Swaziland People's United Democratic Movement 2008 None 





Swaziland People's United Democratic Movement 2010 NV 
Swaziland Swaziland Democratic Alliance 1996 NV 
Swaziland Swaziland Democratic Alliance 1997 None 
Swaziland Swaziland Democratic Alliance 1998 None 
Swaziland Swaziland Democratic Alliance 1999 None 
Swaziland Swaziland Democratic Alliance 2000 None 
Swaziland Swaziland Democratic Alliance 2001 None 
Togo Union for the Forces of Change 2009 NV 
Togo Union for the Forces of Change 2010 NV 
Uganda Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) 1996 G/C 
Uganda Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) 1997 G/C 
Uganda Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) 1998 G/C 
Uganda Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) 1999 G/C 
Uganda Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) 2000 T 
Uganda Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) 2001 G/C 
Uganda Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) 2002 None 
Uganda Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) 2003 None 
Uganda Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) 2004 None 
Uganda Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) 2005 None 
Uganda Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) 2006 G/C 
Uganda Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADF) 2007 G/C 
Uganda Holy Spirit Movement 1990 G/C 
Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 1990 G/C 
Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 1991 G/C 
Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 1992 None 
Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 1993 None 
Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 1994 G/C 
Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 1995 G/C 
Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 1996 G/C 
Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 1997 None 
Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 1998 G/C 
Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 1999 G/C 
Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 2000 G/C 
Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 2001 G/C 
Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 2002 G/C 
Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 2003 G/C 
Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 2004 G/C 
Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 2005 G/C 
Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 2006 G/C 
Uganda Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 2007 G/C 
Uganda Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II) 1996 G/C 
Uganda Uganda People's Army (UPA) 1990 G/C 
Uganda Uganda People's Army (UPA) 1991 G/C 
Uganda Uganda People's Army (UPA) 1992 G/C 
Uganda Uganda People's Army (UPA) 1993 None 
Uganda Uganda People's Army (UPA) 1994 G/C 





Uganda West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) 1996 G/C 
Uganda West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) 1997 None 
Uganda West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) 1998 G/C 
Zambia Movement for Multi-Party Democracy 1991 NV 
Zambia National Interim Committee for Multiparty Democracy 1990 NV 
Zambia Oasis Forum 2005 NV 
Zambia Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 1990 NV 
Zambia Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 1991 None 
Zambia Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 1992 None 
Zambia Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 1993 None 
Zambia Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 1994 None 
Zambia Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 1995 None 
Zambia Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 1996 None 
Zambia Zambia Congress of Trade Unions 1997 None 
Zimbabwe Combined Harare Residents Association  2006 NV 
Zimbabwe National Constitutional Assembly 2001 NV 
Zimbabwe National Constitutional Assembly 2005 NV 
Zimbabwe National Constitutional Assembly 2006 NV 
Zimbabwe National Constitutional Assembly 2006 NV 
Zimbabwe National Constitutional Assembly 2007 None 
Zimbabwe National Constitutional Assembly 2008 NV 
Zimbabwe Save Zimbabwe Campaign 2007 NV 
Zimbabwe Women of Zimbabwe Arise 2007 NV 
 
Tests of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives 
Tests conducted on models without country clusters  
MENA 1: 
**** Hausman tests of IIA assumption (N=294) 
 Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives. 
 Omitted |      chi2   df   P>chi2   evidence 
---------+------------------------------------ 
       1 |     0.000    2    1.000   for Ho     
       2 |     0.000    2    1.000   for Ho     









**** Small-Hsiao tests of IIA assumption (N=294) 
 Omitted |  lnL(full)  lnL(omit)    chi2   df   P>chi2   evidence 
---------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
       1 |    -44.216    -36.828  14.775   20    0.789   for Ho     
       2 |    -95.692    -74.308  42.769   20    0.002   against Ho 
       3 |    -88.843    -68.018  41.650   20    0.003   against Ho 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
MENA 2:  
**** Hausman tests of IIA assumption (N=287) 
 Omitted |      chi2   df   P>chi2   evidence 
---------+------------------------------------ 
       1 |     0.000    2    1.000   for Ho     
       2 |     0.000    2    1.000   for Ho     
       3 |    -0.000    4     ---    ---        
---------------------------------------------- 
 Note: If chi2<0, the estimated model does not meet asymptotic assumptions of 
the test. 
**** Small-Hsiao tests of IIA assumption (N=287) 
 Omitted |  lnL(full)  lnL(omit)    chi2   df   P>chi2   evidence 
---------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
       1 |    -64.609    -54.821  19.576   20    0.485   for Ho     
       2 |    -69.572    -64.193  10.758   20    0.952   for Ho     












**** Hausman tests of IIA assumption (N=495) 
 
 Omitted |      chi2   df   P>chi2   evidence 
---------+------------------------------------ 
       1 |     0.051    4    1.000   for Ho     
       2 |    -1.751   11     ---    ---        
       3 |     0.641   16    1.000   for Ho     
---------------------------------------------- 
 Note: If chi2<0, the estimated model does not meet asymptotic assumptions of 
the test. 
 
**** Small-Hsiao tests of IIA assumption (N=495) 
 Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are independent of other alternatives. 
 Omitted |  lnL(full)  lnL(omit)    chi2   df   P>chi2   evidence 
---------+--------------------------------------------------------- 
       1 |   -182.506   -174.310  16.393   16    0.426   for Ho     
       2 |    -68.333    -65.150   6.365   16    0.984   for Ho     










































Table 3. Organizations’ Use of Tactics in MENA 1980-2004 
Results after Multinomial Logit 
Base category: None of the Tactics Used 
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05; **p<0.01; p***<0.001 
MENA 1 
Tactic Independent Variable Coefficient 
Low Popular Satisfaction  .224   (.83) 
High Repression .807***    (.08) 
Low Popular Satisfaction * 
High Repression 
.634**   (.25) 
High State Capacity Autocracy -1.989***    (.45) 
High State Capacity Anocracy -15.272***   (1.17) 
Rural Population  -.037   (.02) 
Foreign State Fin. Support .593  (.94) 
Cold War  -.515    (.61) 
Group Proportion 2.765*   (1.38) 
Nonviolent 
Constant -.575   (1.26) 
Low Popular Satisfaction  -.359   (1.81) 
High Repression 2.349***   (.09) 
Low Popular Satisfaction * 
High Repression 
-.040  (.81) 
High State Capacity Autocracy 3.073   (8.08) 
High State Capacity Anocracy -11.734   (7.70) 
Rural Population  -.044   (.28) 
Foreign State Fin. Support -1.121**  (.33) 
Cold War  1.864**  (.63) 
Group Proportion -1.510**   (.45) 
Guerrilla/Conventional 
Constant -3.163   (2.04) 
Low Popular Satisfaction  -13.665***     (2.50) 
High Repression -.295***    (.03) 
Low Popular Satisfaction * 
High Repression 
1.282***   (.21) 
High State Capacity Autocracy -15.034***  (1.88) 
High State Capacity Anocracy -27.697***  (3.45) 
Rural Population .0353   (.07) 
Foreign State Fin. Support 2.335   (2.22) 
Cold War  .284   (1.27) 
Group Proportion 4.140   (5.59) 
Constant 9.164   (5.45) 


















Table 4. Organizations’ Use of Tactics in MENA 1980-2004 
Results after Multinomial Logit 
Base category=Nonviolent tactics 
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05; **p<0.01; p***<0.001 
MENA 1 
Tactic Independent Variable Coefficient 
Low Popular Satisfaction  -.224   (.83) 
High Repression -.807***    (.08) 
Low Popular Satisfaction * 
High Repression 
-.634**   (.25) 
High State Capacity Autocracy 1.989***    (.45) 
High State Capacity Anocracy 15.272***  (1.17) 
Rural Population   .037   (.02) 
Foreign State Fin. Support -.593   (.94) 
Cold War  .515    (.61) 
Group Proportion -2.765*  (1.38) 
None of the tactics used 
Constant .575   (1.26) 
Low Popular Satisfaction  -.583   (1.68) 
High Repression 1.542***   (.10) 
Low Popular Satisfaction * 
High Repression 
-.6730   (.60) 
High State Capacity Autocracy  5.062   (8.11) 
High State Capacity Anocracy 3.538   (8.09) 
Rural Population -.0074   (.28) 
Foreign State Fin. Support -1.714*   (.67) 
Cold War   2.379*   (.93) 
Group Proportion -4.275**   (1.43) 
Guerrilla/Conventional 
Constant -2.589**  (.93) 
Low Popular Satisfaction  -13.889***   (2.36) 
High Repression -1.101***   (.10) 
Low Popular Satisfaction * 
High Repression 
.648  (.34) 
High State Capacity Autocracy -13.045***   (1.86) 
High State Capacity Anocracy -12.424***   (2.64) 
Rural Population .072   (.07) 
Foreign State Fin. Support 1.741    (1.28) 
Cold War  .799   (.68) 
Group Proportion  1.375  (4.21) 
Constant 9.739*   (4.70) 


















Table 5. Organizations’ Use of Tactics in MENA 1980-2004 
Results after Multinomial Logit 
Base category: Guerrilla/Conventional Warfare 
 
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05; **p<0.01; p***<0.001 
MENA 1 
Tactic Independent Variable Coefficient 
Low Popular Satisfaction  .359   (1.81) 
High Repression -2.349***   (.09) 
Low Popular Satisfaction * 
High Repression 
.040   (.81) 
High State Capacity Autocracy -3.073   (8.08) 
High State Capacity Anocracy 11.734   (7.70) 
Rural Population .044   (.28) 
Foreign State Fin. Support 1.120**   (.33) 
Cold War  -1.864**  (.63) 
Group Proportion 1.510**   (.45) 
None of the tactics used 
Constant 3.163    (2.04) 
Low Popular Satisfaction  .583   (1.68) 
High Repression -1.542***   (.10) 
Low Popular Satisfaction * 
High Repression 
.673   (.61) 
High State Capacity Autocracy -5.062   (8.11) 
High State Capacity Anocracy -3.538   (8.09) 
Rural Population .007   (.28) 
Foreign State Fin. Support 1.714*   (.67) 
Cold War  -2.379*   (.93) 
Group Proportion 4.275**   (1.43) 
Nonviolent 
Constant 2.589**   (.93) 
Low Popular Satisfaction  -13.306***   (3.73) 
High Repression -2.643***   (.07) 
Low Popular Satisfaction * 
High Repression 
1.321    (.85) 
High State Capacity Autocracy -18.107   (9.57) 
High State Capacity Anocracy -15.963    (10.08) 
Rural Population .080   (.31) 
Foreign State Fin. Support 3.455   (1.93) 
Cold War  -1.580   (1.55) 
Group Proportion 5.650   (5.61) 
Constant 12.327**   (4.47) 

















Table 6. Organizations’ Use of Tactics in MENA 1980-2004 
Results after Multinomial Logit 
Base category:Terrorism  
Standard errors in parenthesis *p<0.05; **p<0.01; p***<0.001 
MENA 1 
Tactic Independent Variable Coefficient 
Low Popular Satisfaction  13.665***   (2.50) 
High Repression .295***   (.03) 
Low Popular Satisfaction * 
High Repression 
-1.282***    (.21) 
High State Capacity Autocracy 15.034***   (1.88) 
High State Capacity Anocracy  27.697***    (3.45) 
Rural Population -.035   (.07) 
Foreign State Fin. Support -2.335   (2.22) 
Cold War  -.284   (1.27) 
Group Proportion -4.140   (5.59) 
None of the tactics used 
Constant -9.164   (5.45) 
Low Popular Satisfaction  13.889***   (2.36) 
High Repression 1.101***   (.10) 
Low Popular Satisfaction * 
High Repression 
-.648   (.34) 
High State Capacity Autocracy 13.045***   (1.86) 
High State Capacity Anocracy 12.424***  (2.64) 
Rural Population -.072   (.07) 
Foreign State Fin. Support -1.741    (1.28) 
Cold War  -.799   (.68) 
Group Proportion -1.375  (4.21) 
Nonviolent 
Constant -9.739*   (4.70) 
Low Popular Satisfaction  13.306***    (3.73) 
High Repression 2.643***   (.07) 
Low Popular Satisfaction * 
High Repression 
-1.321    (.85) 
High State Capacity Autocracy 18.107   (9.57) 
High State Capacity Anocracy 15.963  (10.08) 
Rural Population -.080   (.31) 
Foreign State Fin. Support  -3.455   (1.93) 
Cold War  1.580  (1.55) 
Group Proportion -5.650  (5.61) 
Constant -12.327**   (4.47) 


















Table 7. Organizations’ Use of Tactics in MENA 1980-2004 
Results after Multinomial Logit 
Base category: None of The Tactics Used 
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05; **p<0.01; p***<0.001 
MENA 2 
Tactic Independent Variable Coefficient 
High State Capacity Autocracy -2.792***   (.50) 
High State Capacity Anocracy -17.925***   (.82) 
Low Popular Support .877   (.90) 
High Repression  -.593***   (.01) 
Low Popular Support* 
High Repression  
-.843  (1.54) 
Foreign State Fin. Support .883   (1.14) 
Group Proportion 2.923   (1.65) 
Rural Population  .002   (.02) 
Cold War -.969   (1.07) 
Nonviolent  
Constant -.284   (.66) 
High State Capacity Autocracy 2.824   (6.56) 
High State Capacity Anocracy -.181  (4.96) 
Low Popular Support -1.44***   (.12) 
High Repression  14.34***   (1.37) 
Low Popular Support* 
High Repression  
.159   (1.08) 
Foreign State Fin. Support -1.36*   (.54) 
Group Proportion -1.92   (1.29) 
Rural Population  -.03   (.23) 
Cold War 2.11***   (.19) 
Guerrilla/Conventional  
Constant -16.32***   (3.10) 
High State Capacity Autocracy -2.21   (1.77) 
High State Capacity Anocracy -17.13***   (1.46) 
Low Popular Support -15.10***   (.79) 
High Repression  -.06   (.14) 
Low Popular Support* 
High Repression  
15.03***  (1.18) 
Foreign State Fin. Support 2.42   (2.09) 
Group Proportion 4.55   (4.76) 
Rural Population  .06   (.08) 
Cold War -.05   (1.14) 
Constant -4.58   (2.81) 

















Table 8. Organizations’ Use of Tactics in Africa 1990-2010 
Results after Multinomial Logit 
Base category: None of the Tactics Used 
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05; **p<0.01; p***<0.001 
Tactic Independent Variable Coefficient 
Low State Capacity Anocracy  .407   (.48) 
Low State Capacity Autocracy  -.710   (.56) 
Low Popular Support  -.253   (1.22) 
High Repression  -.021     (.59) 
Low Popular Support* 
High Repression  
.899   (1.07) 
Rentier State -2.400**    (.71) 
Rural Population -.046**   (.01) 
Nonviolent 
Constant 1.328   (.89) 
Low State Capacity Anocracy  -.122   (.73) 
Low State Capacity Autocracy  .365  (.84) 
Low Popular Support  -1.249*   (.56) 
High Repression  .678   (.43) 
Low Popular Support* 
High Repression  
1.023   (.55) 
Rentier State .429   (.51) 
Rural Population .025   (.02) 
Guerrilla/Conventional  
Constant -1.838   (1.51) 
Low State Capacity Anocracy  -.265   (.64) 
Low State Capacity Autocracy  .2661   (.94) 
Low Popular Support  -13.210***   (.84) 
High Repression  .797   (.90) 
Low Popular Support* 
High Repression  
13.489***   (1.33) 
Rentier State .136   (.65) 
Rural Population -.005   (.03) 
Constant -2.744*   (1.40) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0783 
Terrorism 

















Table 9. Organizations’ Use of Tactics in Africa 1990-2010 
Results after Multinomial Logit 
Base category: Nonviolent  
Standard errors in parentheses *p<0.05; **p<0.01; p***<0.001 
Tactic Independent Variable Coefficient 
Low State Capacity Anocracy  .407   (.48) 
Low State Capacity Autocracy  -.710   (.56) 
Low Popular Support  -.253   (1.22) 
High Repression  -.021     (.59) 
Low Popular Support* 
High Repression  
.899   (1.07) 
Rentier State -2.400**    (.71) 
Rural Population -.046**   (.01) 
Nonviolent 
Constant 1.328   (.89) 
Low State Capacity Anocracy  -.122   (.73) 
Low State Capacity Autocracy  .365  (.84) 
Low Popular Support  -1.249*   (.56) 
High Repression  .678   (.43) 
Low Popular Support* 
High Repression  
1.023   (.55) 
Rentier State .429   (.51) 
Rural Population .025   (.02) 
Guerrilla/Conventional  
Constant -1.838   (1.51) 
Low State Capacity Anocracy  -.265   (.64) 
Low State Capacity Autocracy  .2661   (.94) 
Low Popular Support  -13.210***   (.84) 
High Repression  .797   (.90) 
Low Popular Support* 
High Repression  
13.489***   (1.33) 
Rentier State .136   (.65) 
Rural Population -.005   (.03) 
Constant -2.744*   (1.40) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0783 
Terrorism 



















Table 10. Organizations’ Use of Tactics in Africa 1990-2010 
Results after Multinomial Logit 
Base category: Guerrilla/Conventional 
Standard errors in parenthesis *p<0.05; **p<0.01; p***<0.001 
Tactic Independent Variable Coefficient 
Low State Capacity Anocracy  .122   (.73) 
Low State Capacity Autocracy  -.365   (.84) 
Low Popular Support  1.249*  (.56) 
High Repression  -.678   (.43) 
Low Popular Support* 
High Repression  
-1.023   (.55) 
Rentier State -.429   (.51) 
Rural Population -.025   (.02) 
None of the tactics used 
Constant   1.838   (1.51) 
Low State Capacity Anocracy  .529   (.82) 
Low State Capacity Autocracy  -1.074   (.90) 
Low Popular Support  .996   (1.15) 
High Repression  -.699   (.70) 
Low Popular Support* 
High Repression  
-.124   (.94) 
Rentier State -2.828***   (.70) 
Rural Population -.071**    (.02) 
Nonviolent  
Constant 3.166*   (1.52) 
Low State Capacity Anocracy  -.144   (.77) 
Low State Capacity Autocracy  -.098   (1.19) 
Low Popular Support  -11.961***   (.86) 
High Repression  .119   (1.02) 
Low Popular Support* 
High Repression  
12.466***   (1.28) 
Rentier State -.293   (.68) 
Rural Population -.030   (.03) 
Constant -.906   (1.90) 




















Table 11. Organizations’ Use of Tactics in Africa 1990-2010 
Results after Multinomial Logit 
Base category: Terrorism 
Standard errors in parenthesis *p<0.05; **p<0.01; p***<0.001 
Tactic Independent Variable Coefficient 
Low State Capacity Anocracy  .265   (.64) 
Low State Capacity Autocracy  -.266   (.94) 
Low Popular Support  13.210***   (.84) 
High Repression  -.797   (.90) 
Low Popular Support* 
High Repression  
-13.489***   (1.33) 
Rentier State -.136   (.65) 
Rural Population .005   (.03) 
None of the tactics used 
Constant 2.744*   (1.40) 
Low State Capacity Anocracy  .672   (.77) 
Low State Capacity Autocracy  -.976    (1.15) 
Low Popular Support  12.957***   (1.36) 
High Repression  -.818   (1.13) 
Low Popular Support* 
High Repression  
-12.590***  (1.59) 
Rentier State -2.536**   (.79) 
Rural Population -.041   (.04) 
Nonviolent  
Constant 4.072*   (1.90) 
Low State Capacity Anocracy  .144    (.77) 
Low State Capacity Autocracy  .098   (1.19) 
Low Popular Support  11.961***  (.86) 
High Repression  -.119   (1.02) 
Low Popular Support* 
High Repression  
-12.466***   (1.29) 
Rentier State .293   (.68) 
Rural Population .030   (.03) 
Constant .906   (1.90) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0783 
Guerrilla/Conventional 
  
Observations 495 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
